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“The Making of Rural Healthcare in Colonial Zimbabwe: 
A History of the Ndanga Medical Unit, Fort Victoria, 1930-1960s” 
 




This thesis adopts a social history of medicine approach to explore the contradictions 
surrounding a specific attempt to develop a rural healthcare system in south-eastern colonial 
Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) from the 1930s to the 1960s. Influenced by a combination of 
healthcare discourses and models, in 1930, the colony’s new medical director formulated the 
first comprehensive rural healthcare delivery plan, premised on the idea of ‘medical units’ or 
outlying dispensaries networked around rural hospitals. Beginning with a brief analysis of the 
policy dimension of the scheme, the thesis proceeds to trace its implementation in Ndanga 
District, Fort Victoria Province, by the frontier medical officer, Dr James Kennedy. A 
determined, independent-minded but also unorthodox character, Dr Kennedy attempted with 
partial success to adapt a curative biomedical model to the local social milieu.  
 Placing this attempt within a wider context and tracing its waxing and waning over 
three decades, the thesis illustrates the challenges of developing efficient rural healthcare 
services within a context of colonial and cultural encounters. Insights about these 
complexities are drawn from a relatively rich, but imperfect, collection of evidence, including    
a variety of policy documents, operational records and correspondence, annual health reports, 
reports of commissions of inquiry, memoirs, published eyewitness accounts, photographs and 
oral testimonies. The thesis explores this evidence for underlying motives, recurrent practices 
and the key structures and discourses that drove rural medical policy-making and practice.  
The main argument of the thesis is that the Ndanga Medical Unit, as this pioneer 
















between innovative endeavours to control disease on the one hand, and the need to fulfil 
broader colonial ambitions on the other. It further argues that, precisely because of this dual 
motive, African communities’ responses were equally ambivalent as they selectively 
embraced the beneficial aspects and attempted with mixed results to reject intrusive and 
ineffective practices. The aim of the thesis is to take the historiography of colonial medicine 
beyond the polarising and increasingly unproductive debates that have depicted colonial 
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Rethinking colonial healthcare  
 
The main goal of this thesis is the systematic examination of the historically important case 
study of the Ndanga Medical Unit with the objective of re-thinking the precise nature of 
colonial healthcare within the context of ongoing scholarly debates. Launched in the early 
1930s in rural Fort Victoria Province, colonial Zimbabwe (hereafter Southern Rhodesia), the 
Ndanga Medical Unit – which at its zenith comprised ten medical stations – was one of the 
first two experiments of the reformative ‘medical units’ scheme. This innovative, albeit 
colonially inclined, model for delivering rural district healthcare services was formulated in 
1930 by the British colony’s principal medical officer as he attempted to reform the colony’s 
enclavist medical services and address the existing health challenges among African 
communities.  
 
In addition to the intrinsic historical value of the medical units model as a distinctive 
variation of colonial healthcare, the ongoing historical debates surrounding the ways in which 
colonial public health officials understood and dealt with African health problems motivated 
and profoundly shaped this thesis. What were the basic motives of colonial healthcare? Did 
colonial officials comprehensively understand the health challenges faced by Africans? Were 
colonial healthcare initiatives innovative or not? Were they ill conceived? These apparently 
simple questions have occupied scholars for a long time now and the output is dizzying in 
terms of both quality and quantity.  
 
However, despite a great deal of painstaking research and theorising on the subject, pinning 


















 has proven to be a challenging affair. To date, a wide range of interpretations 
have been proffered and theoretical and historiographical lines of inquiry have waxed and 
waned, leaving the subject essentially an ‘unfinished agenda’.
2
 Three successive scholarly 
currents are discernible: the triumphalist tradition, the critical postcolonial historiography and 
the newly emerging revisionist scholarship. 
 
Whereas the earliest interpretations tended to be Whiggish and laudatory, mainly depicting 
colonial medicine as a benign force for good and empire as the ‘white man’s burden’,
3
 in the 
postcolonial historiography colonial medicine attracted scrutiny that was much more critical. 
A growing number of scholars started to depict colonial medicine as a ‘sword of empire’, a 
curatively-focused progeny of imperial tropical medicine, a handmaiden of evangelical 
Christian interests and civilising agendas, a conduit for colonial power and social control and 
a willing instrument of colonial capital.
4
 Because these impulses tended to be essentially self-
serving, ‘the health of colonized people deteriorated under colonial rule’.
5
 This is said to have 
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Although departing from different theoretical and historiographical formations, including 
Marxist, Foucauldian and cultural theories, as well as the new imperial and social histories of 
medicine, the common platform that these analytical traditions have shared is that colonial 
healthcare systems were poorly conceived, either makeshift or overwhelmingly self-serving.
7
 
The health needs of the majority of colonial subjects were either poorly understood or totally 
ignored, particularly before World War I.
8
 At the same time, because it was possessed by 
professionals with increasingly powerful scientific explanatory models,
9
 biomedical 
knowledge provided colonial officials with the ‘skills and rules’ for colonial domination.
10
 As 
Poonam Bala and Amy Kaler put it, ‘medical knowledge was part of colonial authorities’ 




Other scholars have emphasised its appetite for corporeal control, which David Arnold has 
defined as ‘colonizing the body’.
12
 Megan Vaughan has also expertly addressed the colonial 
pre-occupation with the elaboration of notions of difference as one of the defining features of 
colonial medicine. In Vaughan’s own words, African spaces were perceived as repositories of 
‘death, disease, and degeneration, inscribed through a set of recurring and simple dualisms – 
black and white, good and evil, light and dark’.
13
 According to Anna Crozier, this 
‘sensationalism favoured explanations fro disease that confirmed implicit racial connections 
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between ill health and the African native....’
14
 The colonial public health discourse was ‘built 
around the colonial cultural and racial differentiation’, which was in itself an important aspect 




However, as Juanita De Barros et al have correctly noted, ‘health and medicine in colonial 
environments is one of the most active, contested, and fascinating areas of the history of 
medicine’.
16
 Indeed, some of the major pillars of this critical historiographical colossus are 
beginning to be challenged. An emerging brand of scholarship, which I have here labelled 
‘revisionist scholarship’, has begun to point to some well-informed efforts made by colonial 
public health officials to deploy the proper tools of medical research and healthcare delivery 
to deal effectively with the recurrent colonial public health problems. Three particular 
scholars exemplify this newer historiography, which is yet to assume a distinctive paradigm. 
The first one is Miriam S. Chaiken, who has done work on the historical design of particular 
colonial healthcare programmes in eastern Africa. In a tellingly entitled article, ‘Primary 
Healthcare Initiatives in Colonial Kenya’, Chaiken has made the point that, ‘while Kenyan 
colonial medical services were fundamentally hierarchical, and often paternalistic and 
coercive, they also managed to implement effective programs that were nearly identical to 




Although the perceived link between colonial health policy and the tenets of primary health 
care has had a relatively long postcolonial history, going back to the 1977 Oxford 
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Symposium on ‘Health in Tropical Africa during the Colonial Period’,
18
 in making this 
argument Chaiken has had the benefit of a large corpus of comparative literature. The 
argument made by Chaiken was clearly framed with the knowledge that colonial healthcare 
initiatives have long been criticised for overlooking the basic healthcare needs of the 
colonised populations.
19
 Indeed, in interpreting the intentions behind some of the initiatives, 





The second scholar who has attempted to rehabilitate certain aspects of colonial medicine is 
Michael Jennings. In the field of research focusing on colonial Tanganyika, Jennings has 
come out particularly in defence of missionary medicine which he reckons ‘has suffered in 
the historiography from a series of broad generalisations and misconceptions’.
21
 According to 
Jennings, one major misconception that has been peddled about missionary medicine is that it 
was ‘overwhelmingly curative’ in focus. In contrast, Jennings argues that the approach of 
missionaries to maternal and child healthcare in Tanganyika belies this claim, which was first 
disingenuously popularised by colonial state officials. According to Jennings, such work ‘fell 
easily into the preventive medicine arena’ and the missionaries demonstrated a commitment 
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The last and very latest scholar to challenge the radical critiques of colonial medicine is 
Helen Tilley, whose major ideas are embodied in a new book, Africa as a Living 
Laboratory.
23
 In this book, Tilley argues that during the 1920s and especially the 1930s, 
colonial medical knowledge in British Africa began to witness some ‘epistemic shifts’ as 
‘long-standing concerns with hygiene and public health were gradually being coupled to 
significant new insights within ecological science, immunology, nutrition, and 
epidemiology’.
24
 Colonial healthcare policy thinkers started to engage in original and frank 
self-critique and to embrace holistic definitions of health, which recognised that ‘a modern 
approach to medicine meant collaborating across territorial departments, tackling cure and 




Taking particular aim at the political economy approach that has emphasised the fact that 
colonial healthcare initiatives were mainly structured by ill-conceived economic motives, 
Tilley argues instead, that there was a lot more at stake in colonial healthcare than mere crude 
economic considerations.
26
 Moreover, according to Tilley, colonial officials were not 
ignorant of the fact that poverty and development were key determinants of health. Quoting 
the deliberations of the 1933 East African medical research conference where officials 
admitted that ‘ill-health in Africa is to no small extent a matter of poverty, poor nutrition, and 
fly-borne disease’, Tilley flags some notable ‘shift in perspective’. The widespread nature of 
this shift was exemplified by the second League of Nations Health Organisation’s 1935 Pan-
African Health Conference, which emphasised the ‘economic advance’ of rural African 
communities as a way of stamping out endemic diseases such as malaria.
27
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1870-1950 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011). 
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Tilley further argues that this groundswell of shifts in thinking was embodied in the two 
companion research compilations, E. B. Worthington’s Science in Africa (1938) and Lord 
Hailey’s An African Survey (1938). These works, especially the former, criticised the 
fragmentation of early colonial healthcare services and the ill-conceived interventions that 
tended to ignore local knowledge and customs.
28
 Tilley concludes by arguing that colonial 
medical officials actually anticipated later radical assessments epitomised by scholars such as 
Lesley Doyal who argued in a 1979 political economy of health classic, that an 
overwhelmingly curative approach that ignored ‘the fundamental social and environmental 




Tilley reckons that this critique is similar to the comment raised by Hailey’s An African 
Survey, which stated that a great deal of sickness in Africa was caused by ‘... poor physical 
conditions, due to poverty and environment....’
30
 Similar views, according to Tilley, were 
espoused by the leadership of colonial public health departments, such that, as Tilley says, 
‘they would probably have been surprised to learn that so many scholars and social critiques 
would later accuse them of being oblivious to these patterns, when they constantly confronted 
them’.
31
 In Tilley’s view, therefore, many of the issues raised by scholarly critics later in the 
postcolonial period were actually first raised by colonial medical officials themselves as they 
sought to reform their initially defective approaches.  
 
This latest partial rehabilitation of colonial healthcare poses some new challenges to 
historians, mainly because, since the discrediting of the old, triumphalist historiography, the 
                                                 
28
 Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory, p. 212. 
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 Doyal, with Imogen, The Political Economy of Health, p. 256. 
30
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social history of colonial medicine has been overwhelmingly dominated by scholars who 
have depicted it as mainly a ‘cultural artefact carrying its own assumptions and prejudices’.
32
 
More importantly, the works by Chaiken, Jennings and Tilley present historians with new 
opportunities by making it urgently necessary to revisit the historical record and carefully 
analyse new case studies to establish the validity of their claims and the possibility of 
generalising them. This thesis is an attempt to take up that challenge. 
 
If it is true that colonial medical officials possessed valid knowledge about African healthcare 
challenges and attempted to formulate appropriate initiatives, the second task is to ask why, 
on the eve of decolonisation, African healthcare systems were severely defective.
33
 And 
precisely why was this so at a time when medical science in general had shown enormous 
technical and conceptual capabilities? Indeed, why did preventive public health remain 
subordinate to curative medicine? Or, as Shula Marks and Neil Andersson showed in their 
postcolonial review of the health profile of southern Africa, why is it that the burdens of 
disease had ‘come to be differentiated according to skin colour’?
34
   
 
Using the Ndanga Medical Unit case, this thesis systematically explores these questions. The 
history of the Ndanga Unit is traced from its emergence in the early 1930s to the 1960s when 
it had gone beyond its highest point and was out of step with convention. During this time, 
decolonisation was also beginning to take a definite shape thereby altering the dynamics of 
what used to be a colonial healthcare scheme. The decolonisation aspect deserves its own 
separate study. The greater part of the period covered in the thesis coincides with the time 
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 Tomkins, ‘Colonial Administration in British Africa during the Influenza Epidemic’, p. 61. 
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spent at Ndanga by Dr James Kennedy, the long-serving district medical officer and chief 
developer of this pioneering scheme. An innovative, energetic but also controversial 
character, Dr Kennedy firmly imprinted his own stamp as he spearheaded the development of 
the Unit from its infancy in 1932.  
 
Of particular interest here is Kennedy’ attempt to implant his own biomedical model onto 
selected local social structures. Or, put differently, his efforts to run clinics along community 
lines in order to make biomedicine a popular issue. Therefore, in addition to the very 
important policy origins and framework, the scheme is analysed from its operational point of 
view, paying particular attention to the ways in which the medical officer blended his own 
‘frontier’ biomedical vision with the mandate of developing a district healthcare system that 
he received from the Public Health Department. By frontier biomedical vision it is meant the 
determination by the district medical officer to present himself as a pioneer of modern 
medicine in an area that was to all intents and purposes regarded as terra incognita. The form 
of practice that resulted from this perception forms the backbone of the thesis. 
 
The relations between colonial medical doctors, especially those medical officers in outlying 
districts, and Public Health Departments have become an issue of growing interest among 
historians.
35
 Perhaps this is because of the nature of these relations and the insights they 
provide to understand the workings of colonial medicine. Because of the small size of the 
average colonial bureaucracy, or the ‘thin white line’ as A. H. M. Kirk-Greene described it,
36
 
colonial district medical officials were usually afforded a great deal of latitude, a situation 
                                                 
35
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that allowed for the flourishing of divergent visions and, inevitably, promoted conflicts. As 
Bala and Kaler have argued, there were always ‘clashes of interest between those who 
believed themselves intellectually qualified to prescribe and those who took healing as part of 
a wider administrative practice’.
37
 It was in the instability of these relations that the true 
nature, intentions and motives of colonial healthcare systems were often clearly brought to 
the surface. This thesis therefore pays attention to the ways in which healthcare ideas and 
practices were forged both at national and local levels as healthcare policy was conceived and 
implemented by medical officers such as Dr Kennedy. 
 
Moreover, the history of the Ndanga scheme is also explored fr m the perspective of the 
subordinate African medical staff and patients and their communities. The colonial 
experiences of African medical staff and patients alike have also become areas of growing 
scholarly interest, perhaps because of the increasingly felt need to project the African voice in 
postcolonial studies. Attempts to estimate the extent of the success of the project of colonial 
hegemony and the huge impact of subaltern theories are the other possible explanations for 
this interest.
38
 The strategy used in this thesis was to draw analytical insights from these 
different African groups, based on their dynamic engagement and critique of colonial 
medicine. In other words, their voices are used here as a historical index with which to 
evaluate the quality and contemporary acceptability of the medical services examined in the 
thesis.  At the same time, the thesis acknowledges that these people acted within a much 
                                                 
37
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distorted colonial environment. Thus, their actions should be understood mainly as subaltern 
struggles for a voice in an environment of skewed power relationships. 
 
Through this multifaceted analysis, the thesis makes the important observation that in an 
effort to discredit the unashamedly laudatory historiography, the majority of medical 
historians might have somehow overlooked the innovative side of biomedicine or, in some 
cases, overemphasised its selfish motives and controversial methodologies. Having explored 
the Ndanga case from different perspectives, the picture that emerges is that it indeed 
possesses some potentially progressive features. For instance, in the context of the interwar 
period the idea of a district healthcare system, which was embodied in the medical units 
scheme, was far ahead of its time. Attempting to develop a district healthcare system among 
subordinate populations was even more radical. In addition, Kennedy’s attempt to adapt his 
curative biomedical model to the existing social milieu was novel.  
 
Other scholars have found similar innovative ideas in other colonial contexts and the Pholela 
health centre of South Africa comes into mind. Pioneered in the late 1930s by Sydney and 
Emily Kark, the Pholela project of rural Natal was a community-oriented healthcare scheme 
organised on the tenets of social medicine, evidence that some colonial practitioners were 
indeed far-sighted.
39
 South Africa had its brief but important experience with social medicine, 
which began in the late 1930s, flowered in the 1940s and atrophied in the 1950s.
40
 As Alan 
Jeeves has noted, ‘social medicine in South Africa challenged some of the central orthodoxies 
of modern medical practice’.
41
 With all their oversights, such schemes like the Pholela and 
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the Southern Rhodesian medical units model cannot therefore be ignored as examples of 
early forms of healthcare practice partly driven by innovative ideas. 
 
However, the newer historiography is yet to answer some very important questions too. For 
instance, although the Ndanga Unit was partly founded upon particular forms of vision and 
energy, its wider outlook remained decidedly colonial. The reform discourse that kept it in 
existence remained couched in racial terms, the infrastructure was makeshift, and the staffing 
was organised on racial lines. The promotion of new health concepts among African 
communities was also invariably an onslaught on African habits and ways of life. Moreover, 
although a potentially good example of an early model of organised district healthcare, the 
Ndanga Unit was, by the 1960s, still suffering from too great a focus on curative care.  
 
In this regard, it was not different from other schemes in British colonial Africa. Therefore, 
one could ask, what became of the ‘epistemic shifts’ emphasised by Tilley? Moreover, what 
happened to the valorised primary healthcare initiatives? The problems of an overwhelmingly 
curatively focused biomedical model cannot be over-emphasised. Almost invariably, this 
model of biomedical care leads to a gross maldistribution of facilities and resources.
42
 Some 
colonial officials such as Southern Rhodesia’s A. P. Martin (medical director, 1935-1945), as 
even Tilley correctly noted, did admit that curative medicine was bad medicine because it 
merely touched ‘the fringe of the problem’.
43
 However, such statements seemed to have 
remained mere rhetoric as very little was done to remedy the defective colonial healthcare 
systems. 
 
                                                 
42
 Doyal with Imogen, The Political Economy of Health, p. 256. 
43
















Therefore, as an attempt to orchestrate these debates in a new direction, this thesis argues that 
colonial medicine was essentially a dynamic tension between the colonial ambitions of 
colonists and the innovative ideas of different experts. That modern medicine, including its 
colonial variant, was as much driven by innovation as by colonial impulses cannot be 
gainsaid. As Nayan Shah has persuasively argued,  
Public health investigation produced a repertoire of precautions and prophylactics to 
dampen the spread of contagious diseases. Through strategies of sanitation, 
vaccination, and therapeutic care, public health extended human longevity, increased 




As an emblem of modernity par excellence, medicine became the arena for the ‘deployment 




However, it was precisely because of these capabilities that modern biomedicine, as a 
recognisably autonomous body of knowledge, was enlisted for the purposes of state-making. 
Even in cases where knowledge was still weak, the hope that ‘at the intersections of 
medicine, science and public health, in areas of research and application, the tools will 
become available to reduce the burden of disease’,
46
 was enough to make biomedicine an 
attractive tool in the hands of the colonisers. Medicine became a ‘tool of empire’
47
 simply 
because it promised to conquer certain forms of infectious diseases and to extend ‘the 
biomedical model to the non-medical world’.
48
 Indeed, it provided colonial officials with 
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In that context, the colonial (medical) scientist had a dual mandate ‘to serve the state and to 
serve science’.
50
 Furthermore, as the thesis seeks to show in the case of the Ndanga Unit, the 
responses of the African communities further illustrated the dual identity of biomedicine as 
an innovative body of therapeutic knowledge on the one hand, and a tool of colonial power 
and authority on the other. People selectively embraced and helped to develop those 
beneficial aspects of biomedicine, but rejected those that projected colonial power. Moreover, 
Vaughan was addressing the dual or dichotomous character of colonial medicine when she 
noted that, ‘In colonial medical discourse there was tension between an analysis of the social 
and cultural influences on disease, which naturalised “difference”, and a “scientific” model of 
disease, tended towards universalization and blurring of difference’.
51
   
 
Through the Ndanga case study, therefore, this thesis attempts to show that the progressive 
and retrogressive aspects of colonial medicine were two sides of the same coin.
52
 Moreover, 
the thesis further illustrates the argument first developed by Doyal that the retrogressive 
politics of colonial healthcare tended to eclipse the innovative ideas and reforms that came up 
from time to time. According to Doyal, although between the late 1920s and 1930s there was 
new awareness about the causal connections between poverty and disease within African 
communities – precisely the point reiterated by Tilley – the resulting reforms were set to 
‘take place within the existing framework of [distorted] social relations – the structural 
constraints of colonialism were not challenged’.
53
 Therefore, colonial healthcare reforms 
were always imbued with a split character.  
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Colonial Healthcare, African Voices: Historiographical Debates 
Perhaps it is because of this duality that, as social historian of colonial medicine, Harriet 
Deacon, has perceptively noted, scholars often find themselves in a “Catch-22” situation, 
‘arguing (a) that Western medicine was a detrimental agent of colonialism, but also (b) that 
black people were disadvantaged because they did not have equal access to its practitioners 
and therapies’.
54
 This dilemma speaks to the challenges encountered by historians as they try 
to understand colonial medicine as a historical phenomenon. How can colonial subjects be 
disadvantaged when medicine was detrimental in the first case? This suggests a complex 
identity, which this thesis is attempting to disentangle and illuminate. 
 
When the new social history of medicine increasingly assumed a paradigmatic structure from 
the 1970s through the 1980s to the 1990s, historians were keen to discredit the earlier, largely 
celebratory, ‘traditional’ historiography.
55
 Apparently, the best way of doing this was to 
depict medicine as a surrogate of narrow c lonial interests. Hence there emerged the now 
well-known narrative, that from the outset, colonial medicine was demographically and 
geographically enclavist in nature, focusing primarily on the health needs of white settlers 
and, in a minimal way, the health of Africans in employment.
56
 The great majority of African 
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The concern with rural health, which became more pronounced after World War I, was a 
product of the enlightened self-interest of the colonial officials as it dawned on them that 
there was no surer way of guaranteeing a secure environment for colonists than dealing with 
the rural ‘reservoirs’ of disease. The needs to forestall demographic collapse and the 
deterioration of rural communities, as well as to ensure healthy labour supplies were the other 
pragmatic considerations.
58
 As Randall Packard has put it, ‘European interest in the “health 




Others believe that colonial public health departments were jolted by the health ramifications 
of World War I as wartime recruitment exposed a great deal of hitherto unknown levels if 
disease among the Africans.
60
 A few dissenting voices such as Osaak Olumwullah argues that 
the increasing attention to rural health was an ideological rather a material issue because the 
colonial state was keen to project its benign visibility through dispensaries. For Olumwullah, 
the aim was to take advantage of the post-war context of reconstruction and ‘invent a human 
face’ following long periods of neglect.
 61
 This argument ties in with John Illife’s view that 




The overarching theme shaping these scholarly views is that the colonial healthcare system 
was initially operated along the lines of racial privilege before it was opened up, in a limited 
way, following the discovery that such an approach was self-defeating. The essence of this 
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argument is further emphasised in the literature that has depicted colonial medicine as an 
‘integral element in the establishment and maintenance of European status and authority’.
63
 
The abiding interest of historians has been to explore the workings of colonialism through the 
healthcare archive. The unforeseen results of this have been that the exclusive focus on 
colonialism in medicine has led to the overlooking of certain epistemic changes in the 
planning and practice of medical care in colonial environments. In other words, the history of 
colonial healthcare has been somehow flattened, and perhaps understandably so, and seen 
mainly as a history of colonialism. 
 
In addition, with a few exceptions,
64
 the post-World War reforms have been depicted as 
solely colony-specific responses to changing local epidemiological circumstances or as 
adjustments to shifting notions of inter-racial public health and the minimum requirements of 
colonial labour welfare. The aim of this thesis is to show that the Southern Rhodesian reforms 
were partly influenced by a broader wave of international shifts in thinking about the 
healthcare of marginal population groups. Certainly, this was the case in interwar Europe.
65
  
It also attempts to show that these changes were driven by a combination of incompatible 
factors.  
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The thesis will also offer commentary on whether the responses of African communities 
profoundly altered the conduct of colonial medicine. The picture that emerges from much of 
the literature is that Africans selectively embraced aspects of biomedicine, rejected the most 
intrusive elements or those they did not understand or believe in, and contested and 
reformulated others. In fact, many scholars have tended to prefer ambiguity as the appropriate 
word to describe these complex responses, whereby biomedical elements were perceived as 
both potent and foreign, or even dangerous, all at once.
66
  
Frantz Fanon, an avid critic of colonial power, argues that the colonised peoples used their 
reason to say ‘yes’ to certain biomedical innovations of the colonisers, but were cautious not 
to become a ‘prisoner of the entire system’.
67
 On her part Hunt suggests that this cautious 
acceptance was filtered through symbolic practices and objects.
68
 This reaction through 
domestic models of thought is also shared by Luise White, who, in her study of colonial 
Uganda, demonstrates how medical encounters were attended by rumours by which people 
tried to make sense of the newly emerging biomedical world.
69
 In the same study, White 




Fanon also talks about the issues of discontinuation of treatment and absconding as some of 
the actions by which the colonised patients registered their displeasure with colonial 
medicine.
71
  In like fashion, in his study of the leprosy management initiative at Ngomahuru, 
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Southern Rhodesia, Mazarire reveals that patient desertions were a corollary of enforced 
confinement of leper patients. As for the communities surrounding the institution, Mazarire 
says that they shunned the institution because they were never consulted when it was placed 
in their midst, and also because it fouled their spiritual and ecological environments.
72
 
Overall, Africans’ responses to colonial medicine were conditioned by their wider outlook as 
many people remained resolutely pluralistic in their behavior.  
However, the complicated question that begs to be answered is whether these varied 
responses cumulatively constituted some form of agency? In other words, how much of an 
impact did these various responses make have on the conduct of colonial medicine? Did they 
contribute to altering its conduct in profound or only superficial ways, or at all? How did they 
benefit the colonised peoples themselves, if at all? Scholars are very much divided on this 
question of African agency. Those who have approached the subject from the perspective of 
‘the weapons of the weak’
73
 seem to suggest that Africans made a profound impact through 
their responses to colonial medicine or colonial rule in general. In her study of the history of 
domination and contestation in a South African society, Jean Comaroff argues that, in its 
efforts to anchor itself by supplanting pre-colonial systems, the colonial capitalist system was 
‘determined, in significant respects, by the local systems it … sought to engulf.’
74
 Frederick 
Cooper has also suggested that ‘the institutions of the colonial state ... did not operate as their 
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These profound conclusions have also been shared by some scholars of colonial medicine. 
White, for instance, has remarked that ‘the negotiations between African and European 
health-care workers were almost always shaped by African demands and resistances’.
76
 
Gorge Ndege also posits that African agency was central in shaping the colonial Kenyan 
health service delivery strategy during the interwar period.
77
 This transformative agency has 
also been ascribed to African healthcare workers (orderlies or medical assistants). Although 
previously seen by others as either the success stories of colonialism’s hegemonic 
tendencies,
78
 or as an ambiguous group of professionals who joined the colonial medical 
service for ‘altruistic service’, ‘power’, and ‘blatant self-interest’,
79
 African colonial 
healthcare workers have recently begun to be presented as powerful ‘middle figures’ or 
‘intermediaries’ in studies by historians such as Walima T. Kalusa.
80
  
Kalusa strongly believes that, because of their unfamiliarity with African languages and 
cultures, the European medics abdicated to African auxiliaries the important task of 
translating their medicine and by so doing they ‘unwittingly rendered their medicine 
vulnerable to (re)interpretation in ways that they could neither imagine nor control’. The net 
effect of this was that, as Kalusa argues, biomedicine ended up being embellished with 
‘pagan’ tropes that were detested by medical officials.
81
 These views are echoed in the work 
by Benjamin N. Lawrence et al on colonial African intermediaries.
82
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These conclusions are built on updated notions of concepts such as ‘synthesis’, 
‘accommodation’, ‘adaptation’ and ‘hybridity’, which were developed in the 1970s and 
1980s, although they are now increasingly seen to be having limited applicability.
83
 Ndege 
has particularly used the term ‘accommodation’ together with ‘compromise’ to suggest that 
there were colonial ‘negotiations’ – another term which is now being deployed widely by 
scholars. Although this thesis acknowledges that Africans certainly strove to appropriate, 
contest, and reform the colonial biomedical culture selectively, there is lesser conviction 
about the overall impact of these heroic struggles on the essence and conduct of colonial 
medicine per se.  
There is a sense in which the postcolonial, subaltern turn in historical writing has tended to 
magnify African contestation of each and every aspect of colonial power excessively, and 
have, in the process, overstretched the instrumentality of such actions in ways that threaten to 
liquidate even colonialism itself. One should hasten to note that this complex question of 
African agency has increasingly compelled historians into the false situation of having to 
make an unequivocal judgment about whether the colonial state was strong (or hegemonic) or 
weak.   
Yet, those who have closely applied their minds to this question of the ‘strength’ or 
‘weakness’ of the colonial state have not found unequivocal answers to it. Bruce Berman 
was, for instance,   
… struck by the two very different and apparently contradictory faces of the colonial 
state in Kenya that it depicts. On the one hand, there is the “weak” state, the 
paternalistic mediator struggling to maintain a precarious sovereignty over contending 
interests of colonial society ... it appears as a facade of power ... constantly threatened 
by crisis and struggle. On the other hand, however, there is the “strong” colonial state, 
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the potent bureaucratic agent of imperialism. By coercion, indirect pressure and 
material inducement it smashed the self-sufficiency of indigenous pre-capitalist 
societies and managed their articulation with metropolitan capital ... and containing 
and suppressing indigenous social forces. This state was a powerful instrument of 
political domination and structural transformation.
84
  
If the colonial state defies categorisation as either weak or strong, how then can it be 
characterised in its engagement with indigenous African forces? Fanon’s contention that 
colonialism essentially destabilised indigenous societies because of its negative processes 
such that ‘the very life of the colonized can manifest itself defensively in a more or less 
clandestine way’, will be found to be instructive.
85
 Sandra E. Greene also shares similar 
sentiments, and has noted that ‘the ability of the colonized to choose what to accept and what 
to reject was circumscribed by the power dynamics embedded in the colonial enterprise’.
86
 
Thus, although colonialism was contested and fragmented, its visceral processes were 
inherently distorting. If, for instance, the need for medical assistants thrust Africans into the 
middle of colonial healthcare systems as cultural brokers, the medical hierarchies of (white) 
doctor- (black) nurse, imposed new professional structural constraints and cast these 
assistants to the margins of power. As for African doctors, we all know that colonial health 
departments were very slow in developing this category of elite health workers. It is therefore 
the contention of this thesis, that although Africans attempted to ameliorate their positions of 
subjugation, the environment was largely not permissive. However, the thesis also uses the 
Africans’ engagement with colonial medicine as a commentary on the nature of the latter.  
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The Case Study  
The intrinsic historical value of the Ndanga Medical Unit lies on three levels. First, the Unit 
was the product of the pioneering rural healthcare delivery concept that was formulated out of 
a number of ideas drawn from different metropolitan, imperial and local sources. At policy 
level, therefore, the Ndanga Unit provides a rich case to explore the identity of colonial 
healthcare within a broader context. Secondly, the implementation of the Ndanga scheme 
mainly by Dr. Kennedy and his subordinate staff between 1932 and 1959, spawned 
rudimentary but enduring forms of curative medicine practised within community and family 
contexts.  
 
Thirdly, the African communities interacted with the Ndanga Unit in various intriguing ways. 
During the implementation of the scheme, they provided the required resources and 
knowledge and then presented themselves at the medical stations as patients and/or patient-
helpers. However, they also undermined those procedures that contradicted their own 
pluralistic beliefs. The Ndanga Unit, therefore, provides multiple perspectives from which to 
assess the nature of colonial healthcare and formulate concrete conclusions. One is able to 
move seamlessly from policy through practice to community responses. 
 
 Moreover, as the epitome of one of the most extensively organised and longest-surviving, 
district-based, rural medical schemes to emerge in interwar colonial southern and central 
Africa, perhaps rivalled only by the Belgian Congolese foreami experiment,
87
 the Ndanga 
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Unit may be of great comparative interest to both historians of colonial healthcare and 
contemporary health policy-makers. Choosing this case study was, therefore, based on both 
its own independent appeal and its capacity to illuminate the questions under review. 
Methodologically, using the case study as a research strategy enables us to address the ‘need 
for specific understanding through documentation of concrete details’.
88
 Indeed, medical 
historians have often found it necessary to often resort to local case studies in their 
descriptions of broader historical phenomena.
89
 In this case, although the broader context is 
an intrinsic part of the study, only a micro-historical study is capable of giving prominence to 
the voices of the local, subject communities.  
 
The sources 
Important to the compilation of this thesis were the sources. With all their limitations and 
oversights, three main types of sources were used. These included different types of 
documents, oral testimonies and visual materials such as photographs. The documentary 
sources, which form the backbone of the thesis, were mainly collected from archives and 
document repositories in Zimbabwe and Britain. The documentary reconstruction of the 
history of the Ndanga Unit from the beginning of this research in 2008 was both challenging 
and rewarding. While the period up to the late 1940s was fairly well covered by different 
types of documentary material, the period thereafter tended to be sometimes patchy in 
documentary terms.  
The accessible documentary materials, which included official operational records, 
correspondence, annual reports and reports of commissions of inquiry are housed at the 
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National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ). During the greater part of the period when this 
research was undertaken, the NAZ, just like other public institutions in Zimbabwe, was going 
through difficult economic times. Therefore, research for this thesis, especially in 2009, was 
frequently interrupted by non-availability of electricity and the associated file retrieval 
challenges. Abrupt ends of documentary series, for instance, the Native Commissioners’ 
annual reports, often frustrated the pursuit of certain trends. Patient admission and treatment 
records were also virtually non-existent.  
However, at the end it was possible to piece together key policy and experiential issues from 
the available records and to make an unequivocal case about the duality of colonial healthcare 
as it was practiced in Ndanga. The National Archives of Zimbabwe’s adjunct regional records 
office in Masvingo yielded some additional insights on epidemics covering the period from 
roughly the mid-1950s to the 1970s. Ongoing research in Cape Town, and stints at the British 
National Archives at Kew in London, the Bristol Records Office and the Bodleian Libraries 
(especially Rhodes House) in Oxford, yielded important international perspectives on the 
colonial health policy in general and Robert Askins’ ideas in particular. Askins, the originator 
of the medical units scheme, had worked in the Bristol Public Health Department for many 
years before moving to Southern Rhodesia. Exploring his previous experience was therefore 
important.  
However, the main weakness of these records is that they do not shed light on the private 
lives of the two key figures of this story, Askins and Kennedy. No personal papers for either 
could be found. Alas, outside the official memoranda and reports, the two did not spell out 
















by Kennedy in 1957.
90
 The other inherent weakness of the documentary sources is that they 
usually tend to reflect the views of the views of colonial medical officials.  
Because of the lack of a writing tradition in rural Southern Rhodesia, the views of the 
communities that are projected in documentary sources are mostly the interpretations of those 
in positions of power. To make them useful as a source of the Africans’ voices, these sources 
were read against the grain for subaltern perspectives. Although criticised by some for being 
limited by the range of issues ‘determined in advance’ by the dominant archive,
91
 reading 
against the grain has remained the choice strategy in the absence of other viable sources. 
Indeed, as Carolyn Hamilton et al have argued, although archives ‘are often both documents 
of exclusion and monuments to particular configurations of power’ the ‘traces of marginal 
lives are by no means absent from mainstream archives’.
92
 
The second important source of insights were the oral testimonies of a few surviving 
informants who sometimes told the story of the Ndanga Medical Unit with nostalgia and with 
all the vividness they could possibly muster. Since Jan Vansina’s pioneering attempt to 
codify the usage of African oral traditions,
93
 this resource has been taken seriously in African 
historiography.
94
  Although concerns have been raised about its reliability, there seems to be 
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consensus that such challenges are not insurmountable. Indeed, even ‘native nostalgia’ is now 
being taken seriously as a window into the complex world inhabited by colonial subjects.
95
  
Lyn Schumaker called for oral histories of health that can uncover ‘the very different 
histories told by local people compared with those told by the scientists, the… experts and the 
archives’.
96
 In the Ndanga case, a few key eyewitnesses had good memories of Kennedy, 
which were useful in the re-creation of his personal outlook as perceived from ‘below’, rather 
than only from above. To keep in line with ethical sensitivities guiding research on human 
subjects, the names of surviving patients interviewed were not reproduced in the main text.  
The last form of evidence used here are the photographs. These were helpful in projecting a 
vivid visual image of particular aspects of the Unit’s history. Indeed, as the popular Chinese 
proverb says, a picture is worth a thousand words. Although visual images have become 
staple sources in other historical genres,
97
 in medical history there is still hesitation, possibly 
because of the sensitivity of many of the photographs. Indeed, some of the patient 
photographs utilized in this thesis do raise ethical dilemmas relating to the fact that these 
pictures were taken by colonial doctors probably without the patient’s consent within a 
context of unequal power relations. The photographs in question mostly depict patients with 
particular conditions. However, some are already in the public domain as they have been 
published in colonial medical journals before. Drawing on them in this thesis is meant to 
raise, but perhaps not necessarily resolve, the issues of objectification involved.   
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The thesis is divided into seven chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 provides the historical 
background to healthcare reform in 1930, and therefore covers the period from colonization 
in 1890 to 1930. Its main concern is to trace the emergence and development of the African 
rural healthcare question, and the attempts made before 1930 to address it. It notes the failure 
of medical officials to formulate a comprehensive programme of rural medical care, and 
argues that by 1930 the colony indeed required a fresh approach. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
advent of Askins as the colony’s new medical director and the shifting trajectory of rural 
healthcare under his administration. The chapter is particularly interested in the origin of the 
medical units scheme, and the international concepts from which he drew inspiration.   
Chapter 3 and 4 both focus on the implementation of the pioneering medical unit in Fort 
Victoria Province by Dr. Kennedy from 1932. Chapter 3 focuses mainly on the struggle to 
commence the scheme in the context of the Great Depression, settler agitation, and the 
changing political landscape. The chapter illuminates the crucial role played by Kennedy and 
the support he received from local African communities in setting up the Unit’s nine outlying 
dispensaries, especially after the death of Askins in 1935, and the virtual abandonment of the 
concept of medical units. Chapter 4 takes the story forward by focusing on the medical 
approach of Kennedy, with specific reference to his attempts to adapt his biomedical model 
to the existing social circumstances. This chapter explores the waxing and waning of 
Kennedy’s ‘very own special brand of social medicine’.    
Chapter 5 explores the complex position of African medical orderlies (assistants) and 
attempts to understand their condition and agency in a new way that avoids over-glorifying 
their power, given the opportunities and constraints associated with their positions. Likewise, 
















but distorted therapeutic environment. Continuing with the perspective developed in chapter 
5, this chapter acknowledges patient agency, but notes that, just like orderlies, they also 
encountered constraints because the system was either paternalistic, frugal or based on racial 
differentiation. Chapter 7 wraps up the thesis by looking at the public health aspects of the 
Unit’s work. This chapter zooms in on the official perception of the disease and health 
situation in the Unit, and the limited efforts at health promotion and at disease prevention 
campaigns. The chapter notes that the Unit’s public health system was notable for its narrow 
focus on health education and compulsory immunization, at the expense of broader 
community development. The thesis concludes with a review that asks about the possibilities 



















Historical Background: Origins of the Rural African Healthcare Question in Colonial 




Although the main focus of this thesis will be the nature and aftermath of rural healthcare 
reforms introduced in 1930, and pioneered in Ndanga, Fort Victoria, from 1932, it might be 
useful to begin with a sketch of the historical background against which these important 
reforms emerged. This opening chapter provides that important background by outlining, in 
very broad terms, the origins and evolution of the rural African healthcare question from 
colonisation to 1930. The discussion is arranged in three chronological sections. The first 
section, which covers roughly the first two decades of colonial rule, identifies the taproot of 
the rural healthcare question and demonstrates that it emerged as a component of a larger 
‘native question’. The ‘native question’ was a referent for ‘the questions colonial 
development raised concerning what the role of Africans was to be in the changed and 
changing society’.
1
  The section will make it clear that, although rural healthcare entered 
policy debates relatively early, opinion remained divided over the correct approach.   
The second part of the chapter gives an overview of the failed attempts made between 1912 
and the end of British South African Company (BSACo) rule in 1922 to implement a rural 
dispensaries scheme which was an outcome of early debates about rural healthcare. This 
failure is ascribed to a number of factors, chief among them being the hesitant approach of 
the Public Health Department under Andrew Fleming who was the Medical Director from 
1897 to 1930. The third and last section provides a brief outline of the policy changes and 
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continuities in the 1920s and reviews the status of the rural healthcare question on the eve of 
reform.  
The main observation of this chapter is that by 1930 the rural healthcare question had long 
entered policy debates although on the ground progress remained severely limited because of 
a stalemate over the ideal approach. The Public Health Department, which doubted the 
advisability of embarking on a large scale rural healthcare delivery programme, was pitted 
against a loose but resolute alliance of non-medical state officials, missionaries, settler and 
African associations, who favoured prompt action. That the Public Health was anti-reform 
even though the core colonial administration was pro-reform is one of the most intriguing 
paradoxes of Southern Rhodesia’s early twentieth century medical history. As such, by 1930 
it was clear that the colony required a fresh and innovative approach to break the policy 
impasse over an issue which, the world over, was becoming ‘a first class political problem… 
full of questions, rich in promises and burgeoning professional administrations’.
2
  
Colonisation, the ‘native question’ and rural healthcare, 1889- 1911 
Southern Rhodesia became a British colony from 1890 following its annexation on behalf of 
the Crown by an imperial chartered company and pioneering ruler of the colony, the BSACo. 
One of the immediate challenges that faced the Company administration was finding the best 
way of governing Africans. What were to be the main elements of a colonial ‘native’ policy? 
This question was formidable because the Company government immediately found itself 
caught in-between the relatively liberal African policy stipulations of the imperial 
government (and by extension the ‘bogey of Exeter Hall’) and the rather strident demands of 
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 In addition, during 1896-7 the Africans embarked on the well-orchestrated 




Whereas the initial encounters had tended to be ‘unsystematic and unstructured’,
5
 although 
basic enough to sustain the earliest, rampant acquisition and exploitation of resources,
6
 during 
the aftermath of the 1896-7 uprisings colonial officials began to look for overarching 
theoretical premises and hegemonic ideas that would allow the Company to maintain order, 
exploit and govern ‘with creative authority’.
7
 This objective brought up questions about the 
nature and condition of African society, whether it could allow for the achievement of such 
aims. For instance, there were concerns that Africans were too primitive and their 
communities were prone to physical and moral degeneration. In addition, Africans were 
depicted in contradictory terms as either infantile, and therefore requiring tutelage, or 
rebellious and thus requiring taming.
8
 Moreover, African communities were perceived to be 
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The solution was thought to lie in limited civilisation of African communities. In practice, 
this entailed walking a tight rope between ‘notions of incorporation and differentiation’ of the 
kind expertly explored by Ann L. Stoler and Frederick Cooper in Tensions of Empire.
10
 On 
its part, the Native Affairs Department began to work out ‘its own mystique of 
administration’ which was anchored in notions of paternalistic guardianship.
11
 Since some of 
the early Native Commissioners came from the Cape and Natal, the liberalism of the former 
and the ‘firm paternalism’ of the latter helped underpin this new ethos.
12
 In addition to law, 
education, taxation and labour contracts, one of the specific tools that was increasingly relied 
upon to make African society governable and exploitable was biomedicine.  
 
Although early healthcare initiatives ‘took little note of the mass of the African population’,
13
 
certain basic, narrowly-conceived aspects of African health became arenas of state action 
from the outset. For instance by 1899, the state was already subsidising mission schools to 
teach Africans hygiene.
14
 Moreover, Africans were in principle allowed to access government 
                                                 
9
 Jock McCulloch, ‘The Management of Venereal Disease in a Settler Society: Colonial Zimbabwe, 1900-1930’, 
in Philip W. Steel, Milton Lewis and Maryinez Lyons (eds), Histories of Sexually Transmitted Diseases and 
HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa (Westport, CT, London: Greenwood Press, 1999), p. 196. 
10
 A. L. Stoler and F. Cooper, ‘Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda’, in F. Cooper 
and A. L. Stoler (eds), Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley & Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1997), p. 10. 
11
 Steele, ‘The Foundations of a “Native” Policy’, p. 13; W. A. Munro, The Moral Economy of the State: 
Conservation, Community Development and State Making in Zimbabwe (Athens, OH: Ohio University Centre 
for International Studies, 1998), p. 54. 
12
 Steele, ‘The Foundations of a “Native” Policy’, p. 6; Diana Jeater, ‘Speaking Like a Native: Vernacular 
Languages and the State in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1935’, Journal of African History, vol. 42, no. 3 (2001), p. 
452. 
13
 Michael Gelfand, A Service to the Sick: A History of the Health Services for Africans in Southern Rhodesia, 
1890-1953 (Gwelo: Mambo Press, 1976), p. 17. 
14
 Central Statistics Office, Official Yearbook of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia (Salisbury: Rhodesia Printing 
and Publishing Company, 1932), p. 676; Speight (ed.), ‘Education Ordinance, 1903’, Statute Law of Southern 
















hospitals built primarily for white colonists. As the Secretary to the Administrator, H. 
Marshall-Hole explained in 1904, ‘we realise that it is a public duty to receive anyone, 
European or native, who is found suffering from illness or injuries demanding treatment’.
15
 
However, these were mainly urban hospitals, which catered for those with access to money, 
as treatment was not free. 
 
The control of epidemics among Africans was, however, the earliest main preoccupation of 
the state. Compulsory medico-legal codes such as the Cape Public Health Act of 1886 were 
used to enforce vaccination orders and the suppression of epidemics such as smallpox. By 
1903/4, officials from the Native Affairs Department could round up and vaccinate more than 
80,000 Africans for smallpox.
16
 In addition to epidemics control, the health of African 
labourers also received limited attention from the outset. In 1903 and 1908, labour 
considerations compelled officials to enact rules for the provision of cottage hospitals in 





By so doing, Southern Rhodesia was in keeping with the 1903 British imperial directive: 
‘preserve the health of the European’, ‘keep the labour force in reasonable working 
condition’ and ‘prevent the spread of epidemics’.
18
 The regular medical care of rural 
communities was left in the hands of the missionaries who recognised biomedical healing as 
an ‘integral part of the Christian witness... [and] an important evangelistic agency’.
19
 These 
were however few and far in-between and their work was hampered by their miniscule 
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resources. Thus, for a long time they assiduously petitioned the state for financial assistance 
until a comprehensive subsidy system was worked out in the late-1920s.
20
 Their tacit 
recognition as stakeholders in African colonial policy helped to keep them hopeful. 
 
However, in Southern Rhodesia African policy was the ‘product of arguments, debates, and 
profoundly conflicting interests among the whites – administrators, missionaries, and settlers 
– who interacted with Africans on a daily basis’.
21
 Therefore, besides missionaries, Native 
Commissioners were also keen believers in the notion of early development of rural 
healthcare services. Although African education and health, the two ‘specialist functions’, 
were not under the direct control of the Native Affairs Department,
22
 healthcare commended 
itself to the Native Affairs Department officials because of the promise of disease control and 
the modernisation of African society. Through the provision of common treatments, the 
Native Commissioners were also keen to put up a positive face among Africans as a way of 
justifying colonisation and its concomitant demands. 
 
Indeed, in 1909, following years of concern about diseases like syphilis,
23
 the 
Superintendents of Natives (SoNs), a corps of senior Native Commissioners adopted an 
agenda-setting motion tabled by Herbert J. Taylor, the Chief Native Commissioner (1894-
1928). Taylor’s proposal was ‘that provision be made in the estimates for increasing the vote 
for Native Education, and for special contributions to those Missions affording facilities for 
medical treatment of natives and for the teaching of hygiene’.
24
 He also suggested that a grant 
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of £100 per annum be made to a satisfactory medical mission employing a qualified medical 
person. A further £100 should also be made where the state was satisfied that ‘special 
facilities are afforded for the treatment of the sick by providing hospital accommodation for 





Taylor’s major motive for making this proposal was that ‘any means which would induce 
natives to adopt European medicines should be encouraged, as the influence of witchcraft 
would thereby be gradually weakened’.
26
 He added that,  
The medical supervision and industrial education of the native may at first sight be 
considered subjects which should be dealt with on an entirely different basis but these 
matters are really essential to the general prosperity of the native and the country as a 
whole, and one can so materially assist the better working of the other.... It is not 
suggested that the work of the Medical Officer should be confined to the treatment of 
the sick and injured. His work must be considered as part of a scheme of the gradual 




Marshall-Hole, the Secretary to the Administrator, was supportive of Taylor’s proposals and 
he envisaged that ‘they practically amount to the creation of a sort of District Surgeon in 
reserves and the scheme might be a valuable aid to the Medical Department’.
28
 However, the 
Medical Director, Andrew Fleming, opposed the proposal, citing lack of proper medical 
knowledge among both missionaries and Native. The government ‘would be lending its 
countenance to the unqualified practice with all its dangers’ if it allowed such a practice.
29
 
Moreover, if one denomination was offered assistance, all denominations would claim the 
same privilege. In addition, medical treatment was as an evangelising strategy which the 
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government should not be expected to underwrite. According to Fleming, although the only 
ideal policy was for the government to establish its own dispensaries under district medical 
officers, he thought the time was ‘hardly ripe for this yet’ because there were no sufficient 




The next round of pressure came from the Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Committee of 
Enquiry of 1910-11 (NACE) who requested him to make a comprehensive submission of a 
rural healthcare plan. Although he obliged, he did so with a warning that Africans still 
possessed a rooted objection to biomedicine and, therefore, ‘any attempt... at assisting the 
natives and encouraging them to go to European institutions for treatment must be made 
gradually and with extreme caution’.
31
 Surprisingly, the scheme he drew up proposed a rural 
dispensary system delivered through the agency of missionary societies, which he had earlier 
opposed.  
 
Fleming explained his change of mind by saying he had realised that as opposed to a circular 
medical doctor an average missionary held superior knowledge about Africans and had the 
desire to learn more about their customs and habits of this nature than a circular medical 
practitioner would. Circular doctors were more inclined to prioritise advancement and 
openings in more comfortable areas of practice.
32
 Accordingly, he proposed a sum of £9,250 
for the first year to construct six mission medical stations, each under a qualified missionary 
doctor. Each of these medical officers would also run three outlying dispensaries within their 
districts.  
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The NACE adopted wholesale Fleming’s proposals and in the final report argued that the 
implementation of the scheme in ‘purely African areas’, 
... would have a beneficial effect, not only for the restoration or preservation of health, 
but also for weaning the Natives from faith in witch doctors, diviners or soothsayers 
or men who profess to have supernatural power or knowledge whether as medicine 




The formulation of a rural healthcare service was therefore an integral part of the agenda of 
transforming African societies. In April 1911, the London Board of Directors of the BSACo 
gave added impetus to this issue through a directive issued to the colony’s Office of the 
Administrator, which was the heart of the Company colony’s administration. The Board 
suggested that, 
... in addition to the existing measures for the care of natives who are employed at the 
Mines or in towns, more might be done at their own kraals to improve their physical 
condition…. It might be practicable to arrange for some simple means of medical 
inspection and dispensary aid which might, without inordinate expense, gradually 
introduce into the kraals some knowledge of the elementary rules of health; of 
treatment of ordinary complaints, and improve the conditions of the native in his own 
kraal…. In particular…attention might be given to the better care of women in 




A high-level conference of senior civil servants, including Taylor, Marshall-Hole and W. M. 
Eaton, the acting Medical Director, was held October/November 1911 to discuss both the 
NACE Report and the London Board recommendation.
35
 Although Eaton had initially 
opposed the idea as ‘impracticable, and one that should be discouraged’, the conference 
resolved that the state would pioneer two sizeable dispensaries under the care of qualified 
medical officers. Subsidies would also be given to two missionary societies to do the same.
36
 
Eaton’s suggestion to start the scheme in the two big urban centres, Salisbury and Bulawayo, 
and include ‘the more ignorant [rural] native’ later, was criticised and rejected by the 
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 Instead, two rural areas – Ndanga in Mashonaland and Belingwe in Matabeleland 
– were selected as the sites for the first two government medical stations. Each medical 
station would comprise a dispensary and a main ward that could accommodate eight to 
twelve patients. From their main stations, medical officers would go around the outlying 
areas promoting hygiene and sanitation and treating the sick. African orderlies would also be 
trained in urban hospitals to assist in the running of these medical stations, which could be 




Pioneering the dispensaries initiative, 1912-1922. 
After the conference, Fleming was directed to proceed with the preparations for the 
commencement of the agreed work.
39
 However, what followed thereafter were essentially 
half-hearted attempts at implementing the scheme. Except for the Ndanga medical station 
which survived into the 1920s, albeit in a wobbly state,
40
 the other three medical stations 
collapsed within a few years of their existence mainly because of disorganisation and lack of 
will. The circumstances surrounding the rise and fall of two of these medical stations will 
suffice to illustrate this point. The Mwembe dispensary in Belingwe was doomed to failure 
from the start. On his commencement of duty, the founding doctor, Neville S. Williams, was 
denied the four mules, a Cape cart and a horse which he had requested for his transport so 
that he could travel extensively around the district to advertise his presence.
41
 Fleming said 
his Department could not afford his requests, which he thought were unnecessary. Instead, he 
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In addition to being denied these basic necessities, the medical officer commenced duty 
before the completion of his quarters, compelling him to live in a tent for three months, and 
thereafter in the kitchen while he awaited the completion of the house. In addition, he also 
spent two months without any means of transport. In June 1913 he was supplied with a mule 
which, according to the Acting Native Commissioner, Belingwe District, ‘would disgrace a 
meat cart both on account of age and condition’.
43
 The transportation of hospital supplies was 
also very poor and the doctor usually kept patients on placebos as he frequently ran out of 
medical supplies.
44
 As a result, ‘the patients got worse instead of better and lost confidence 
which has not been recovered since [the] arrival of a fresh supply [of medicines]’.
45
 Matter-
of-factly, the Acting Native Commissioner for Belingwe charged that, 
In my opinion the whole administration up to the present has been a farce. So 
disgusted has Dr. Williams become with his treatment, that he has sent his resignation 
and until a more progressive, definite and liberal policy is formed, I fail to see how I 
can co-operate in its [medical station’s] advancement.... Unless a more generous 




A three-man fact-finding mission comprising Taylor, Fleming and H. M. Jackson, the SoN of 
Gwelo, toured the hospital and agreed in their joint report that the needs of the doctor had not 
been dealt with promptly or systematically.
47
 As a remedy, some improvements were 
attempted but Williams was not willing to bear it any longer, and so left. Although his 
successor, McGowan was provided with a scotch cart, eight young oxen and a salted horse, 
he also reported difficulties in getting patients to come to him regularly for treatment, in 
addition to their being suspicious of treatment as in-patients.
48
 It seems the use of placebos 
and the farcical experience under Williams had hurt the reputation of the institution. 
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By mid-1914, McGowan was also on his way out. The dispensary had started its protracted 
collapse. The ill-fated Dr Joynt, the third medical officer in the space of two years, replaced 
McGowan. In November 1914, nature quickened the collapse of the station when lightning 
struck the hospital and almost completely reduced it to ashes. Joynt’s equipment was also 
destroyed; the government offered him £50 as an ‘act of grace’.
49
 What remained of the 
building was hard hit by severe summer storms and in May 1915 it was recommended that 
the institution be closed.  
 
The medical stations attempted through missionary agency were not any more successful. 
Two dispensaries were established in Rusape and Kwenda under the auspices of the Church 
of England Missionary Society and Wesleyan Missionary Society respectively.
50
 In both 
cases missionary doctors were employed. However, within a short period, the two stations 
were rocked by problems and they collapsed. Although in Rusape conflicts between Dr 
Homer and the priest-in-charge resulted in the dismissal of the former in 1914,
51
 at Kwenda 
problems were between the medical missionaries and the Public Health Department.  
 
Dr Sydney Osborne’s application for leave in 1916 following three years of service at 
Kwenda led to a succession of events that led to the collapse of the dispensary. Approval of 
his application was delayed over the finding of a locum. When Dr Osborne mentioned the 
loneliness of the station and fluctuation of patient numbers as a way of suggesting that a 
locum might not be absolutely necessary
52
 Public Health Department officials began to query 
the results coming from the dispensary. In their opinion, they did not appear to be 
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commensurate with expenditure. Although the Rev. John White, the Superintendent of the 
Wesleyan Methodist Church in Southern Rhodesia pleaded for the continuation of the 
medical station as an educational instrument which Africans would gradually get used to, the 




The foundering of these initial experiments and the fact that extremely low patient numbers 
were also cited as a major factor in the decision to close the Kwenda station seemed to 
vindicate Fleming’s hesitancy and argument that the majority of Africans were still opposed 
to biomedical care. However, the Fleming administration seems to have lacked vision, tact or 
interest. The haste with which the closure of the clinic was recommended defied the logic of 
the Rev. White’s reasoning that continuation of the work was a good option in the long term. 
Following the collapse of these dispensaries, Fleming and his Department failed to offer any 
innovative alternatives.  
 
In 1915, the indefatigable SoNs had come up with another suggestion. They recommended 
that Native Commissioners be supplied with stocks of common medicines to help those 
Africans who sought treatment.
54
 They cited ethical reasons as the basic motive of their 
recommendation. Although acknowledging the importance of the Ndanga and Belingwe 
experiments, they ‘felt that, in view of the revenue contributed by the Natives, they should 
benefit as a whole’.
55
 Using the agency of Native Commissioners was an effective way of 
ensuring equitable access because they were present in all corners of the colony. However, 
these Native Affairs officials appeared to be also motivated by the need to offer medical 
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treatment as a benign counterweight to tax collection and other forms of state control. The 
proposal was approved by the Administrator’s Office and the colony entered the politically 
historic 1920s with this ad hoc measure as the backbone of the rural healthcare system. 
 
Change and continuity in the 1920s 
From 1923, the administrative arrangements of the colony changed as the BSACo ceded 
administrative control to the Responsible Government (RG) of white settlers. The 
administrations of the colony’s first two Premiers, Charles Coghlan (1923-1937) and Howard 
U. Moffat (1927-1933), inherited an unsettled rural healthcare question. Steele is correct in 
saying that ‘the new settler administration installed in October 1923 inherited an African 
health service that may, not unreasonably, be described as rudimentary’.
56
 But did anything 
change under RG? 
 
Under Responsible Government, the pool of advocates for healthcare reform continued to 
expand as the new crop of political leaders began to redefine ‘native’ affairs in their own new 
ways. In part, this stemmed from concerns about deterioration in the reserves, which stoked 
fears of social unrest.
57
 African proto-nationalist groups were beginning to emerge, inspired 
by older South African movements. Such groups like the Southern Rhodesia Native 
Association and the Bantu Voters Association among others, campaigned for reform, equal 
development and enfranchisement.
58
 In 1924, an African teachers’ group reportedly famously 
remarked that the government was providing medicine for their cattle (an allusion to dip 
tanks) but not for people.
59
 Such developments forced the state to reconceptualise its 
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development approach partly as a way of stopping the perceived collapse of reserves and also 
undermining the power of African associations.  
 
In addition, in keeping with the spirit of the reserved clauses in the RG constitution, which 
prescribed that Africans were Crown subjects, Coghlan and Moffat were keen to prove to the 
imperial government that white settlers were capable of running their affairs without 
jeopardising African welfare.
60
 Moreover, there were also perceptions that syphilis was 
increasing among Africans.
61
 Municipalities also became concerned about increasing 
numbers of venereal diseases sufferers coming from rural areas to seek treatment in 





Furthermore, different settler organisations, including the Southern Rhodesian Women’s 
League, which claimed to speak on behalf of the ‘practically inarticulate’ African women,
63
 
farmers and miners, all joined the chorus for rural healthcare reform. The self-styled 
‘guardians’ of the ‘natives’, the Native Affairs Department, also continued their advocacy. In 
1926 and 1927, NCs and SoNs held conferences where they passed resolutions, including the 
provision of free treatment and accommodation for venereal cases.
64
 In June 1927, the 
Department of the Colonial Secretary sought the opinion of the Native Commissioners on the 
advisability of setting up dispensaries and facilitating periodic visits by medical officers in 
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 Their responses were overwhelmingly supportive of the idea, with some 
describing medical treatment as ‘the most urgent native question of the day’.
66
 Others went to 
the extent of proposing the introduction of the system of African doctors who would 




Moreover, driven by their evangelising aspirations and religious humanitarianism, 
missionaries also continued their petitioning of the Public Health Department to work out a 
comprehensive policy of rural medical care. In 1924, and then again in 1926, they convened 
the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference where they discussed the further trial of the 
rural dispensary system, the introduction of training schemes for African orderlies and 
midwives and the granting of financial support to missionary initiatives.
68
 The Moffat 
administration seems to have given missionaries a sympathetic ear. Born into a Kuruman-
based missionary dynasty, Moffat was a product of Victorian missionary paternalism and a 




However, Fleming maintained his cautious approach. He rebuffed concerns about the 
increase in the prevalence of syphilis as scientifically incorrect and as rather exaggerated. 
According to him, ‘a far higher proportion of venereal disease occurs amongst the white 
trooper as compared with natives’.
70
 In Fleming’s view, there were simply more disclosures 
than before. On the question of attempting to re-establish dispensaries, he told the Colonial 
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Secretary, the new political head overseeing the Public Health Department, that ‘the 




However, he could not totally ignore the pressure from different sections of colonial society 
without doing anything. In 1925 he committed himself to the fight against venereal and other 
infectious diseases. This was given impetus by the enactment, that same year, of the colony’s 
first Public Health Act that gave local authorities and medical officers wide-ranging powers 
for the suppression of what were termed ‘formidable epidemic diseases’, which included 




In 1927, Fleming agreed to establish venereal diseases clinics in Native Commissioners’ 
camps.
73
 Essentially, this was an extension of the work that Native Commissioners had 
started in 1916. In the 1920s it enhanced by the increasing availability of the more efficacious 
treatment such as salvarsan.
74
 Through this, Fleming managed to assuage the concerns of the 
settlers while buying time. However, these clinics had a severely limited geographical scope 
as they seemed to depend more on the enthusiasm and willingness of each Native 
Commissioner to do or supervise such work. Although most Native Commissioners were 
supportive of the idea of setting up dispensaries in reserves, most of them were not inclined 
to supervise the work. Thus, by 1930, there were only seven venereal diseases clinics, 
catering for only 4,359 patients per year.
75
 Native Commissioners and their wives acted as the 
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‘superintendents’ and were supported by one or two African orderlies. Medical officers only 
paid periodic visits. 
 
Fleming’s other concession was that, in 1927, he agreed to formulate a reasonable grant-in-
aid scheme to support medical missions capable of employing qualified persons, whether 
doctors or nurses. These grants would cover salaries, maintenance and upkeep, and the cost 
of drugs and surgical instruments and dressings.
76
 Although the Colonial Secretary, William 
M. Leggate, was satisfied with the scheme, he implored Fleming to go further and work out a 
comprehensive proposal for the provision of medical services that would encompass the 
whole colony, including the rural areas. He argued that the time was ripe for the state to give 
further medical assistance to Africans and that ‘the Government cannot escape the liability 




However, Fleming did not share Leggate’s convictions. In his own words, although 
developing such a service might sound ‘humanitarian and progressive.... The native... is still 
too primitive to take advantage’ of such services.
78
 A1929 conference of senior government 
medical officers that was chaired by Fleming presented Leggate with another opportunity to 
make it known that the government was anxious to avail more medical services to Africans 
and that resources had been set aside for that purpose. He also emphasised the state’s view 
that Africans were ready for such services.
79
 However, he left the conference astounded by 
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the divisions in opinion and the lack of firm commitments.
80
 The colony was set to continue 
on its path of lack of a coherent rural medical policy. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that by 1930 the issue of rural healthcare question was a 
longstanding one. Despite mounting pressure, Fleming and his administration did not offer 
any innovative ideas. The few schemes that were tried out were the ideas of other colonial 
departments. The sector was virtually stagnant. As Steele correctly observed, ‘the principal 
breakthrough in the field of African health, the establishment of medical units in reserves, 
was... the work of Askins, Fleming’s more imaginative successor’.
81
  In early 1930, Fleming 
retired and he was replaced by Robert Askins who proactively engaged the rural healthcare 
question and introduced the reforms which form the main starting point of this thesis. The 
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Robert A. Askins and the shifting trajectory of rural healthcare from 1930: local, 





This chapter explores the shifting trajectory of Southern Rhodesia’s rural healthcare policy 
from 1930 and serves as a critical outline of the policy origins of the Ndanga Medical Unit, 
the pioneering scheme which is closely examined from chapter three onwards. The reforms 
introduced by Robert A. Askins, the colony’s second medical director, as he sought to deal 
comprehensively with the long-standing rural healthcare question, are the major focus of the 
chapter.  Distinguishing himself from his dithering predecessor, Fleming, Askins made the 
control and eventual eradication of the colony’s rural diseases the priority of his 
administration from the outset.
1
 This he sought to accomplish through the systematic 
establishment of hospitals/dispensaries countrywide and the deployment of trained medical 
staff in rural areas. He thus set out to initiate a rural medical service scheme organised 
according to the pioneering model of district-focused medical units, of which the Ndanga 




The chapter analyses this model and its underlying influences and illustrates that, among 
other things, (a) Askins’ arrival signalled the beginning of a new focus on the district as the 
primary zone for African public health intervention; (b) that his model implied a discernible 
shift of focus from individual epidemics to a group of endemic rural diseases; and (c) that it 
received inspiration from emerging British and transcolonial models of health care delivery 
between the wars. The chapter notes too that Askins’ medical units scheme contained both 
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progressive and retrogressive elements. On the progressive side, in addition to exemplifying 
the first concrete commitment by a leading public health bureaucrat to overhaul rural 
healthcare, the medical units scheme was also the first model with the potential to create a 
relatively well-organised district health care system for the colony’s African communities. 
Also, to his credit, Askins acknowledged that disease caused a great deal of unnecessary 





However, on the negative side his major justification for urgent reform was mainly informed 
by the unfounded and yet popular colonial argument that, because of their supposedly 
primitive culture and non-scientific outlook, Africans were the inherent reservoirs of the 
many diseases that menaced white citizens and disrupted the colonial economy.
4
 
Conveniently ignored by Askins were the very conspicuous colonial determinants of ill-
health, including colonial dispossession and the disruption of ecological equilibrium due to 
forced resettlements and colonial labour migration. The district health staff complement was 
also designed in such a way that the privileged medical turf was reserved for white doctors. 
Africans were consigned to the lower cadre of medical orderlies.  
 
To explain this curious admixture of progressive and retrogressive elements in Askins’ 
model, the chapter emphasises the fact that healthcare reform in interwar colonial Africa 
generally responded to an admixture of reformative, progressive and conservative impulses 
which had observable international and local, imperial and colonial dimensions. For instance, 
the reformative, progressive impulse was generated and emboldened by developments such 
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as the increasing efficacy of biomedical cure following the germ revolution,
5
 the emergence 
of rudimentary ideas of social medicine, and the increasing involvement of the state in 
healthcare. The intensity with which these factors were pursued and which one of these 
virtually trans-imperial and transnational factors received greater attention in any given 
colonial policy depended much on the personal outlook of the chief reformers and the 
institutions within which they worked. 
 
However, counteracting these progressive impulses were the retrogressive features which had 
their origins in colonial racial prejudice. The main argument of this chapter is that the 
motives and content of colonial healthcare reforms were inherently contradictory and 
therefore that the major policy that brought the Ndanga Medical Unit into existence, was a 
double-edged sword. To explore these issues, the chapter begins with a historiographical 
overview that sets the scene for the analytical framework used here in placing the Southern 
Rhodesian reforms within a broader, international context. This theoretical scene-setting is 
followed by a brief outline of the changes in the management of Southern Rhodesia’s Public 
Health Department, with the major highlight being the appointment and commencement of 
duty by the new medical director, Robert Askins, in August 1930.  
 
After that, the chapter proceeds to outline and discuss the main elements of the new reforms 
which he introduced, paying particular attention to the broader context and the different 
formative influences and concepts from which he drew inspiration and specific models. 
Thereafter, the chapter offers a critique which illuminates the ways in which these 
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increasingly necessary reforms were paradoxically structured and justified by pandering to 
colonial stereotypes and racial prejudice.  
 
Social history of medicine ‘beyond the local’ 
Historians of colonial health care have tended to explain the evidently widespread interwar 
healthcare reforms through localised, colony-centric perspectives. In contrast, this chapter 
recognises some broader influences on Askins’ ‘local’ reforms and proposes that a wider 
perspective is therefore necessary if these reforms are to be understood in their entirety. 
Available evidence indicates that Askins was motivated by (and borrowed from) trends and 
models pioneered in other dominions/colonies such as the Union of South Africa (which was 
essentially Southern Rhodesia’s regional metropole), French West Africa and the Belgian 
Congo. He was also inspired by models of rural, district health care delivery that were being 
tried out in south-west England where he spent much of his professional life before coming to 
Southern Rhodesia. 
 
By highlighting these influences and the ways in which they coloured the lenses through 
which he viewed local systemic inadequacies and prompted him to develop a new, hybrid 
framework of healthcare delivery, this chapter establishes an inadequately recognised point, 
viz. that a combination of coalescing international and local factors underlay interwar 
colonial healthcare reform. Many historians have largely missed this important perspective, 
preferring to look at the reforms as solely colony-specific responses to changing local 
epidemiological circumstances or as adjustments to shifting notions of inter-racial public 
health and the minimum requirements of colonial labour welfare.
6
 Even the latest revisionist 
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explorations of the origins of interwar colonial healthcare reform proffered by historians such 
as Osaak Olumwullah
7
 and George O. Ndege
8
  have ignored the important international 
dimensions of this subject. Seeing that the reforms took place across the various African 
empires almost simultaneously, solely local-bound explanations give a one-dimensional 
picture. Indeed, as Ilana Lowy reminds us, ‘Investigations limited to developments in a single 




Coming at a time when the historiography of modern medicine in the non-Western world is 
undergoing significant revision, with Hormoz Ebrahimnejad not very long ago calling for the 
jettisoning of ‘diffusionist’ perspectives in favour of localising historical narratives ‘that 
would address change in the medical or scientific outlook no matter the origin of such 
evolution, foreign influence or internal dynamics, or a combination of both’,
10
 this chapter 
may well be considered as a significant counter-narrative. Based on unequivocal evidence, 
the chapter goes against the grain of this scholarship by highlighting the movement of ideas 
from other regions to Southern Rhodesia where they were clearly reformulated and adapted 
to suit the perceived local needs. The mere fact that medical concepts and models crossed 
boundaries during the interwar period is, however, no longer a novel observation; certainly, 
other historians of interwar healthcare reform in both imperial Europe and colonial Africa 
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have already shown that certain, the ostensibly country-specific models benefited from trans-




However, what could be pioneering about this chapter is the call to apply this approach 
routinely in interwar health policy histories as these crossovers were not a rarity. Thus, this 
chapter provides a new example of a case where this exchange of ideas happened through 
both easily observable and less obvious ways. Selected both as an appropriate  heuristic 
device and also an answer to the newly emerging calls for trans-boundary histories of 
medicine or histories of medicine ‘beyond the local’,
12
 a range of comparative documentary 
sources from different repositories was carefully read  and quarried for corresponding ideas.  
 
This method led to the intriguing discovery of similarities and crossovers between Askins’ 
medical units concept for Southern Rhodesia and John Middleton Martin’s far-removed 
Gloucestershire Extension of Medical Services Scheme (GEMSS), for instance.
13
 This 
discovery underpinned Katie Trumpener’s view that the imperial world was characterised by 
intricate ‘transcolonial circuits’ and ‘conduits’ that facilitated flows of people and ideas in 
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Perhaps it should be clearly stated here that by emphasising the transfer of ideas from other 
regions to Southern Rhodesia, the aim is not to privilege the apparent source of the idea and 
undermine the recipient. A classical ‘core’ – ‘periphery’ flow of concepts from the imperial 
core to the colonial periphery is not implied; instead, the chapter takes a ‘decentred’ view of 
empire, in the manner suggested by Dane Kennedy and Dhuba Gosh in Decentring Empire.
15
 
In this compelling study of the flow of concepts within the British empire, Ghosh and 
Kennedy strongly suggest an analytical shift from a static, top-d wn view of empire to a 
more dynamic one that incorporates ‘the multiple networks of exchange that connected 
colonies to one another as well as to Britain’, for such networks straddled ‘the geographical 
and political boundaries that normally delimit inquiries.’
16
 As Ghosh and Kennedy further 
observe, the networks that emerged in the interstices of empire drew in and touched ‘areas 
and regions that ranged beyond the formal parameters of colonial relationships.’
17
 The two 
scholars correctly characterise the British empire as a conduit for the globalisation of the 




Anchored in these considerations, Askins’ 1930 reforms are treated as part of a circle of 
circulating ideas. However, as a matter of course, they should also be separately subjected to 
further critical scrutiny, focusing on the structural and discursive devices personally used by 
Askins to justify reform and promote his ideas. Although these reforms constituted a 
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significant improvement on the pre-reform state of affairs, they still fell far too short of the 
ideal. It needs to be re-emphasised that colonial health care was first and foremost meant to 
safeguard the health of people of European descent. Only by association did this entail 
dealing with the health of the Africans.  
 
However, it would be a travesty of historical fact to suggest that, during all stages of 
development of colonial medicine, taking care of Africans’ health needs was solely a measure 
to secure the health of the whites alone. Among many other considerations, there were also 
cultural and religious motives, as colonial officials were keen to render obsolete indigenous 
healing systems by popularising biomedical institutions and practices which were gaining 
strength because of state patronage, the germ revolution and chemotherapy. This was linked 
more to the pragmatics of colonial governance and biomedical hegemony than public health 
per se.  
 
In addition, the objective of safeguarding the health of white settlers should not be taken at 
face value because quite often reformers evoked images of epidemic threats as a way of 
arousing colonists’ fear. This would in turn force the holders of colonial finance to fund 
healthcare reforms, even those with no promise of immediate results.  As such, colonial 
healthcare cannot be explained from one angle alone; indeed, as Michael Worboys has aptly 
noted, in addition to securing the health of the colonists, colonial healthcare consisted of a 
combination of uneven efforts towards the introduction of modern ‘scientific’ rationality, the 
consolidation of colonial rule, the promotion of material development, ‘while at the same 
time protecting the welfare and health of indigenes’.
19
  However, protecting the welfare and 
health of the indigenes was beset with its own set of complexities. As will be shown a little 
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later in the chapter, colonial healthcare initiatives were also arenas for the reproduction of 
racialised discourses of difference and white privilege. 
 
Leadership change and policy reform 
In 1929, the Southern Rhodesian government started searching for a new medical director as 
Fleming’s thirty-three years long administration was about to come to an end. Although the 
colony had several senior contenders for the post, some of whom had acted as medical 
directors during Fleming’s absences, an outsider, Robert Askins, landed the post. In the 
absence of any unequivocal evidence it is difficult to say why internal candidates were 
overlooked. It can, however, be speculated that the Colonial Secretary, William M. Leggate, 
was keen to appoint a candidate with new ideas on how to take the colony’s health care sector 
forward. The previous chapter noted Leggate’s unsuccessful call to Fleming to work out 
something akin to a national health service.  
 
However, although he lacked colonial experience, Askins was not an inferior candidate. Born 
in 1880 in Clonmore, Ireland, he studied medicine at Trinity College, Dublin, where he 
graduated with first class Bachelor of Medicine and Surgery honours in 1907. Later he earned 
a Cambridge Diploma i  Public Health (1912) and the degrees of M.A. and M.D. (1913), 
again in Dublin.
20
 After a brief appointment as Assistant Medical Officer of Health for 
Merthyr Tydfil, in 1909 he became Assistant Medical Officer to the Lancashire Education 
Committee – a position he held up to 1914.
21
 After that he was employed by the Bristol 
Education Committee as the first substantive Schools Medical Officer and held that position, 
together with other key portfolios in the city’s public health sector, up to 1930, the year he 
left for Southern Rhodesia. During World War I he was recruited as specialist sanitary 
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officer. In 1917, he had also enrolled for law studies and in 1920 was admitted to the Bar at 




Fig. 2.1: Dr Askins, late 1920s. 
 
(Photo Courtesy of the National Archives of Zimbabwe) 
 
In 1924, Askins was appointed to deputise for Dr D. S. Davies, the Bristol City and County 
Medical Officer of Health. Upon the latter’s retirement in 1928, Askins was unanimously 
appointed to that vacant position which also included being the Medical Officer of the Port 
Authority. In that same year, he was also selected as lecturer-in-charge of Public Health at 
Bristol University.
23
 He also continued with his appointment as the Schools Medical Officer. 
An active member of the British Medical Association and the Society for the Medical 
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 Askins held all these demanding appointments simultaneously up to 
May 1930 when he left Britain after accepting an appointment by Southern Rhodesia as the 




Having gone so far in his career, his decision to migrate to Southern Rhodesia is not easy to 
explain, but the issue of remuneration which should be understood against the background of 
the Great Depression should not be ruled out. When he informed the Bristol City and County 
Health Committee about his acceptance of an appointment in Southern Rhodesia, the 
Committee’s Chairman, H. J. Maggs, made frantic efforts to retain him ‘in view of the 
schemes for co-ordinating the medical and nursing services which are under consideration 
and the additional work and responsibility which would be taken over by him [Askins] on the 
1
st
 of April [1930].’
26
 Available evidence shows that Askins took advantage of that overture 
to bid for a higher remuneration package. He requested the Committee to pay him an annual 
salary of £1, 800, rising by £100 per annum for the succeeding two years to eventually reach 
£2, 000 per annum. If that happened, he intimated, he would be willing to reconsider moving 
to Southern Rhodesia. However, these crisis negotiations to retain him in Bristol failed, 
leaving him to move to Southern Rhodesia where he was offered a salary of £1, 750 per 
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Askins took over the administration of the Southern Rhodesian Public Health Department in 
August 1930, and one of his immediate plans was to fix, in his own ways, the problems he 
perceived to be bedevilling the colony’s medical services for the largely rural African 
population. As noted in the previous chapter, his predecessor, Fleming, had bequeathed to 
him only seven state-run venereal diseases dispensaries, one rural ‘native’ hospital, and five 
subsidised missionary dispensaries, for an estimated African population of 1,080,000.
28
 As 
noted in Chapter 1, in 1930, state dispensaries had treated only 4,359 patients, mainly for 
venereal diseases.
29
 Recognising the inadequacy of these services, on 8 September 1930 (that 
is, just over a  month after his assumption of duty) Askins produced a green paper on rural 
healthcare,  entitled ‘Preliminary Report on the Treatment of Natives’, in which he dealt 




Making a case for reform, Askins argued that the colony was threatened by the many diseases 
that occurred in endemic and epidemic forms among the Africans. In his view, these diseases 
had to be controlled because of their ‘liability to spread to Europeans’ and the ‘unnecessary 
destruction of life and lowering of health’ which resulted from them among the Africans.
31
 
He argued that there was a very high likelihood of infection to be ‘conveyed to European 
households by natives who had the disease and carrying the infection, though to all outward 
appearances perfectly well’.
32
 He further elaborated this line of thought in his first substantive 
Annual Report as the colony’s Medical Director, in which he asserted that, 
The native is the reservoir of infective tropical disease, from which the European and 
his family is subject to invasion. Unfortunately the native carrier is commonly a 
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perfectly healthy looking individual, so that the European may not have the 




He enumerated a list of diseases that he considered to be a threat to the colony. Beginning 
with syphilis, he argued that, although it was spread ‘almost entirely through the medium of 
sexual intercourse’, it was nonetheless ‘undesirable from an aesthetic point of view that there 
should be the risk of native boys being in European houses whilst they are suffering from this 
disease.’
34
 In addition to syphilis, Askins also blamed malaria for a ‘large amount of death, 
and a lowering of health amongst the European population in the rural districts’.
35
 He 
indicted Africans for spreading this disease to the white population, arguing that ‘malaria is a 




Going further, he noted that also frequently conveyed to the ‘unsuspecting’ European 
‘victims’ by the African ‘carriers’ were amoebic and bacillary dysentery, both of which, he 
argued, were ‘endemic amongst the natives of Southern Rhodesia’.
37
 Extending the list of the 
invasive ‘native’ maladies, he noted bilharzia (which he said infected six percent of European 
children), cerebro-spinal meningitis, and sleeping sickness as some of the menacing endemic 
diseases that were frequently communicated to Europeans by Africans. However, he did not 
offer any explanation as to how diseases such as sleeping sickness and bilharzia could be 
conveyed directly by Africans to the Europeans; in the case of the former he simply disputed 
the emerging view that big game was to blame. Instead, he blamed Africans for being the 
‘cause of the [sleeping sickness] disease that remained endemic in the colony’.
38
 As he later 
warned in his 1930 Report, this danger tended to increase as the colony was ‘becoming more 
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closely settled by Europeans.’
39





His ideas were based on the prejudiced knowledge of the time. The focus on rural health was 
premised on the perception that civilisation had driven diseases away from urban areas and 
that most of the remaining scourges were rural and, by extension, African.
41
 To buttress his 
ideas he cited evidence produced by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
field researchers who had been doing their work in the colony from 1925.
42
 However, he also 
relied on his own observations and the opinions of other (mainly white) stakeholders he met 
during his tour of the country.
43
 Askins was concerned that the colony’s healthcare 
infrastructure was virtually non-existent in rural areas, a situation that created dangerous 
social and geographical inequalities in health and healthcare.  
 
While acknowledging that Africans dwelling in townships and mining compounds had 
‘ample’ access to medical facilities and that some isolated rural areas were being serviced by 
subsidised medical missions and the state’s own dispensaries, he was of the view that 
‘excellent as the above inst tutions are, a careful examination of the position makes it is clear 
that only a small proportion of the native population are at present receiving medical 
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He also viewed the existing approach to rural health care as being rather narrow because of 
too much focus on a single disease at a time. His alternative vision was that the health of 
African was to be ‘considered as a whole, and that the establishing of separate clinics for 
individual ailments, such as venereal diseases, should be avoided’
45
 – an indication that his 
acknowledgement of the ‘excellence’ of the available institutions was nothing but diplomacy. 
He proposed the adoption of systematic planning and the comprehensive development of 
rural medical services. As he was still pondering over this subject, E. G. Howman, the 
Superintendent of Natives, Fort Victoria, submitted for his approval a proposal to build a 
venereal disease clinic in his region, much in line with the practice under Fleming. Askins, 
however, withheld approval, arguing, ‘I feel that some kind of definite policy is essential… a 




Furthermore, he emphasised that it was ‘most essential that a policy be framed and adopted 
which will have in view the definite object of reducing, and ultimately eradicating these 
diseases which are endemic among the native population’.
47
 He also registered his strong 
feeling that the health needs of the Africans should be dealt with, ‘not haphazardly but by a 
comprehensive scheme for the entire colony’
48
, since there was ‘no reason whatsoever why 
malaria, dysentery, pneumonia and everything else should not be treated together’.
49
 For him, 
therefore, whatever method of medical care was adopted, the health of the African was to be 
considered in its entirety and not just in part. 
 
To remedy the problems he observed, he proposed that: 
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1. the health of the African and many diseases from which he suffered ‘should be 
considered as a whole’ and that the establishment of clinics for individual diseases 
‘should be avoided’; 
2. the country be mapped out into sizeable districts, to which should be applied medical 
units, gradually and as circumstances (financial and logistical) of the colony could 
permit;. 
3. each medical unit should consist of a central hospital ‘of the simplest possible type’, 
with African patients dwelling ‘as far as is possible’ in huts and under conditions 
resembling their home life ‘as closely as is consistent with efficiency’. To such a 
hospital was to be appointed a European government medical officer with a small 
cohort of European nursing staff, but the greater part of the nursing was to be carried 
out by trained African orderlies;  
4. up to six dispensaries should be ‘attached’ to each central hospital. They were to be 
positioned at a maximum distance of fifty miles by road from the hospital.. Like the 
main hospital, these dispensaries were also to be of simple construction, and to be 
staffed by trained African nursing staff and directly supervised and visited by the 
central hospital medical officer at regular intervals, once every week or every ten 
days; 
5.  African men and women should be trained as orderlies and midwives in government 
hospitals before being deployed to serve in these medical units. They were to be 
Africans of ‘known character’, with an education of up to Standard VI or as close to 
that benchmark as was possible. These African medical aids were to complete a 
course in hygiene as part of their instruction, and would be expected to visit rural 
















6. the new scheme should take advantage of existing hospitals and use them as  
springboards for beginning such work in districts where they were found. 
7. the scheme should be managed in close co-operation with the Native Affairs 
Department and other departments dealing with Africans; 
8. wherever possible, the African should bear the cost of his/her medical care.50  
This became the first comprehensive plan for the development of rural medical services for 
Africans made by a medical bureaucrat in the colony. In summary, the new scheme’s 
declared objectives included the bridging of the geographical inequalities in healthcare, the 
reduction and ultimate eradication of endemic diseases among the rural Africans, the 
prevention of disease through early treatment, the safeguarding of whites against infectious 
‘native’ diseases, the promotion of biomedical precepts among Africans, and the securing of 
colonial development in general.
51
 The mere fact of the scheme’s existence, even though still 
on paper, and the difference it intended to make was welcomed by other high-ranking 
colonial officials such as the Chief Native Commissioner, Colonel Carbutt. At a Native 
Affairs Conference held in Victoria Falls in June 1931, attended by officials from Southern 
Rhodesia’s neighbouring colonies, Carbutt noted that, 
There has not been, until recently, any defined policy for the development of medical 
services for Natives; but within the last two years the Medical Director for the colony 
has evolved a definite scheme of development which will result in the gradual 
establishment of a chain of Native Hospitals throughout the colony, with a number of 




An earlier sitting of the Advisory Board of Native Development had also passed a resolution 
that, 
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This Advisory Board, having heard with great pleasure and satisfaction the 
suggestions for the formulation of a definite scheme for medical service for the 
Natives of this country laid before it by the Medical Director, signifies its whole 
hearted approval of such a scheme which it feels can but greatly benefit both black 




Not only was the scheme pioneering as it set out, for the first time, to provide rural medical 
services in a systematic way, but also because it sought to transfer the actual running of the 
existing rural dispensaries from the firm grip of the Native Affairs Department officials to a 
district health team consisting of a medical officer and medical assistants.
54
 However, the free 
assistance of Native Affairs officials was still desperately required to render medical service, 
especially in the mapping of districts and in arrangements related to initial construction. 
Although some Native Commissioners initially protested, the matter was resolved when the 
Chief Native Commissioner exhorted to cooperate ‘in every way which will lead to the 




Why reform?: Individual initiative in a broader context 
 
Given the fact that different sections of colonial society had been advocating the extension of 
medical services in rural areas as illustrated in the previous chapter, these reforms can 
incorrectly be taken as solely a direct outcome of such advocacy alone. Moreover, because 
during his initial tour of the colony as medical director, Askins had been requested by mostly 
white settlers to set up (mainly) clinics for the control of venereal diseases, Askins’ initiative 
can misleadingly be seen only as an answer to these Southern Rhodesian-specific anxieties. 
Indeed, there was continuing direct pressure from missionaries and the Advisory Board of 
Native Development which comprised missionaries, Native Affairs officials, and such 
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individuals as the ‘outspoken negrophile’, F. L. Hadfield, the founder of the Native Mirror.
56
 
Some of the Board members went to the extent of encouraging Askins to motivate for the 
establishment of a separate division of African medical services (a sub-department of some 
sort) through which efforts focused on African healthcare could be channelled.
57
 In addition, 
in 1929 Leggate had communicated government readiness to reform and therefore it can be 
assumed that Askins was just tapping into these ripe conditions.  
 
However, looking at things from this angle alone is rather limiting as it gives only a partial 
picture of the issues involved. Firstly, as will be elaborated a little later in the chapter, there 
are very strong indications that Askins was personally interested in such reform. Even if 
allowing for differences in leadership between him and his predecessor, if he was not 
personally interested in such reform, the existing pressure for reform could have produced 
positive results within such a short space of time. Secondly, by late 1930 when Askins 
proposed his reforms, the colony’s political economy had radically changed because of the 
Great Depression. The Depression had led to a precipitous decline in national income, thrown 
many white citizens out of employment, converted many into virtual indigents and caused 
serious agitation over the ‘tepid’ Moffat government’s uninspiring handling of affairs during 
this crisis period.
58
 In addition to postponing the planned ‘native development’ projects, the 
colonial Treasury was looking for both overt and less obvious ways of balancing its books on 
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the backs of African commodity producers and taxpayers, hence the introduction of new 




The implication was that, while Leggate had in 1929 indicated the availability of funds for 
health care development, by mid-1930 that position had altered markedly. Arguably, Askins’ 
emphasis on what appeared to be a simple – and therefore cheap – scheme to address some 
important and urgent programmes was a necessary tactic if he entertained any hope of being 
listened to by a government that was presiding over its worst economic crisis ever. He was 
fully aware that, ‘if we are going to extend the system at the moment, we come up against the 
question of finance’.
60
 Thus, although the longstanding interest in reform certainly provided 
the necessary logic for his proposal, that alone was not enough.  
 
It therefore necessary to reflect on the broader context within which Askins acted, and the 
individual agency he brought to bear on the issue as he appraised himself with changes in 
healthcare policy. This perspective is necessary because it helps us to understand why 
Fleming and Askins dealt with the same problem differently. This section thus seeks to show 
that Askins read the situat on differently, perhaps because of his broader outlook. For him, 
reform was an urgent local (colonial), international and personal issue that required urgent 
action, however tentative, even during the Depression years. 
 
Notably, Askins framed his ideas with developments in other colonies in mind. His reforms 
came against the background of similar developments which had been taking place in other 
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African colonies after World War I. Such schemes which included the establishment of rural 
dispensaries, the commencement of training schemes for healthcare workers and the adoption 
of other special initiatives such as maternity work, have been widely discussed in the 
burgeoning historical literature focusing on different regions of colonial Africa.
61
   
 
These essentially simultaneous, overlapping and cross-pollinating
62
 developments indicated 
the gradual acceptance by colonial governments of the responsibility of providing medical 
care as a national service. Askins proved himself to be a person of wider outlook than his 
predecessor as he was quick to realise that Southern Rhodesia was already lagging behind in 
the area of rural health care, making it important that a scheme should be formulated and 
tried out. In prefatory remarks to his new scheme, he showed awareness of this fact and 
sought to also bring it to the attention of the other Southern Rhodesian officials: 
The treatment of natives is a matter which has long received the attention of the 
authorities of the French African colonies and of the Congo. The matter has more 
recently received much consideration in Uganda and Nyasaland, and schemes are now 




Further arguing his case, he indicated that, while many aspects of colonial African life were 
still open to ‘doubt and discussion’, it had become clear that there was ‘unanimity of opinion 
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in regard to the need and desirability of the provision of medical treatment for their more 
urgent wants.’
64
 He cited this as one of the major highlights of the conference of the South 
African Medical Association held in Durban in 1930 where, he learned, there was ‘complete 
agreement as regards the necessity, though there were wide differences of opinion as regards 
the correct method, for securing medical treatment of natives.’
65
 Clearly, Askins had taken 
time to familiarise himself with developments in other parts of the colonial world and used 
such knowledge jointly with internal realities to justify reform. At the same time, his ideas 
pandered to popular stereotypes.  
 
It is also possible that he immediately became aware of the fact that comparing Southern 
Rhodesia with other colonies that had programmes in place was a useful bargaining tool in a 
colony which, on account of its peculiar position, was extra-conscious about how it was 
perceived within the family of British colonies. Officials always took care to be seen to be 
doing better than other colonies in terms of their ‘native policy’, to avoid any embarrassing 
sanction by British public opinion.
66
 Officials in Southern Rhodesia were thus always quick 
to tout the progressive nature of their ‘native policy’.  
 
But why would reform be such an urgent matter for Askins personally? Together with urban 
planning
67
 – perhaps an interest which he developed because of the nature of his previous, 
urban-focused public health work in Bristol – the development of new medical services in the 
underserved rural areas was an area where he could achieve distinction as a new colonial 
public health bureaucrat. His predecessor had trail-blazed in other areas, including the 
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initiation of a schools medical service for white children and the setting up of a London 




It can therefore be argued that rural medical care provided him with an underdeveloped area 
where he could carve his own niche, and that developments elsewhere in Africa provided him 
with the necessary models. His compelling observation that only a few urban-based Africans 
and those capable of accessing medical services in mining hospitals and a few medical 
missions,
69
 can be taken as a strategy in that direction. However, the urgency he showed also 
said something about him as a public health professional, recently arrived from reforming 
Britain. There are strong indications that he brought some of the reform momentum from his 
previous duty station, Bristol. Peering into his previous experience could therefore yield 
further insights into some enduring influences that could have been seminal in his 
determination to reform the colonial medical service. In doing this, it may also be helpful to 
keep in mind Lenore Manderson’s relevant that some public health programmes were merely 
implemented in colonies ‘soon after they were introduced in the centre, and reflected not 
government understanding of colonial needs, but rather contemporary changing ideas and 




Askins left England at a time when social reform schemes, of which public health was an 
integral part, were increasingly engaging the attention of the British society at large. There 
were emerging concerns about the health of the nation and Jane Lewis suggests that this was 
a result of eugenicist and imperial ideas, especially following the Anglo-Boer War which 
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exposed the extremely poor quality of British army recruits.
71
 This realisation increased focus 
on personal healthcare services and produced an associated push for the state to take a 
leading role in the provision of such services.
72
 The 1906 assumption of power by the Liberal 
Party created an enabling environment for the rising tidal wave of social reform, especially 
those driven by the ‘radical reforming politician’, Lloyd George,
73
 leading, inter alia, to the 




Further reforms were introduced soon after World War I, including the establishment of a 
Health Ministry was established in 1919 and the publication, in 1920, of the Dawson Report 
which advocated health centres and the increased availability f health services.
75
 This 
report’s publication coincided with the formulation of schemes such as the Gloucestershire 
Extension of Medical Services Scheme (GEMSS) whose main premise was also the extension 
of personal health services through a locally coordinated healthcare delivery system.
76
 Other 
pioneering experiments emerged in the 1920s, notably the Peckham Health Centre which 
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In all this push for reform, some historians have argued, medical officers of health played 
crucial roles both as innovators and implementers of such policies.
78
 Indeed, some of them, 
such as Arthur Newsholme, have attracted scholarly attention because of the legacy of their 
ideas.
79
 Going into detail about these interesting developments is outside the scope of this 
chapter; suffice it to say that medical officers of health were responsible for originating 
programmes designed to radically improve access to medical services. Also, personal health 
services expanded significantly under their agency as they oversaw the development of 
numerous welfare schemes in the early twentieth century.
80
 Askins was one of those medical 
officers of health who were in the forefront of the implementation of these new schemes, an 
experience he carried over to the less developed Southern Rhodesia.  
 
Askins’ flirtation with this new aspiration to extend medical services to previously ignored 
risk groups had its beginnings in 1914, when the Bristol Education Committee appointed him 
as the inaugural head of the Schools Medical Service. Accordingly, it is important to briefly 
profile here his story from 1914 onwards, and gradually build towards the argument that his 
work in Bristol influenced his later work, in Southern Rhodesia. Initiated by the British 
Parliament in 1908,
81
 the schools’ medical service constituted one of the new areas for 
widened medical coverage in the early twentieth century. Working within that context in a 
leadership position placed Askins on the cutting edge of ideas that related children’s health to 
national success and progress.  
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In 1915, he went on war duty to France and returned to Bristol after demobilisation with 
increased confidence about the subject of youth health and national well-being. For instance, 
in his 1919 Annual Report of the Schools Medical Officer, he spoke about how the war had 
made him realise ‘the large amount of physical unfitness in adults due to want of care and 
treatment during childhood’.
82
 This realisation, he revealed, gave him a ‘powerful incentive’ 
to enlarge and improve the schools’ medical work, with the objective of improving the 
standard of health of those children ‘who are to form the future of the race’.
83
 He was 
certainly not the only one to realise this, but he worked within an enabling wave of 
reformative ideas which he increasingly became passionate about. During that period, 
systematic treatment as an important preventive tool was increasingly becoming an area of 
greater emphasis,
84
 an issue he vigorously pursued in his schools medical work.  
 
In 1924, Askins was appointed Deputy Medical Officer of Health of Bristol, and in 1928 
when he succeeded Dr. Davies as Bristol’s City Medical Officer of Health. This put him in 
complete charge of an area of strategic importance, not only in terms of south-west England, 
but also nationwide. As a port city, Bristol occupied an important position in the country’s 
defence against imported diseases. In addition to coordinating the public health activities of 
the Port Authority in general, he was also solely responsible for the direct supervision of 
inspection of foreign immigrants.  
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With this background in mind, it is possible to argue that his advocacy in Southern Rhodesia 
was simply a continuation of his Bristol work in a different context. Although the language of 
justification differed between colony and metropole, in essence in both communities the aims 
of safeguarding the health of the elite from infection and ensuring a healthy nation were high 
on the agenda. Moreover, in drawing up his medical units scheme, Askins was inspired by 
certain specific healthcare schemes that were being tried out in some English counties in the 
1920s.  Notably, similarities between his scheme and John Middleton Martin’ GEMSS 
scheme, strongly suggests that he drew some lessons from the latter. 
 
The influence of the Gloucestershire Scheme 
  
The idea of the district being the focal point for organised medical care may have had other 
colonial origins, but the fact that it featured in Askins’ proposed scheme had observable 
origins in Gloucester. In parts of Britain, the idea of organising health services on a district 
basis emerged very strongly during the early twentieth century as a result of concerns about 
the fragmentation of existing health care services.
85
 Coordination schemes such as the 
regional hospital trusts had their origins in such concerns. As N. T. A. Oswald put it, the 
thinking behind these trusts was that, 
If the whole population is to have access, when necessary, to highly specialized 
services which cannot, by definition, be provided at all locations, then there must be a 





This may have been the influence behind Askins’ proposed arrangement that there be a 
district hospital where the skills of the government medical officer would be accessed 
through a referral system of patients from the network of dispensaries, and through the 
medical officer’s regular visits to such outlying medical stations. 
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However, as already noted the British health-service coordination and extension scheme that 
seems to have had the most influence on Askins’ medical units scheme was the GEMSS, a 
Gloucestershire County Council’s public health project whose boundaries overlapped with 
Askins’ Bristol City and County public health boundaries. The GEMSS was commenced in 
1920 by John Middleton Martin, the County’s medical officer of health, as an experiment in 
both the extension and co-ordination of rural medical services.
87
 George C. Gosling suggests 
that, in similar spirit to its national counterpart, the Dawson Report of 1920, the GEMSS’s 





The aim of the model was to set up a scheme that would be able to effectively deal with the 
different common cases found in the County, namely, defects of schoolchildren, maternity 
and child welfare cases, tuberculosis, venereal diseases, and orthopaedic cases.
89
 The scheme 
sought to use the County’s existing infrastructure and personnel, including hospitals, hospital 
staff, general practitioners, and district nursing groups to operate in a coordinated structure 
with out-stations that pivoted around central hospitals, to create an elaborate district health 
system. Martin Gorsky offers the best description of the main features of the scheme: 
[I]ts innovative feature was the provision of “out-stations” in the rural parts of the 
county. These were small-scale health centres, either purpose built or situated in 
existing cottage hospitals, Poor Law institutions or tuberculosis dispensaries, and 
staffed by GPs paid on a contractual basis. Gloucestershire was divided into 
administrative areas (Bristol, Gloucester and Cheltenham), each with its general 
hospital, to which the out-stations were affiliated for patient referrals, and with its 
specialist institutions such as tuberculosis sanatoria.
90
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A Survey Report compiled in the early 1930s praised the scheme for its full exploitation of 
local resources.
91
 Each of the district hospitals had its allocated part of the County, and the 
allocation of personnel was arranged in such a way that consultants left their hospital bases 
and visited patients at their nearest outstations, whereas in most counties patients travelled to 
see consultants.
92
 The goal of the originator of the scheme, Martin, was eventually to have an 
out-station within three miles of every section of the County, achieved on the basis of the 




The Gloucestershire scheme is so closely echoed in Askins’ scheme that it is not far-fetched 
to argue that the latter was a direct adaptation of the former. Firstly, the proposed division of 
Southern Rhodesia into ‘medical districts’ or medical units mirrored the division of 
Gloucestershire into Bristol, Gloucester and Cheltenham health administrative districts in 
which there were designated out-stations c nnected to the big hospitals in the centres of 
specialisation. Secondly, the idea of mobile consultants was also echoed in Askins’ idea of 
running each medical unit on the basis of a designated medical officer who visited out-
stations located at certain pre-determined distances from the district hospital. These were 
supported by a sedentary African auxiliary and white nursing staff. Thirdly, the use of 
‘existing agents’ and institutions by the Gloucestershire scheme found its way into Askins’ 
proposal of taking advantage of existing government infrastructure in launching the 
programme of medical units. In both schemes, the new institutions had to be purpose-built, 
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mainly to economise on resources, although Askins also rationalised his idea by saying that 
he required medical stations that were familiar to Africans.  
 
The Gloucestershire scheme was certainly more elaborate and complex because it was grafted 
on a better-developed foundation. In contrast, the Askins scheme was mainly concerned with 
inaugurating services in areas where they were virtually non-existent. In addition, the Askins 
scheme had to negotiate a complex set of racial relations in addition to the professional and 
resource issues with which the Gloucestershire scheme was mainly concerned. Nevertheless, 
the two schemes clearly shared some profound similarities. Gorsky suggests that public 
health’s affinity for well-planned and coordinated services during the period under review 
may have emerged as a result of the influence of notions of ‘rationalization’ and ‘scientific 
management’ spawned by the Taylorist management system pioneered in the American 




The influence of the Gloucestershire scheme on Askins’ thinking is not hard to explain 
because of its relative success and popularity. Although the Gloucestershire scheme had its 
detractors, it had such widespread appeal that renowned advocates of social medicine, public 
health reformists and intellectuals such as Professor Charles-Edward Winslow of Yale 
University travelled to Gloucester in August 1932 to study the system of medical out-
stations.
95
 Within the United Kingdom, it was cited as one of the pre-eminent pioneering 
experiments in organised medicine.
96
 As contemporaries, Askins and Martin had interacted in 
various forums, including the West of England Branch of the Society of Medical Officers of 
                                                 
94
 Gorsky, ‘The Gloucestershire Extension of Medical Services Scheme’, p. 493. 
95
 UKNA, Mh66/90, A. C. Parsons, Administrative County of Gloucester, Report on a Survey of Public Health 
Services, 1932, p. 90. 
96
















Health, of which Askins was elected President in October 1924.
97
 Society meetings offered 
members opportunities to discuss new schemes in their districts and many of those schemes 
were noted for publication in the Society’s official journal. This fostered exchange of ideas, 
and their adaptation in different areas. 
 
Furthermore, Gloucester was Askins’ preferred retreat and it was said of him that ‘he was 
extremely fond of simple rural life, and whenever his duties permitted he sought the company 
of the Somerset and Gloucester Hills’.
98
 If he had no experience in rural healthcare delivery, 
he had experience of rural life, and he apparently also had a valuable template from the 
Gloucester public health scheme on which to formulate his own ideas.  
 
The reforms as colonial biomedical power 
Yet, Askins’ reforms were as colonial, as they were innovative. Indeed, as David Arnold has 
famously said, 
There is indeed a sense in which all modern medicine is engaged in a colonizing 
process…. It can be seen in the increasing professionalization of medicine and the 
exclusion of ‘folk’ practitioners, in the close and often symbiotic relationship between 
medicine and the modern state, in the far-reaching claims made by medical science 




Anna Crozier adds that one of the defining features of colonial medicine in British Africa was 
the continued ‘sensationalisation’ of the African as inherently pathological, and the 
valorisation and celebration of the colonial doctor as the hero who selflessly served the 
primitive African patients at great personal risk.
100
 There was a tendency among many 
colonial medical officials to be unquestioning of their own self-proclaimed superiority and 
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 These insights aptly summarise some of the inner essences 
of Askins’ reforms. 
 
Firstly, Askins did not jettison the infamous colonial practice of framing Africans as 
reservoirs of infective disease. By resorting to the ‘reservoir of disease’ stereotype, Askins 
consolidated a prejudiced image that Africans had endured since the pre-reform era. Such 
views informed repressive disease control measures. A good example of this sensationalist 
view related to the syphilis scare, a disease that, because of its closer linkages with inter-
racial sexual relations, endured the most widespread, elaborate and lingering attention of the 




Lynette A. Jackson remarks that a ‘striking characteristic of the public health files on colonial 
Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) is the frequency with which one encounters references to 
African women as disease hosts or agents’.
103
 According to Jackson, at a conference held in 
1928 to consider some new strategies against syphilis, Fleming indicted ‘stray (African) 
women’, ‘girls on the move’ and ‘travelling prostitutes’, as the main agents responsible for 
‘spreading disease all over the country’.
104
 Such women were forced to submit to compulsory 
examination which they remembered as chibeura (to turn upside down).  
 
Were the reforms, therefore, solely driven by self-interested and racist public health ideas? 
Were they only about averting the spill over effects of poor health among the Africans? There 
is no single answer to this question. In December 1930, when Askins addressed the Advisory 
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Board of Native Development, he told them that ‘we doctors feel the humane side’, but that 
‘the purely selfish side is also of practical importance... because it will obviously commend 
public sympathy’.
105
 Was this a conscience-salving ploy since he was speaking to a mainly 
missionary-dominated group?  
 
The well-informed medical historian, Walter Bruchhausen has compellingly argued that not 
all colonial healthcare officials should be accused of ‘lacking a genuine sympathy for the sick 
and a wish to relieve their suffering’.
106
 Indeed, Askins was concerned that the various 
diseases that occurred in endemic and epidemic forms in the colony were of importance both 
because of the likelihood that they would spread to Europeans and because of the 
unnecessary destruction of life and erosion of health which resulted among the Africans.
107
 
The latter reason clearly stemmed from a form of medical humanitarianism. 
 
Arguably, sometimes invoking such popular, sensationalist images was an important strategy 
used by reform-minded officials to get the buy-in of colonial legislatures and treasury 
officials who held the keys to funding. Askins had dealt with complex funding issues during 
his time in Bristol, and was therefore aware of the difficulties involved in fund-raising for 
new projects. For instance, in 1925, he had a long list of items for which he required funds, 
including hospital treatment for children suffering from crippling conditions, operative 
treatment of enlarged tonsils and adenoids, increasing dental staff and the provision of open-
air hospitals and schools accommodation.
108
 In anticipation of official outrage at the amount 
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of funds required, he tactfully pre-empted criticism by noting that, ‘the treatment of illness in 





If it was an issue to convince the authorities in richer England, Southern Rhodesia was even 
tougher terrain for him, given the complex, racialised structures of development the immense 
impact of the Depression on colonial coffers. However, as Bruchhausen also admits, in our 
efforts to understand the nature of colonial healthcare institutions and policies, we should 
look for answers beyond ‘just the personal’ and ‘moral’ feelings of the key players.
110
 Even if 
we accept Askins’ explanation that he emphasised self-interest for pragmatic reasons, his 
entire treatise cannot escape critical assessment from many other angles. Firstly, in 
mimicking the popular stereotype of the African as a ‘reservoir of disease’, Askins fortified 
prejudice and distorted his own motives.  
 
In Mimesis and Alterity, Michael Taussig perceptively argues that ‘The wonder of mimesis 
lies in the copy drawing on the character and power of the original, to the point whereby the 
representation may even assume that character and that power. In older language, this is 
“sympathetic magic”.’
111
 Askins’ approach, as much as it was partly sympathetic, did exactly 
what is suggested by Taussig. That said, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that he 
did not believe these stereotypes himself.  
 
Secondly, in his policy proposal he revealed that one of his reasons for developing rural 
medical services was to eradicate the influence of indigenous healers whose medical work, he 
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disparagingly said, ‘must frankly be described as being of the most primitive character’.
112
 
He particularly took aim at indigenous midwifery, charging that there was a lot of ‘folly and 
superstition,’ and a ‘considerable admixture of cruelty’ that entailed the extreme suffering of 
African women in childbirth.
113
 Indeed, Askins was keen to supplant African forms of 
healing and to impose Western biomedical institutions and practices. In January 1931, writing 
to the Chief Native Commissioner who had sought his opinion on the subject of doctoring by 
Africans, Askins showed that he looked forward to the eradication of this maligned practice 
‘as soon as the government are able to substitute a scheme for the treatment of natives by a 




In June 1931, Molala Milasi, described in the scant records as an African ‘doctor’, applied 
through the Native Affairs Department to try an experimental cure for leprosy, or 
alternatively for a permit to cure patients on his own. Askins’ response was that, ‘we cannot 
grant this native a room in which to experiment on leprosy. Neither will it be possible to issue 
him with a permit to “doctor” the sick’.
115
 He added that if the African in question cared to 
‘send in samples of his medicines and tell us his methods in using them, the Government 
Analyst has promised to experiment with the samples....’
116
 It is not clear whether this leeway 
was an open-minded gesture or a ploy to stealthily take the medication in question and the 
methods of its usage under the cover of scientific analysis. Indeed, other biomedical 
practitioners would have rejected the request unequivocally.  
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However what was unfortunate, although not surprising, was that this budding therapeutic 
pluralism was suffocated by Askins at a time when biomedicine was still itself faced with 
pharmacological and epidemiological challenges in respect of African healthcare, some 
notable progress in other areas notwithstanding. Some medicines used by doctors were not 
any safer. For instance, between 1930 and 1932, a venturesome use of vermifuges like carbon 
tetrachloride, together with a purgative to cure hookworm and endemic helminthic disease 
caused a scare when patients vomited and became ill; a woman so treated miscarried and six 




Thirdly, Askins also fortified racial privilege by pivoting the medical units scheme around 
European medical officers when he framed the structure of the district health team. In his 
policy documents he specifically referred to the South African Loram Committee Report, 
which had recommended, inter alia, the training of Africans as doctors to work in rural areas, 
but emphatically stated he would not recommend the scheme in Southern Rhodesia.
118
 In his 
own words, Askins said, 
I do not think the problem of Southern Rhodesia is a very difficult one. It is perfectly 
obvious that we want trained Native Orderlies and Native Midwives.... I think there is 
no doubt we do not want to fall in with Rockefeller’s suggestion in regard to the 
Johannesburg University. I do not think it would be wise to adopt the proposition of 
Rockefeller for trained Native Doctors. Therefore we go back to this, that we have got 




For him, therefore, the correct course for Southern Rhodesia was the modification of the 
much-vaunted French West African system whereby Africans were trained and deployed to 
work under the supervision of a white doctor.
120
 Perhaps what Askins wanted to be modified 
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in the case of Southern Rhodesia was that, according to M. S. Kiwanuka, the French gave 
some of their best African medical assistants a chance to practise privately.
121
 The system of 
medical orderlies supervised by white doctors also commended itself to him because the cost 
‘would be low per capita’.
122
 In thinking about these issues he drew on the South African 
case where the liberal recommendations of the Loram Committee Report came under 
immense criticism by medical conservatives.
123
 By dint of this, Askins’ otherwise 
reformative scheme took on a conservative, colonial nature. Therefore, as he sought to extend 
the benefits of biomedicine to the rural Africans, he also promoted white privilege at the 




Askins came into the colonial African scene at a time when reformist ideas were floating 
around across the metropolitan and imperial borders, and so it would be a mistake to treat 
Southern Rhodesia as an isolated case. As has been demonstrated above, the Southern 
Rhodesian version of rural healthcare reform was influenced by developments elsewhere. By 
offering to reduce inequalities in healthcare provision, the reforms were progressive. 
However, the good intentions were muddied by numerous prejudices, including 
ethnocentrism and the entrenchment of racial privilege. This was perhaps indicative of the 
multiple, often incompatible aims of colonial biomedicine. In the interstices of these impulses 
were tensions between race, public health and colonial progress. And, as this chapter has 
attempted to show, these impulses had histories beyond the local and the colonial. The next 
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chapter which focuses on the pioneering of the medical units scheme in colonial Fort Victoria 
province illuminates these contradictions even more precisely, along with the negative impact 












































‘The work had to be commenced, enlarged and carried on’: The pioneering of the 
medical units scheme in Fort Victoria Province 
 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the pioneering of the medical units scheme in rural Fort Victoria and 
it pays particular attention to how the vision turned out on the ground. After his conception of 
the scheme and its approval by the relevant authorities, from 1931 Askins started preparing 
for its gradual implementation, beginning with delineation of two medical districts for the 
creation of the first two pilot medical units. The first medical district, which became known 
as the Ndanga Medical Unit, and which is the main focus of what follows in this and the rest 
of the chapters, encompassed Ndanga, Bikita and Gutu, the three contiguous districts making 
up half of Fort Victoria Province, in south-eastern Southern Rhodesia. The second medical 
district was mapped out around Mtoko, in the north-eastern part of the colony. The choice of 
Ndanga and Mtoko as the first two pilot districts was in line with one of the major pillars of 





Ndanga and Mtoko were by then the only two rural districts with posts that were occupied by 
resident government medical officers primarily preoccupied with so-called ‘native medical 
work’. From 1926 Mtoko had been an area of growing leprosy control work under Dr. S. R. 
P. Montgomery.
2
 Although Dr. Montgomery left the colony at the end of 1927, his post was 
not abolished, giving Askins an opportunity to appoint his own candidate, Dr. James Leggate, 
in 1931, to spearhead the setting up of the new Mtoko Medical Unit through the expansion 
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and diversification of the existing leprosy control work to include a general district hospital 




Meanwhile, in Ndanga, Dr. T. J. Williams had been responsible since 1913 for running the 
only state-owned rural general hospital for Africans, as was illustrated in chapter 1. In 
addition, in 1926 the medically aware Native Commissioner for Bikita District, H. N. 
Watters, had successfully motivated for the setting up of a venereal diseases clinic in the 
vicinity of his administrative compound.
4
 From its establishment the clinic was regularly 
visited by Dr. Williams, while much of the daily work was done by the Native 
Commissioner’s wife and two African orderlies. The new plan was, therefore, to refurbish 
and expand the existing infrastructure before building more subsidiary dispensaries across the 
three selected districts, with Ndanga as the headquarters (hence the name of the unit) and 
Bikita and Gutu being the subsidiaries.. 
 
This chapter, and indeed the entire thesis from here, focuses on the Ndanga experiment for 
one historical reason. In 1935, Askins, the originator and initial promoter of the idea of 
medical units, was succeeded by Dr. A. P. Martin who was not enthusiastic about his 
predecessor’s scheme. The Askins model consequently lost its currency and the Mtoko Unit 
was abandoned, while the third medical unit which was planned for establishment in 
Sebungwe, in the southwest of the colony, was not attempted at all. The Ndanga scheme was 
thus the only enduring story to emerge from the original vision of a comprehensively-
organised, district-based African healthcare delivery system run by a fulltime government 
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medical officer, white nurses and African medical auxiliaries.
5
 Despite its many 
imperfections and the burden of being a product of abandoned plans, the development of the 
Ndanga Unit left behind an incomplete but sizeable collection of archives that can be used to 
probe the scheme of medical units and gain useful insights into the underlying concept’s 
rather limited operational history.  
 
Focusing particularly on the period from 1932 to 1959 – a period which corresponds with the 
time spent in Ndanga by the Unit’s pioneer and chief developer, Dr. James H. Kennedy – this 
chapter uses this existing archive, augmented with oral sources, to trace the history of the 
development of the Unit’s main facilities very closely. Exploring this particular aspect of the 
Unit’s history is important for two reasons. Firstly, it introduces us to the particularities of the 
Unit’s ten key nerve-centres which included the main Ndanga Hospital and its nine out-
stations dotted across Ndanga, Bikita and Gutu. Secondly, probing first how each medical 
station came into existence is the logical starting point towards understanding the full 
spectrum of local and national factors which either advanced or limited the development on 
the ground of a district healthcare system as envisaged in Askins’ medical units proposal. The 
chapter argues that while the scheme was hobbled by faltering state commitment to African 
healthcare in general and the medical units approach in particular, the role played by 
Kennedy was the single most important factor that explains the continued existence and 
expansion of the Unit. 
 
Kennedy was determined to forge ahead with the scheme even after the abandonment of the 
idea of medical units after 1935. However, his mission became possible because of three 
reinforcing factors. Firstly, because the colonial state generally underfunded African 
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healthcare and had too small a bureaucracy to be able to supervise practice in far-flung 
regions closely, district medical officers were generally afforded a great deal of leeway to 
organise things locally as they saw fit. Although Kennedy’s position was not unique, he 
however utilised that latitude to an unusual, albeit controversial extent.  
 
The second factor in explaining Kennedy’s record was his unconventional character. As this 
chapter and the next one will show, Kennedy had low regard for bureaucratic authority and 
he often seemed oblivious to disapproval from the public health headquarters. His 
organisational skills and imperious zeal also worked to his advantage. However, his work 
could have been impossible without the third enabling factor: the co-operation of African 
communities and their willingness to either heed his calls to build the required dispensary 
facilities or their volunteering to do so out of perceived community need.  
 
In formulating some of the opinions about the historical role played by the medical officer, 
the variable nature of African’s participation in healthcare development and the way that 
these two interacted with each other and with the state, this chapter relies on a synthesis of 
different but reinforcing insights drawn from scholars such as Anna Crozier, Gerald C. 
Mazarire and George O. Ndege.
6
 In a detailed description of the life experiences of mostly 
rural medical officers in colonial East Africa, Crozier illuminates several key themes, 
including rural doctors’ relative independence and the extremely wide remit of their official 
and general responsibilities. According to Crozier, medical officers generally faced limited 
official superintendence and professional monitoring. Crozier reckons that their wide 
professional responsibilities were matched only by the equally huge size of their operational 
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districts. The average medical officer was expected to be an ‘all-rounder’ and a versatile 
‘jack-of-all-trades’.
7
 As a result, further argues Crozier, ‘doctors in the field were therefore 





In a study of the Ngomahuru Leprosarium, Fort Victoria, Mazarire corroborates this view that 
colonial rural medical officers were generally allowed a great deal of latitude to plan certain 
things locally. This was partly because the state was often hamstrung by lack of funds,
9
 and 
one could add, by a lack of political will, given the almost discretionary nature of colonial 
state schemes for Africans. As Mazarire ably demonstrates, while that leeway allowed 
medical officers to pursue their personal visions, there were also risks as the state tended to 
be heavy-handed when it felt that the manner in which a particular doctor was carrying out 
his duties was bringing western medicine and colonial governance into disrepute.
10
 Although 
this was largely mirrored in the case of Ndanga, the clashes between the state and medical 
officers there seem to have been about more than just the state’s worries about the integrity of 
biomedicine. Instead, they mainly related to differences over the manner of the usage of state 
resources. To borrow Poonam Bala and Amy Kaler’s relevant statement, the Ndanga case 
was a conflict of priorities ‘between those who believed themselves qualified to prescribe and 
those who took healing as part of a wider administrative practice’, a situation which entailed 
that ‘divisions of labor and authority were often unstable and ambiguous’.
11
 As this chapter 
will elaborate, these contradictions tended to present the colonial rural medical officer as both 
a colonial agent and an advocate of the poor.  
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In Ndanga, these indeterminate, complex relations transcended the interaction between the 
state and the medical officer to include the African communities. Although in Mazarire’s 
Ngomahuru case Africans were generally not keen on  the institution’s existence in their 
midst because it tended to reflect the imperial mindset of disease control while also 
‘desecrating’ the locals’ ecology, in Ndanga the picture was far more complex. Communities 
there came forward to assist in the construction from scratch of most of the clinics and then 
participated in their maintenance. This important variation has a precedent in other 
comparable colonial contexts. In a refreshing study of the development of modern biomedical 
care in rural Kenya, Ndege has emphasised that relations between African communities and 
colonial officials were not perpetually characterised by conflict, as often believed. Instead, 
there were notable moments of compromise and accommodation whereby African 
communities provided the required resources and ideas for the development of healthcare 
facilities in their communities.
12
    
 
However, while placing a premium on the contributions of African communities in the 
development of healthcare services in Ndanga, this chapter is less sanguine than Ndege’s 
rather exuberant charge that through their ‘proactive activities’ Africans ‘were the prime 
movers of health care development’ in colonial contexts.
13
 That could be peculiar to his 
western Kenyan case. In the case of Ndanga, it is argued that, despite the crucial role played 
by African communities in the development of the district healthcare system, in terms of the 
quality of facilities, the Unit remained on the margins of prime colonial healthcare. This 
illustrated the misplaced priorities of the colonial state and the limitations of localised 
initiatives that were not consistently matched by steady political will. 
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At the same time, as an arena of the extension of the state’s tentacles and professional 
medical practice, colonial medical care remained ensconced in the broader matrix of 
asymmetrical power relations surrounding colonial development, whereby Africans were 
treated as a different, inferior class of human beings. In the process, the few progressive 
elements and the inherent potential of certain aspects of biomedicine and district healthcare 
suffered heavily. The chapter is therefore a discussion of the possibilities and constraints of 
healthcare development in a divided, profoundly undemocratic society.  
 
Having considered these issues, the chapter argues that the implementation of Askins’ model 
of a district-based rural healthcare system turned out to be a tension between the broader 
colonial ambitions and the health-related imperatives of developing a functioning rural 
healthcare system. The chapter develops and illustrates through concrete examples the 
argument raised in the previous chapter, that colonial healthcare was a contradictory 
constellation of innovative and retrogressive forces. Nothing confirmed its partly alluring 
appeal than the proactive action taken by the Africans communities of Ndanga, Bikita and 
Gutu to provide the facil ties for its practice. At the same time, nothing illustrated its 
limitations than its alignment with the whims of the privileged colonial classes.  
 
To explore these issues, the chapter begins with a brief introduction of the chief protagonist 
of the Ndanga Unit story, Dr Kennedy, followed by an overview of the sub-region he was 
charged to oversee as a medical officer. It then proceeds to explore the initial attempts to set-
up the Unit beginning from the early 1930s, illuminating particularly the challenges 
encountered in raising the initial funds for the refurbishment and expansion of the main 
















trace the establishment of outlying dispensaries, and closes with an exploration of the limited 
modernisation (or further improvement) of the facilities of the main hospital in the 1940s.    
 
The beginning of an epoch 
One of Askins’ top priorities in the process of implementing the Ndanga Unit was finding a 
suitable medical officer to spearhead the process as Dr. Williams was due to leave Ndanga. 
His search for that candidate led him to Dr. Kennedy whose appointment to Ndanga can be 
regarded as the beginning of a distinct epoch in the medical history of rural Fort Victoria. 
While he lived and practised in Ndanga for almost three decades, Kennedy attained legendary 
status not only among his white and medical contemporaries, but also among the African 
communities of Ndanga who still have fond memories about their Chiremba Kenende, as he 
was known in local Karanga dialect.
14
 In the oral histories of Ndanga, nostalgic memories of 
Kennedy’s times are barely matched by those of Dr. Simon Mazorodze, the African doctor 
and well-known liberation war figure who was the medical officer in charge of Ndanga from 
the late 1960s to the early 1970s.
15
 As Kennedy was a generally liberal-minded, generous, but 
also demanding frontier doctor, this popularity is in part understandable. He also seems to 
have minimised overt racial prejudice, which however appears in his memoirs.  
 
Described by Dr. Dyson Blair, one of his contemporaries, as ‘the despair of the 
administrator’,
16
 Kennedy was notorious for his disregard for official procedure, especially in 
relation to administrative requisitions and returns. For instance, for almost a decade he 
assiduously ignored numerous official protestations over his habit of proceeding to Meikles 
Stores, Fort Victoria, to get whatever he required for his clinics before forwarding the 
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vouchers to the head office in Salisbury, for (often unbudgeted for) payment. This resulted in 
him being hauled before a Public Service Board disciplinary committee for a disciplinary 
hearing over his cases of administrative impropriety.
17
 As one interviewee quipped, he was 
‘his own headquarters’.
18
 Ironically, it was this impropriety coupled with zeal which was 
essentially the lifeblood of the scheme; the Ndanga Unit emerged and continued to exist after 
the abandonment of the idea precisely because Kennedy chose to be his own ‘headquarters’. 
 
But who was Kennedy? Born on 26 November 1899 in Salisbury, the Southern Rhodesian 
capital, Kennedy was the son of his similarly named father, an ex-Griqualand West Irishman 
who had distinguished himself as Southern Rhodesia’s first Master of the High Court. After 
matriculation, in 1921 he was awarded a Rhodes scholarship to study medicine at the 
University of Oxford, before entering St. Bartholomew’s Hospital in London where he 
qualified in 1926.
19
 With this qualification, he became the first Southern Rhodesian-born 
doctor – an achievement which earned him respect and admiration as a history-making 
citizen of that part of the British Empire. A Diploma in Tropical Medicine gained from the 
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene completed his complement of 
qualifications, which primed him for the Southern Rhodesia Medical Service. After some 
brief ‘junior’ postings at the colony’s urban hospitals and rural district outposts, he finally 
landed his own ‘independent command’ when, in October 1932, Askins appointed him to 
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(Photo Courtesy of Rhodes House, Oxford) 
 
Kennedy’s first responsibility was to transf rm the relic he inherited from his predecessor 
into what Askins envisaged to be a functioning ‘headquarters’ for ‘a typical native medical 
unit’ organised on the basis of a simple hospital block, ‘consisting of an operating theatre, 
sterilising room, out-patient department and dispensary’, and several outstations  
approximately 40km away.
21
 The Unit was to serve as a model to illustrate ‘how by this 
method medical facilities can be brought within reasonable distance of 80, 000 to 100, 000 
natives by means of a number of cheap buildings and the services of a European doctor with 
a staff of native orderlies’.
22
 This cheaply built Unit would be able to deal with ‘all types of 
medical, surgical, and obstetric cases’.
23
 Kennedy’s initial task was therefore to spearhead the 
refurbishment and re-equipping of the district hospital before venturing into the extension of 
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the scheme by establishing outstations across the three sub-districts making up the Unit’s 
catchment area. 
 
It is perhaps necessary at this point to give an overview of the area in which he was supposed 
to establish this pioneer Unit. As a colonial administrative district, Ndanga was carved out of 
the Victoria district in 1899, following the creation of the Native Affairs Department.
24
 In 
1920, the eastern portion of what was then a sizeable district was in turn separated from it to 
create the new Bikita district. In addition to the fact that Bikita had a clinic that was 
earmarked as one of the Unit’s first outstations, its administrative ties to Ndanga meant that it 
was the first to be included into the new medical district.  
 
North of Ndanga and Bikita was Gutu district which was incorporated mainly to reach the 
ideal population size of 80, 000 to 100, 000 people to be served by one medical officer, as 
envisaged by Askins.
25
 In terms of population, in the early 1930s Bikita had an estimated 31, 
311 people, Gutu 35, 557 people, and Ndanga 40, 280 people, bringing the total to 107, 148 
people.
26
 These were however estimates, since no proper census of Africans was undertaken 
until the 1960s. African communities were scattered across an area covering approximately 
25, 000 square kilometres (or one-twelfth of the colony), living mainly in reserves, although a 
few others lived in Native Purchase Areas (farms), in alienated lands and on Crown land. 
These three districts also shared a very rich pre-colonial history, a similar cultural milieu and 
a common dialect (Karanga), as well as an identical ecological zone. During the pre-colonial 
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times, the Ndanga-Bikita-Gutu area was mainly inhabited by the Karanga-speaking Duma 
Confederacy, with its nucleus around Bikita,
27
 although some parts were under the influence 




However, the Shangani, a smaller and culturally distinct ethnic group, occupied the southern 
part of Ndanga district, stretching to the border with Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique). 
Although their proper ethnic identification is Hlengwe, from the nineteenth century they have 
been generally called the ‘Shangani’ because of their closer association with the Gaza 
kingdom of Soshangane.
29
 This ethnic group shared similar cultural identities with the 
Tsonga people inhabiting the southern parts of Portuguese East Africa and the northern parts 
of South Africa.  
Fig. 3.1: Map showing the Ndanga Medical Unit area 
 
Source: Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Masvingo_districts.png. 
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The ‘lowveld’ has been the main geographical and regional descriptor used to encompass the 
greater part of the territory demarcated as the new Ndanga Medical Unit, especially the 
portion covered by Ndanga and Bikita. During the colonial period, the lowveld evoked 
competing visions as ‘cattle country suitable for ranching; wild bush for game ranching or 
national park; potentially productive land for irrigated sugar estates or small holder farming; 
and the ethnic homeland of the Shangaan (sic) people and abode of their ancestral spirits’.
30
 
Thus, while the area to be covered by the Ndanga Unit mainly encompassed ‘native districts’, 
it was also interspersed with white farms such as the huge Devuli and Angus Ranches in 
Bikita because of its suitability for animal husbandry. Crown Lands also broke up parts of the 
Ndanga East Reserve.  
 
Warm climatic conditions and the riverine nature of the topography made the lowveld a 
natural habitat for malarial mosquitoes. The provision of health services was therefore also 
presented as a way of taming the supposedly wild territory and possibly opening it up for 
white enterprise and civilisation. In line with this thinking, as late as the 1940s Kennedy still 
considered himself to be spending most of his time ‘in the wilderness doing largely native 
work’ in ‘wild and remote country’.
31
 He indeed wanted to be perceived as somebody 
engaged in the frontier, civilising the African communities on behalf of the British Empire.  
 
However, by the 1930s this part of Fort Victoria had been gradually transforming towards 
modern and colonial forms of life and class differentiation as some sections of the three 
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districts were set aside as Native Purchase Areas, that is, farms set aside for purchase and 
occupation by middle-class Africans under the Land Apportionment Act, of 1930.
32
 The 
process of change and differentiation was also accentuated by missionary evangelisation as 
the Dutch Reformed Church, the Church of Christ and the Roman Catholic Church competed 
to spread their brands of religion among the region’s communities. Independent African 
churches such as the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) and the Zion Apostolic Church also 
started robust evangelisation in the 1920s,
33
 effectively converting the region into a plural 
society.   
 
Other agents of change were the labour migrants as the region was already a labour exporting 
zone by 1900, with most migrants trooping to both Southern Rhodesian and South African 
mines and farms.
34
 This had the effect of gradually introducing industrial diseases, diseases 
of civilization and infectious diseases into the area. Thus, when the sub-region was selected 
to pioneer the medical units scheme in the early 1930s, it was far from being a terra incognita 
as it was claimed by others to be.
35
 However, many people still held on to their hallowed 
therapeutic traditions, something which was important in their gradual encounter with 
biomedicine. Periodic epidemic outbreaks, spells of drought and famine and the tentacles of 
the state brought the Karanga and the Shangani into closer, albeit contested association with 
the biomedical world. Some of these themes will be elaborated in later chapters, after 
understanding first the initial process of setting up the main facilities of the Unit, which is the 
main purpose of the next sections of this chapter. 
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Hopeless foundation, protracted beginning 
When Kennedy first took over Ndanga hospital the position, as he aptly put it, ‘appeared 
practically hopeless’ and therefore the work had to be ‘commenced, enlarged and carried on’ 
in line with Askins’ new idea of medical units.
36
 The existing hospital was woefully 
maintained and was threatened by structural collapse that had started provoking official 
concern in the 1920s, but which remained unresolved until the early 1930s, and even then 
only temporarily so. It was a relic in a relic, having inherited in 1924 the Native 
Commissioner’s old and abandoned compound after its own original buildings had proved 
hopelessly inadequate. A Public Works Department official who visited the hospital in 1925 
had condemned most buildings as unfit for normal use and a large proportion as unfit for 
renovation.
37
 Fleming also admitted after his visit later that same year that ‘a building 





However, two further years elapsed without any recognisable refurbishment. In 1927 the 
Acting Medical Director, A. J. Mackenzie, also visited the hospital and produced another 
instalment in a series of damning reports on the condition of the colony’s lone state rural 
hospital for Africans. Mackenzie described the hospital as a ‘collection of broken down pole 
and dagga shacks’.
39
 In 1929, the nurses’ quarters were found to be in a ‘dangerous 
condition’ as the building was ‘overrun with white ants and in a state of collapse’ and ‘not 
worthy spending a penny on’ if any renovations were contemplated.
40
 Yet, by 1932, major re-
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building had not taken place. This was partly because officials had become cautious about 
making any long-term infrastructural commitments, as the hospital had become the centre of 
conflicting, local white settler group interests. The conflict had its roots in Dr Mackenzie’s 
1927 visit. In the report he compiled after that visit he had shown concern about the 
hospital’s location on the ‘extreme northern end of the district’ and recommended that it be 





This suggestion was supported by the Greater Fort Victoria Settlers’ Association (hereafter, 
the Settlers’ Association), a group of white settlers who inhabited alienated lands on the 
south-eastern parts of the Unit’s catchment area and who relished the idea of the proximity of  
a doctor. From 1928, the Settlers’ Association had started to petition the government of 
Premier H. U. Moffat to urgently transfer the hospital to the new site for the benefit of the 
settlers in that part of the district. However, Fleming was not supportive of the idea of 
transfer as he anticipated resistance from another white settler organisation in the province, 
the Eastern Fort Victoria Farmers’ Association (hereafter the Farmers’ Association), 
representing individuals owning farming and cattle ranching business such as the Devuli and 
Angus Ranches in Bikita. As he told the Colonial Secretary, William M. Leggate, the 
interests involved in the case were too ‘conflicting to arrive at a conclusion with ease and 
certainty’ as he was aware that the Farmer’s Association ‘will hotly resist the removal of the 
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Indeed, as Fleming feared, in August 1929 a letter of inquiry arrived in his office from the 
Farmers’ Association asking him to clarify the rumoured transfer of the hospital.
43
 Perhaps to 
buy time, Fleming professed ignorance in his response to their query.
44
 In the intervening 
period, he advised Leggate to call for a round table conference where the issue could be 
discussed with the conflicting parties,
45
 but the conference did not take place and available 
sources do not shed any light on the reasons for the failure. At that conference Fleming was 
going to suggest improving lines of communication between urban Fort Victoria (where there 
was a hospital for whites) and the parts of the district occupied by the Settlers’ Association 




However, the matter was complicated by the fact that Leggate seems to have accepted 
Mackenzie’s administratively and financially attractive idea. The idea was alluring because a 
concentration of state institutions in one place would mean that the government would be 
relieved of costs incurred during the doctor’s numerous visits from Ndanga to the Native 
Commissioner’s Zaka District headquarters for government medical work. However, in his 
endeavour to explain the reasons for transfer to the Farmers’ Association he, rightfully, 
placed emphasis on the fact that many more patients would be better served by a hospital 
positioned in Zaka rather than Ndanga. He rejected the view by the anti-transfer group that 
Zaka was an unhealthy site in terms of weather and altitude by arguing that such opinion 
could only apply in the case of a sanatorium and not a general hospital. To facilitate the 
doctor’s unimpeded movement from Zaka to the north, he also offered to bridge the Chiredzi 
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On its part, the Farmers’ Association took that argument as undue prioritisation of African 
interests at the expense of white interests. Their response to his reasoning is worth quoting at 
length to illustrate verbatim not only the acrimony, but also some of the crude tactics used by 
the settlers to influence government policy in their favour. They argued that, 
... [T]o depend upon medical assistance 40 miles away offers poor consolation and little 
consideration for the interests of the white element in the country....The consensus of 
white opinion of those residents below Zaka is for the hospital and medical officer to 
remain at Ndanga. The transfer will mean considerable expense which will be shouldered 
more by the European taxpayer than the Native – in fact, we have to bear the burden of 
helping to increase the Black numerical preponderance, which, in the long end, will 
become an insuperable obstacle to white supremacy....The native mind has not been 
educated up to the appreciation of medical science, in short, it is afraid of it and would 





They further reminded Leggate that, 
In an era of depression which gives the profoundest and gloomiest thoughts on the 
future status of the European farmer of Rhodesia, the Government would seemingly 
add to the expenses of his exchequer and simultaneously jeopardise the security of his 
health. In conclusion ... [the Association] would appeal to the Colonial Secretary to 
weigh this matter on the scale of his own flesh and blood and colour – [and] not [to] 
pay the minutest attention to the lines of latitude and longitude with their respective 




Fleming retired leaving this divisive issue unresolved, effectively passing it on to his 
successor, Askins, and it took the latter a further three years to resolve while the Ndanga 
scheme was kept on hold. This stand-off cast a dark cloud of uncertainty over the scheme 
until Askins, who was anti-transfer, managed to defuse the tension through his argument 
which emphasised the fact that Zaka was unsuitable on health grounds. Moreover, based on 
his new concept of medical units, Ndanga hospital would be central, while the outlying 
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dispensaries would cover areas favoured by the feuding parties,
50
 ensuring the accessibility of 
the doctor. He argued that malaria-bearing mosquitoes, which continuously menaced the 
Native Commissioner’s entourage, infested Zaka.
51
 Based on Askins’ opinion, on 17 April 
1934, Colin E. Duffy, the Secretary for Internal Affairs under whom the Public Health 
Department was now administered, therefore issued a final decision that the hospital would 




In all these wrangles Africans were conspicuous by their absence – the strongest indication of 
how settler politics and colonial governance dominated African social and health care at most 
policy-making levels. Although as noted in Chapter 1 Africans had started proto-nationalist 
in the 1920s, their healthcare and other affairs remained in the thrall of white settler interests. 
For instance at one point when the Fort Victoria Branch of the Southern Rhodesia Native 
Association petitioned the state to provide them with a Superintendent of Natives who knew 
African customs, the response they got was, ‘To this I can say that the government knows 
best what is good for you’.
53
 Africans were perceived as children. 
 
However, what worsened matters was the context within which much of debate over Ndanga 
took place: the Great Depression. The Great Depression caused a serious deterioration of 
relations between white settlers and the government of the unenthusiastic Moffat, as the 
former’s enterprises were brought to the brink of ruin and employment opportunities virtually 
vanished, throwing many whites into near destitution.
54
 The rancour that defined these 
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strained relations is exemplified in the letter from the Farmers’ Association to the Leggate, 
quoted above. In the previous chapter it was also noted how, in the wake of the Depression-
induced problems, the colonial state was forced to impose more demands on Africans to 
subsidise the survival of white citizens. In addition, the dominant discourse of African 
‘development’ was temporarily recast to reflect and accommodate the immediate concerns of 
whites rather than the relatively long-term, theoretical premise of civilising the African upon 
which it was initially based.
55
 To compound the already bad situation, African development 
programmes were dropped from the state’s agenda. This brings us to the second and equally 
important challenge that led to considerable delay in the launch of the Ndanga scheme: a lack 
of funds.  
 
In drawing up the scheme, Askins had showed concern about the difficulty of getting enough 
funds, hence the idea of pioneering it tentatively and on the basis of the cheap means of 
African orderlies. Indeed, he spent much of the time between 1930 and 1933 looking for a 
dependable funding mechanism to commence his much welcomed, but poorly-resourced 
scheme. He literally left no stone unturned as he enquired from his counterparts in 
neighbouring colonies how they funded their own schemes, suggested the introduction of a 
general health tax or re-allocating some funds from the existing African taxes and mooted the 
idea of introducing user fees so that Africans could bear the cost of their care.
56
 In Askins’ 
own words, it was ‘clear that if the medical treatment of the native is to be developed, it is 
necessary to tap some source of income which is not at present available’.
57
 However, the 
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idea of user fees was dropped in March 1931, when he was convinced that it would spell 
doom for the new scheme.
58
 Native Affairs authorities also turned down his suggestion of a 
new levy in the form of a health tax, arguing that both the African labour and produce 





Ironically, the same officials who rejected his funding plans oversaw the passage of legal 
instruments such as the Maize Control Act which was one of the vital, Depression-era 
linchpins used in the exploitation of Africans expressly for the purpose of cushioning the 
vocal white citizens.
60
 Also, according to Ian Phimister, the existing Native Development 
Account – which was essentially a trust account – was ‘surreptitiously’ debited by the state 
for the purpose of saving the white population from ruin. Leaders such as the surgeon-cum-
politician, Godfrey Huggins, flagrantly ignored the ethical dilemmas of such actions, arguing 
that Africans would actually ‘prefer an indirect to a direct stock tax’ for instance, ‘unless ill-
intentioned people or agitators stir them up’.
61
 Authorities also turned down a proposal by the 
Southern Rhodesian Native Missionary Conference of July 1931, that two-thirds of the 





This lack of consensus over the funding of the new rural healthcare initiative meant that there 
was no dedicated budget created for its commencement. The expressions of approval of the 
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scheme by the Colonial Secretary and the Chief Native Commissioner rang hollow.
63
 The 
default official position was that, while the state recognised the need to extend medical 
services to Africans in rural areas, this had to be done gradually.
64
 However, Askins was 
anxious to make a start and possibly demonstrate that the scheme could be implemented 
without inordinate expense. He thus began to draw on ‘Vote 7C: Treatment of Venereal 
Diseases’, which was created under his predecessor in the 1920s, and remained the main 
operational reserve for African medical work until the 1935/36 financial year when it was 
expanded and re-named ‘Vote 31/C: Native Dispensaries and Clinics’, in recognition of the 
expanding healthcare work.  
 
However, Vote 7C proved to be so small that to make the first significant move towards the 
re-construction of the Unit’s ‘headquarters’, Askins had to approach Treasury and the 
Minister of Internal Affairs in March 1933 to request a loan of £1, 750 for the reconstruction 
of the main hospital building and £1, 000 for improvements to the medical officer’s house.
65
 
When the financial provisions for the following year were calculated, he managed to get a 
total allocation of only £1, 835 (£1, 115 for Ndanga Hospital and £726 for four dispensaries) 
to cover both construction and running costs during the 1934/5 financial year.
66
 Thus, to cut 
costs, grass-thatched, pole-and-mud patient huts were constructed using free, locally 
available building materials, as well as locally mobilised, free labour. This strategy became 
the lifeblood of the Unit for a long time as it became clear to those on the ground that getting 
sufficient funds from the state was always going to be difficult.  
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However, after these initial difficulties reconstruction began to take shape in 1934. The main 
aim of the officials in Salisbury was to start with the refurbishment of the doctor’s house, the 
white nurses’ quarters and the construction of the main hospital block, which was to include a 
consulting room, a dispensary, a theatre and an out-patients’ department. However, driven by 
the desire to have all the necessary facilities ready from the outset, Kennedy also went ahead 
with some additional construction work that he considered to be equally important, and this 
resulted in his overlooking of certain administrative procedures. Thus, in August 1934 
authorities discovered that he had employed a local African builder, Moses, to construct 22 
new patients huts, for which there was no provision in the estimates. In addition, this was 
done without following a proper tender process as the total cost exceeded the £50 threshold 
for a tender. As a corrective measure, Public Health Department officials barred any further 
expenditure on the required equipment during that financial year, while also pleading with 




These seemingly banal developments are mentioned here because in them lay what became 
the default modus operandi in ‘Jim Kennedy’s kingdom’, as his contemporaries called the 
Ndanga Unit.
68
 A series of cases of improper purchases of unbudgeted for items ranging from 
small provisions to big equipment like electricity generators and, according to some accounts, 
even vehicles,
69
 decorate Kennedy’s administratively controversial career in Ndanga. 
Successive Medical Directors such as Askins’ successor, A. P. Martin, and Kennedy’s juniors 
in the medical service, Richard Morris and Dyson Blair, all tried but failed to stop him from 
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doing things his way. At the end they resigned themselves to the fate of having to live with 
Kennedy’s well-known eccentricities.  
 
Only once, in 1941, during Martin’s tenure as Medical Director, was he formally charged and 
brought before a Public Service Board of Inquiry for his habitual overlooking of official 
procedures.
70
 By touting his incomparable achievements in Ndanga and the impossibility of 
his work without an administrator, he escaped from the inquiry virtually unscathed. He was 
only warned officially and exhorted to regularise his administrative system, something he did 
not faithfully implement.
71
 The breach of official procedure and the compromises reached 
during the 1934 construction work were therefore precursors to a series of future 
developments of similar nature. Relative isolation gave him the leeway to do things his own 
ways. Having found his own independent command in a frontier zone, Kennedy seems to 
have been very keen to rapidly transform the area by impressing upon it a biomedical model. 
Indeed, by 1934, Kennedy had already ventured into the establishing the first outstations. It is 
therefore useful to take a brief detour and reflect on this aspect before coming back to trace 
the further development and modernisation of Ndanga Unit from the late 1930s to the late 
1940s.   
 
The establishment of outstations 
From December 1932, Dr Kennedy started leaving the hospital under the care of a trusted 
‘lieutenant’, his wife, the matron Ino ‘Trix’ Kennedy, as he ventured into the outlying areas 
first to build rapport with two important stakeholders first, Native Commissioners and 
African chiefs. Meetings were held with the highly-regarded Bikita Native Commissioner, H. 
N. Watters, and local chiefs to determine ideal locations for the new dispensaries (or sub-
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hospitals as they were sometimes called) and to get the assurance from chiefs that building 
materials and labour would be provided free of charge by their subjects.
72
 Kennedy initially 
preferred locating these new dispensaries nearer to the Devuli and Angus ranches to give 
access to a large concentration of prospective patients who were employed at these ranches, 
as well as to have the closer presence of whites in case urgent supervision was required.
73
  
Because the ranchers at Angus had previously petitioned the state for help in setting up a 
clinic for their employees,
74
 Kennedy’s proposal to establish the first clinics almost at the 
gates of these ranches was initially criticised by some senior Native Affairs Department 
officials who regarded the idea as a mere attempt by ranchers to get the doctor to set up his 




However, this opposition seems to have ended when officials realised that it would be better 
to have these clinics strategically located nearer to pockets of white settlement than to risk the 
independence of African orderlies who were to run these dispensaries under the distant 
supervision of the medical officer. Thus, a second outstation in Bikita District,
76
 Chikuku 
Dispensary, was built along the main Victoria-Save road in Bikita Reserve, about 48km from 
the Native Commissioner’s Camp and the Bikita Dispensary, and about 4km from the Devuli 
Ranch.
77
 Certainly its location a victory for the Devuli proprietors, the new dispensary 
opened its doors on 17 August 1933. A third outstation in the district, Matsai Dispensary 
(later renamed Mashoko) was situated about 1/2 km from Mashoko Mission so that it could 
depend on the oversight of the missionaries there, as the Native Commissioner’s Camp was 
about 64km away. Accordingly, in May 1933 eight huts were completed by local 
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communities under chiefs Mabika, Gudo, Ziki and the communities occupying the lower 
parts of the Mazungunye chieftainship.
78
 After the delivery of basic equipment and supplies, 
the appointment of an orderly and a request to the missionary’s wife to render some voluntary 
help, the dispensary saw its first patients on 4 August 1933. 
 
A similar procedure was followed in the extension of the scheme in Ndanga District, 
southwards, towards the Native Commissioner’s Zaka Camp and the Greater Victoria Settlers 
Association farms. In that area, the Unit’s fourth outstation, Siawareba (Siawareva) 
Dispensary, was established at Chief Siawareva’s old homestead, about 14km from Zaka 
Camp, and 41km south of Ndanga Hospital.
79
 Built and completed in September 1933 under 
the eye of an African messenger,
80
 this dispensary started with 10 huts, eight of which were 
set aside for a maximum of 50 in-patients, while the remaining two were used as quarters for 
the orderly and a dispensary. 
 
In 1936, the number of outstations was increased with the establishment of Jichidza 
Dispensary in Ndanga District about 16km southwest of the main hospital. Another 
outstation, Chidumo Dispensary, was sited about 100km further south, among the Shangani. 
While the outstation in Jichidza was entirely constructed of pole-and-mud and grass thatch 
material, the one in Chidumo was distinct from others as only the patients’ huts were similar 
to other dispensaries. Like Ndanga Hospital, the central block of the dispensary was a brick-
and-mortar structure with corrugated iron roofing.
81
 Another distinguishing feature was that 
Kennedy also built his own house there. Moreover, unlike at other dispensaries where the 
building programme was usually left in the hands of chiefs and African messengers, in the 
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case of Chidumo Kennedy closely supervised the ‘trained and competent’ African builder, 




Two factors explain why Chidumo was a more elaborate dispensary than the other 
outstations: its distance – some 120 km – from the Ndanga Hospital and Kennedy’s own 
personal interest in the area. Located at the confluence of the Chiredzi and Lundi rivers, the 
area was teeming with wild animals which appealed to Kennedy’s hunting interests. 
Accordingly, he decided to make his travels to Chidumo what Colin Saunders has aptly 
called ‘medical safari trips’.
83
 Through this accomplishment, he established himself as a 
quintessential frontier colonist responsible for opening unexplored areas to white civilisation. 
According to some accounts, the Chidumo outpost hosted a number of colonial hunters, most 




The expansion of the Unit in Gutu District began with the establishment of Chikwanda 
Dispensary in 1935.
85
 The district’s second dispensary was at Chingombe, which was taken 
over from the Dutch Reformed Church in 1938 under circumstances which suggested that 
local state officials were not happy with the Church’s work.
86
 Following a visit arranged by 
the Gutu Native Commissioner, Kennedy wrote to Martin, the Medical Director, that ‘… if 
put on a somewhat different basis, [Chingombe dispensary] could be made to carry out a 
great deal more work, particularly as far as in-patients are concerned’.
87
 He then proposed 
that ‘Chingombe Clinic be taken over by this Unit as soon as possible, and that its scope and 
usefulness, most particularly as regards in-patients (which are not satisfactory) be increased 
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 In addition to adding Chingombe to his network of dispensaries, he also 
managed to persuade Martin to approve the establishment of another dispensary at the Gutu 
District headquarters itself:  
I beg to submit my suggestion…that in the event of it not being possible to erect at the 
moment the nucleus of a clinic at Gutu station itself (which nucleus, in the form of 20 
Kimberley brick and thatch huts, would cost not more than £49) or in the event of a 
lesser sum not being available (and I submit that this lesser sum might without much 
difficulty be obtained) that the offer of the Native Commissioner (of 3 good 
Kimberley and thatch huts) be accepted, and that these be equipped to commence a 





Alas, the Gutu dispensary was located less than 10km away from an existing Dutch 
Reformed Church missionary dispensary at Gutu Mission, which had a fully qualified nurse 
as well as the services of a doctor who was based elsewhere. In addition, the Gutu Mission 
dispensary was a beneficiary of a government subsidy scheme commenced in 1927. The 
setting up of a rival state dispensary in Gutu may have had something to do with ethnic and 
administrative tensions between the British and the Afrikaner staff, known officially for ill-
treating Africans in the Gutu area.
90
 Inevitably, the location of the two dispensaries in close 




The Unit’s last two outstations were established in Sangwe and Chitsa in 1945 and 1946 
respectively. The former was located on the southeast boundary of Ndanga and Bikita 
Districts to cater for communities in Ndanga East Reserve and Sangwe Reserve in Bikita. Its 
establishment followed a nutrition deficiency survey conducted by Kennedy among 
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communities settled along the Mkwasine River.
92
 According to the Native Commissioner for 
Ndanga District, that dispensary ‘was built by interested natives’ of Ndanga East and Sangwe 
Reserves.
93
 Similarly, Chitsa Dispensary in Gutu was also a people’s project. In his 1946 
annual report, the Native Commissioner for Gutu District, wrote that Chief Chitsa’s people, 
[H]ave long been clamouring for a clinic to serve their needs. During this year having 
become tired of waiting for the government to provide a clinic the people got together 
and as a co-operative effort they have so far built a Kimberly brick dispensary and 8 
Kimberely brick huts. Another 12 huts are still to be built and then the clinic will be 
equipped and staffed by the senior government medical officer Ndanga and come 






Fig 3.3: Location of Ndanga Hospital and Outlying Dispensaries 
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In his 1947 report, the Native Commissioner again indicated that the clinic was built and 
completed, much to the embarrassment of the Public Health Department, which was initially 
not ready to equip it and commence treatment work.
95
 Indeed, without the active participation 
of African communities in the pioneering of dispensaries in their communities, it is 
inconceivable that the Unit could have expanded in the way it did. Also not to be 
underestimated is Kennedy’s own ability to put to greater use the autonomy he had as more 
or less a frontier doctor. He used the well-known difficulties of pioneering such work as a 
justification for his unorthodox actions. 
 
In turn, Kennedy managed to accomplish most of his tasks because of the consistent help he 
received from his right-hand man, Benson Charovedza.
96
 Charovedza was Kennedy’s driver, 
interpreter and cultural broker from the latter’s appointment in 1932 until the time he left 
Ndanga in 1959. To illustrate the much glorified Kennedy-Charovedza partnership, it may be 
illuminating to refer to some ‘heroic’ tales related by elderly eyewitnesses. A caveat should 
be issued, though, that these stories are not cited because of their assumed historical 
objectivity or truth, but because of the way they paint in heroic colours the relationship 
between the two men. This is taken as an example of how local people viewed and responded 
to the collaboration between an ‘outsider’ (Kennedy) and ‘their own’ man (Charovedza), and 
as an indication of what the relationship meant for community relations in general. 
 
For instance, one couple told the story that, during one of their numerous hunting trips 
sometime in the late 1940s or early 1950s, Kennedy and Charovedza encountered at close 
range a wounded and angry buffalo which charged at Kennedy and nearly ran over him. The 
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‘brave and loyal’ Charovedza snatched the gun from the frightened doctor and gallantly shot 
at the angry buffalo until it collapsed. When they got back to the hospital, Kennedy decided 
to show his appreciation to his saviour by selecting Charovedza as the heir to his estate. 
Many possessions were bequeathed to Charovedza, including a car, a store, a grinding mill, 
money and guns – although the colonial government denied him possession of those guns 
when Kennedy died in 1967.
97
 Although Charovedza’s surviving son confirmed that their 
father received a long of gifts from Kennedy’s estate, the store was not one of them as it was 
started in the 1950s the later was still alive. His own piece of intriguing story is that upon his 




Fig. 3.4: Deadly Alliance: In this undated photo, Dr Kennedy (behind) and Charovedza (front) 
after shooting an Elephant 
 
(Photo Courtesy of the National Archives of Zimbabwe) 
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What these stories tell us is that, just like other pioneers, Kennedy had relied heavily on his 
close relationship with Charovedza as one of the pillars of the management of the Unit. As 
noted in the introduction to this chapter, the nature of rural medical officers’ work entailed 
that they had to be local innovators.
99
 Much of what Kennedy did was therefore the norm 
elsewhere in the colonial world. For instance, the partnership between popular Ugandan 
medical missionary, Albert Cook, and his right hand man, Yusuf Musajawaza, has been 
recorded by John Iliffe.
100
 However, Kennedy’s story has its own unique features. What 
distinguished him was that his own brand of innovation enabled him to press forward with 
the Ndanga Unit long after the policy of medical units had been abandoned by Askins’ 
successor, Martin, who became Medical Director in 1935. As the Ndanga scheme had gained 
its own momentum, it could not be stopped.  
 
Kennedy attempted to persuade Martin to continue implementing the scheme in other districts 
of the colony as planned by his predecessor. For instance, in February 1936, he wrote to 
Martin recommending an application for funds from the Beit Trust to set up a new medical 
unit.
101
 Apparently, by that time he had already submitted a long memorandum advocating 
the establishment of a new medical unit, an indication that he was keen to see the dream of 
his fellow Irishman, Askins, taken forward. Onto the memorandum to Martin he attached a 
news item clipped from The Bulawayo Chronicle, containing the following words by Henry 
Birchenough, the Board Chairman of Beit Trust: 
The native population has, however, an unmistakable claim to share in the benefits of 
the fund.... We have as a body of trustees still to solve the main problem, namely, how 
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and in what precise directions the benefits of the fund can most wisely and most 




Kennedy took this as a ‘direct invitation to apply for assistance’, and he urged Martin to do 
so, attaching the newspaper clipping, his memorandum on the establishment of a new 
medical unit and annual reports to his letter.
103
 Unfortunately there are no available records 
that shed more light on how Martin responded to this counsel, but the disappearance of the 
concept as the official operational ideology indicates that he was not in favour of its 
continuation. Martin, a man of the Fleming era, preferred what he called a Native Clinic 
System.
104
 Launched in 1936, this system entailed the establishment of individual clinics at 
Native Commissioners’ district headquarters, loosely taken as subsidiaries to the exiting 
district surgeon system that catered for white settlers in outlying districts. Through this 
approach, he sought to revive the system begun in 1927 of locating clinics in the vicinity of 
Native Commissioner’s offices, as discussed in chapter 1. District surgeons made visits to 
these clinics, but their priority was the health of white settlers. 
 
The problem with this approach was that, as noted in 1945 by the colony’s first Preventive 
Field Officer and future Secretary of Health, Dyson M. Blair, ‘Even if a medical officer is 
interested in his native clinic work he must on his own and because of its effect on public 
opinion, give native clinic work second place to his functions as medical practitioner 
attending the European community’.
105
 Blair’s candid view was therefore that, even though a 
number of clinics had been established under Martin’s Native Clinics System by 1945, ‘the 
only work of real lasting value to the African is being carried out by one medical officer who 
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works whole-time with Africans’, a clear reference to Kennedy.
106
 Indeed, in 1945 the 
National Health Services Commission reckoned that the Ndanga Unit accounted for 37 




The value of the idea behind the Ndanga scheme was also realised later by medical 
bureaucrats such as Mark H. Webster, a Secretary for Health, who, in 1973, ruefully 
lamented that ‘it is indeed a pity that this very logical pattern of development was not 
followed completely in the years that came after’.
108
 Although Webster acknowledged the 
logical nature of the district healthcare system as envisaged by Askins, he was also convinced 
that the Ndanga Unit did not develop into the model scheme that it was initially envisaged to 
be. In his 1966 annual report he had damningly remarked that, 
A very special problem of development is presented by the Ndanga group of 
hospitals, which is [an] expanded medical slum, in spite of all the valiant efforts of the 
District Medical Officer who is, incidentally, in charge of more inpatients and 




Certainly, that appalling state was not a recent development in 1966. As the last section of 
this chapter will show, the continued existence of the Ndanga scheme exemplified two 
important factors: (a) Kennedy’s determination, endurance and foresight and (b) the limits 










Fig. 3.5: Patients or Slum Dwellers?: Dr Chitiyo with a Group of Patients, mid-1960s 
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(Photo Courtesy of Dr M. Chitiyo) 
 
 
Fig. 3.6: Worn Buildings: A Part of an Unnamed Clinic, mid-1960s 
 




















Struggles over the improvement of facilities 
Although in documents meant for public consumption at the time, the launch of the Ndanga 
Unit in the early 1930s was clad in grandiose discourse as a model scheme,
110
 this public 
show masked private concern and the complexities associated with developing healthcare 
services for Africans. In private correspondence, he frankly admitted right from the outset 
that, ‘the upkeep of the native clinics has turned somewhat more expensive than we 
anticipated’.
111
 The difficulty of finding a ready funding did not dampen his spirits though. 
Indeed, he continued to use his position to find ad hoc funding for the scheme. However, 
after his death in 1935, his scheme was bound to suffer because Kennedy, a non-policy 
maker, had remained as its sole advocate.  To illustrate the difficulties encountered, it may be 
useful to trace developments surrounding two key services that were central to the success of 
the scheme, viz. water and electricity services. The discussion will also be extended by a look 
into struggles over the maintenance and improvement of the Unit’s facilities.  
 
When the scheme was launched in the early 1930s, water was provided through an ox-drawn 
cart which was ‘now entirely worn’.
112
 Although the logical thing to do was to replace the 
water cart immediately, both Askins and Kennedy were aware that for a hospital that was 
envisaged to grow significantly into a district headquarters, providing water by such means 
was not sufficient. An initial attempt to sink a well in the vicinity of the hospital failed.
113
 At 
the beginning of 1934, therefore, Askins commenced negotiations with the Irrigation 
Department, aimed at the installation of a water engine.
114
 That process took almost three 
years to complete as a 3H.P. engine was only installed towards the end of 1936, after much 
effort and disappointment, including the deletion of this item from the 1934/5 financial 
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estimates, without the medical director’s knowledge.
115
 However, the 1936 installation of the 
pump proved to be the proverbial too little, too late, because the hospital’s water woes 
continued unresolved. Indeed, in 1946, a senior public health official admitted that ‘water 




Efforts to install electricity also encountered difficulties. Although Kennedy’s request for the 
installation of an electricity generation engine began soon after his arrival at the hospital in 
1932, his need for electrical power became stronger in 1935, following the delivery of the 
long-awaited theatre equipment by the Public Health Department. In February 1936, he 
requested the new Medical Director, Dr. Martin, to seriously consider electrifying the 
hospital because ‘I have recently had occasions on which I performed some operations with 
the aid of hurricane lamps, and the contrast of [a] nice o erating theatre illuminated by a few 
natives swinging hurricane lamps was incongruous’.
117
 However, that did not produce rapid 
results and further petitioning followed later that year, when the Beit Trustees donated an X-
ray unit to the hospital.  
 
Perhaps irritated by the persistent requests from Ndanga, at one point the Internal Affairs 
Minister coldly said that, ‘the hospital has been in existence for years without electric light or 
X-ray plant’.
118
 Eventually, however, a 2,000-watt, 110-volt electricity generation plant was 
installed in 1937.
119
 It can be inferred that it was because of the difficulties encountered in 
achieving the initial set-up of electricity generation that, when another engine destined for the 
urban Fort Victoria Hospital was delivered to Ndanga by mistake, Kennedy did not hesitate 
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to encase it and connect it to his hospital’s power system.
120
 When the mistake was later 




Further difficulties were encountered in the maintenance of the infrastructure, which required 
frequent renovation and expansion to cater for the increase in patient numbers. Already 
within a few months of their establishment, in the Chikuku and Siawareba dispensaries 
patients were resorting to erecting their own huts because of inadequate accommodation.
122
 
By early 1936, all the existing clinics had become an eyesore, and Kennedy concluded that 
the time for the abolition of the original pole-and-mud huts and their replacement with 
Kimberley brick and grass thatch huts had arrived: 
 
I think the time has now come in this Unit to have something a bit better than the old 
pole and dagga units. It is going to save me a lot of trouble and worry – with probably 
no result in the end – if I could put up say 14 Kimberley brick and thatched huts, 12 




However, four years later, these pole-and-mud huts were still the backbone of the Unit’s 
patient accommodation because the funds for initiating a more durable form of 
accommodation were not easily forthcoming.
124
 It is not clear why the system started in 1936 
of building rural clinics through pre-cast and corrugated iron material did not cover Ndanga. 
Thus, to stretch the little funds he was getting from treasury, Kennedy turned his hand to 
local brick-making and fund-raising arrangements. He started selling the cattle hides and 
mealie meal sacks which were residues of the Unit’s patient rations programme, and used the 
money to fund maintenance work in the Unit. However, this practice was criticised and 
stopped by state administrators in 1941 because it was done without the knowledge of 
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In 1944, following his return from wartime service, Kennedy expressed his intention to build 
a modern hospital with wards accommodating about 100 patients. His wish was to have a 
centralised hospital with four wards, each with 20 beds, and an additional children’s ward 
with ten beds and a ten-bed maternity ward with labour and sluice rooms. In addition to that, 
he also wanted new accommodation for eight married orderlies and 23 other staff with 
families.
126
 Budget estimates were submitted in time for the 1944/45 financial year. However, 
in April 1945, it was discovered that those estimates had been deleted from the final 
estimates, and therefore the Public Works Department could not proceed with the work.
127
 
When he attempted to proceed with the work through the agency of the Public Health 
Department’s Contractor of Native Clinics, he was warned that it is ‘highly probable that 





During 1945 Prime Minister Huggins instructed the Public Health Department to hand over 
its construction unit and clinic buildings to the Engineering Unit of the Native Affairs 
Department and the Public Works Department, in a move designed to centralise all 
construction work because of war-induced shortages of building materials. Rather unwisely, 
but perhaps normal for him, Kennedy began addressing his construction-related memos 
directly to the Native Affairs Department’s Engineering Unit instead of channelling such 
communication through the Public Health Department. This provoked the ire of the Public 
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Health administrators, who angrily reminded him that no expenditure in his Unit would be 
incurred without the approval of the parent Department.
129
 At that point there were 103 huts 
at Ndanga hospital alone requiring refurbishment and 14 more requiring construction. On top 
of that, all the outlying clinics had about 20 huts each requiring repair.
130
 Some of these huts 
had no doors, and patients ‘hung up dried cattle hides over the opening in an attempt to keep 




Concrete plans to reconstruct Ndanga Hospital along the lines envisaged by Kennedy were 
eventually made in 1947. The directorship of the Public Health Department had by then been 
taken over by Dr Richard Morris, Kennedy’s junior in the service, who later wrote a warm 
tribute to his senior in years when he retired from Ndanga in 1959.
132
 In 1948, the 
construction of a new, modern hospital was begun. The hut system was not immediately 
phased out, however; it continued as the backbone of the Unit, especially in outlying 
dispensaries. The only improvement was the gradual phasing out of the pole-and-mud huts 
and their replacement with Kimberley brick and grass thatch huts. In the early 1960s the 
number of huts in the Unit as a whole was reckoned to be as many as 800.
133
 In this regard, 
Ndanga was a unique entity. Other state clinics that followed the model introduced by Martin 
in 1936 were smaller and mainly catered for out-patients. The reasons why Kennedy 
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Fig. 3.7: A Part of an Unnamed Clinic, mid-1960s 
 
Photo Courtesy of Dr M. Chitiyo 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has served to demonstrate the possibilities and constraints associated with the 
pioneering and further development of the Ndanga Unit. It has done so by tracing the 
complex, multiple, micro-histories surrounding the development of the Unit’s physical 
facilities. The main conclusion of this chapter is that the scheme’s imperfections 
notwithstanding, the persistent, albeit controversial, efforts made by Kennedy explain the 
continued existence and expansion of the Unit which was all that could be pointed to as the 
colony’s own half-hearted efforts at delivering district healthcare services to Africans.  The 
chapter also noted that, while Kennedy’s determination held the fragile system together for so 
long, his task would have been impossible without the support of the African communities.  
 
However, a full picture on Kennedy’s work in Ndanga cannot be drawn from this aspect only. 
Instead, struggles over the provision of infrastructure constituted one strand of a complex, 
















medical practice espoused and practised by Kennedy within the institutions he strove so 
much to set up and run. Like this present chapter, the next chapter also continues to look out 
for the openings and constraints encountered during the process of developing a rural 
healthcare system for Africans. What this chapter has attempted to show is that the 
development of rural healthcare was susceptible to settler politics, the changing interests of 
the medical directors and the personal interests of the presiding medical officer. Local 










































‘Having thus created the physical facilities, he then introduced his own very special brand of 
social medicine’, noted one contemporary reviewer of Kennedy’s accomplishments when he 
retired from Ndanga in 1959.
1
 Another eyewitness observer added that while at Ndanga, ‘Dr 
Jim Kennedy was practising family and community medicine... long before the concept 
became fashionable, as it did after the 1939-45 war’.
2
 These claims made on behalf of 
Kennedy are both profound and vexing at the same time. In his own memoirs published in 
1957 in the Central African Journal of Medicine at Michael Gelfand’s request, Kennedy 
described what he did at Ndanga but never referred to his approach as social, community or 
family medicine.
3
 Unfortunately, he did not write much else besides these brief memoirs.  
 
However, the greatest risk for the historian writing on his medical approach does not lie in 
incorrectly certifying that his approach indeed contained some of the basic elements of 
community healthcare and family medicine (or social medicine). As we know them today, the 
specialties that were later formalised as community/family medicine in the post-war period 
originated from different practical experiences and evolved in connection with the knowledge 
and skills of the general practitioner – or the ‘all-rounder’ as opposed to the specialist. As 
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Steven Dennis has noted, the contemporary field of family medicine emerged out of the need 
for an all-embracing ‘new physician’ trained in the ‘old fashioned relationship’, that is, ‘a 
physician who would not only appreciate the patient as a total person, but who would also 
appreciate the patient in the context of a social unit known as the family, and by extension, in 
the context of the patient’s environment as well’.
4
 Kennedy’s medical approach at Ndanga 
fits this description very well; for him therefore it was a matter of systematically practising 
the rudiments of something that was later correctly characterised by his biographers.  
 
Instead, the risk lies in either rehearsing the maligned great man medical histories of the 
bygone historiographical era or completely dismissing his approach as smacking of colonial 
and biomedical ethnocentrism, paternalism and a sense of superiority. Indeed, in recognition 
of his unique innovations, Kennedy was elegantly decorated by his contemporaries as 
Southern Rhodesia’s own Albert Schweitzer, while that part of Fort Victoria where he 
rendered his services ‘became Jim Kennedy’s kingdom, and almost every facet of its life is 
indebted to him in some way or another’.
5
 While these claims are certainly overly celebratory 
and sensationalist,
6
 it is however true that Kennedy did much in advocating and personally 
organising resources by himself on behalf of the communities he served. He also sought to 
build good relations with the communities served by the Ndanga Unit, although his 
‘decidedly unorthodox’ mannerisms and habits could have undermined some of these efforts, 
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The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to wade through this complicated account, recognising 
the pragmatism of Kennedy’s ideas without at the same time accentuating the sensationalist 
and heroic gloss encapsulated in contemporary reviews. The chapter notes that the gradual 
extension of regular medical services into the hitherto underserved rural areas during the mid-
twentieth century offered innovative frontier medical practitioners like Kennedy 
opportunities for pioneering ideas formulated from a mosaic of floating concepts and models 
of care. Within the complex matrix of colonial power relations such doctors, to a certain 
extent, became the ‘attorney to the poor’.
8
 At the same time, that process raised new sets of 
questions and complications related to the distorting colonial environment wherein the white 
doctors were both professionals and colonisers.
9
 While Kennedy’s understanding of the 
nature of rural diseases did reflect a creative understanding, he at the same time overlooked 
the complicity of colonialism and concentrated on promoting biomedical precepts and 
institutions among the supposedly ‘wild’ and ‘primitive’ people. 
 
The chapter begins with an outline of the different aspects of Kennedy’s ‘own very special 
brand of social medicine’, and then proceeds to explore the paradoxical origins of these ideas 
amidst the high-tide of curative biomedicine and the uncertain methodological approaches to 
rural healthcare in the colony. This section is followed by a critique of his approach and 
accomplishments. In the final analysis, the chapter argues that Kennedy’s approach was more 
one of basic pragmatism laced with benevolent ethnocentrism rather than any concerted effort 
to profoundly change the social and cultural bases of colonial biomedical practice. The 
chapter advances from another angle the ideas raised in earlier chapters about the bifurcated 
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nature of colonial healthcare and the tensions between innovative practice and colonial 
ambitions. 
 
On Kennedy’s innovations 
Kennedy’s initial pragmatic realisation was that his initial priority was to develop facilities 
capable of treating ‘large numbers from a very large area for prevalent endemic diseases 
rather than for the treatment of individual cases, interesting though many of the latter might 
be’.
10
 The previous chapter dealt with this aspect of his work extensively, indicating how he 
went about setting up the required facilities and the extent of his success in that regard. 
Therefore here it may be useful to rather focus on some of the major diseases that he 
encountered and sought to overcome. Since a later chapter will return to a full exploration of 
this subject from a public health perspective, this present reflection will be confined to the 
early data about the prevailing diseases around which Kennedy might have began forming his 
initial opinions. Where possible, it will also focus on his opinions and reflections over the 
years.  
 
Sparse and crudely collated data for the period from the 1920s to the 1940s gives some rough 
indications of the prevalent diseases encountered by Kennedy. Epidemic smallpox outbreaks 
were reported to be a common feature in the region, particularly in Bikita, which, for most of 
the period under review, continued to be the epicentre of such outbreaks within the Unit.
11
 
However, the two leading diseases that frequently recur in the public health writings of the 
time were syphilis and yaws (known to local Africans as njovera). Syphilis is ‘very 
prevalent’, ‘venereal diseases are prevalent’ and the ‘government medical officer [Kennedy] 
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estimated that it [syphilis] was the cause of at least 78% of the cases treated by him’, were 
diagnoses regularly reported during the early 1930s.
12
 According to reports sent to the Public 
Health Department by Kennedy around 1933/4, yaws was ‘very prevalent’ and affected a 





Malaria was also discovered to be prevalent and the southern parts of Ndanga and Bikita 
were regarded as the malaria hotspots because of the humid and riverine nature of the area. 
One report stated that, ‘towards the end of the rainy season it is difficult to find a child 
without splenic enlargement’.
14
 Many children also tested for broncho-pneumonia. Other 
diseases which were found to be common included enteric fever (typhoid), dysentery, 
bilharzia, hookworm, measles, whooping cough and epidemic influenza.
15
 Advanced cases of 
tuberculosis were also frequently encountered. Nutritional deficiency diseases such as scurvy 




Moreover, a great many injuries and maternity work were also dealt with. Also, in addition to 
the mainly acute, infectious diseases, maternity cases and injuries, Kennedy also frequently 
encountered neurological, degenerative and genetic or hereditary diseases. Common among 
them were leprosy and epilepsy (also commonly known as burns). In 1932 a medical survey 
was done in Gutu and nine leprosy cases were discovered among 9, 608 people examined.
17
 
Although the norm was to refer lepers to either Ngomahuru Leprosarium or Morgenster 
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Mission (near Fort Victoria), some refused, and deaths were frequently reported. Cases of 
cancer were also encountered. Therefore, as Askins correctly put it, commonly found in the 




In his memoirs, Kennedy published some graphic images of some disfiguring maladies he 
encountered in Ndanga (see Fig. 4.1-4.4 below). The publication of such grotesque images, 
which certainly raise ethical questions given the fact that their publication did not serve an 
immediate medical educational purpose, might have been motivated by the desire to paint 
himself as having been up against horrific, disfiguring health conditions. Accompanying his 
heroic memoirs, these images were certainly meant to present an image of a heroic pioneer. 
In addition, the images also fed into the obsession with physical health since a great deal of 
the diagnosis in rural areas was done through eyesight. Indeed, some interviewees recall that 
Dr Kennedy was ‘good in diagnosis using his eyes. If you went to hospital with a sore leg he 
would look at it and immediately know what to use to treat you’.
19
 These photographs are 
therefore part of the physical culture of colonial medicine and they give some indication as 
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Fig 4.1: A Leper at an Outlying Clinic 
 
Source: Kennedy, ‘Bygones of a Bundu Bone Thrower: Part III’, p. 315. 
 
        A disease that evoked pathos, horror, segregation and enjoyed a British, empire-wide control  
       attempt in the form of British Empire Leprosy Relief Association (BELRA),
20
 leprosy was 
        bound to excite Kennedy’s imagination as a frontier doctor. ‘The arrival of a good leper, plus 
        entourage, at an outlying clinic’, as his caption to the photograph reads, suggests that the   
       occasion could not be missed as a photo opportunity to illustrate the confidence people had in  
       his biomedical knowledge. Another disfiguring disease that he sought to illustrate  
       photographically, was Ascites, a disease physically recognised through abdominal swelling as 
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Fig. 4. 2: A Case of Ascites 
 
Source: Kennedy, ‘Bygones of a Bundu Bone Thrower: Part I’, p. 238. 
 
Fig. 4.3: A Case of Frohlich’s Syndrome 
 
Source: Kennedy, ‘Bygones of a Bundu Bone Thrower: Part I’, p. 238. 
 
       The two other cases paraded by Kennedy were those of Frohlich’s Syndrome (Plate 4.3), a    
















       Recklinghausen (Plate 4.4), a genetic disorder that manifests itself through some malignant  
       tumours all over the body. 
 
Fig. 4.4: A Case of Neurofibromatosis (aka von Recklinghausen) 
 
 
Source: Kennedy, ‘Bygones of a Bundu Bone Thrower: Part I’, p. 238. 
 
 
With this wide range of maladies both described in word and illustrated in picture, Kennedy 
formed his opinion around the fact that many of the diseases found in the Unit affected 
families rather than individuals, and also that cases of co-infection were frequent and required 
probing. He thus set out to organise a district healthcare system, with one of the priorities 
being the recruitment of the necessary staff. These would help him and his wife who was the 
matron to run the hospital and its outlying stations. He devised a local recruitment and 
training scheme through which he trained his own African medical assistants as apprentices 
















medical training scheme for Africans only took off in the late 1930s, and even then on a very 




However, there is a dearth in detailed sources on the main features of the training scheme. 
The few available sources include Kennedy’s own memoirs which are problematic not only 
because of the propensity to exaggerate, but also because they gloss over the scheme. 
However, in some cases they are corroborated by the few oral testimonies of the few 
surviving former trainees.  In these memoirs, Kennedy says the training was done ‘on 
eminently practical lines’, focusing on the diagnosis of common diseases, measuring dosages, 
the various techniques of administering injections, dressing wounds, the making of common 
stocks of medicines, dispensing medicine and later on, midwifery.
22
 Ninety-one year old 
Rebecca Shoko, a surviving trainee in Kennedy’s apprenticeship programme, recalled her 
own fading memories of the informal recruitment and training process. Shoko’s memories 
give some vague but useful pointers on the programme. 
 
Shoko recalled that sometime in the 1940s her child had been admitted to the hospital from 
Gutu clinic. Kennedy had personally brought her and the sick child during one of his return 
trips from the Gutu clinics. Like other people taking care of their sick relatives, she was 
expected to take part in the routine cleaning of the hospital grounds. One day while she was 
doing that, Sister Dale, the matron, said to her, ‘this lady seems to be smart, call her’. She 
was then taken to the matron’s office and was shown some medicine bottles and instructed to 
clean them every morning. Thereafter, Sister Dale started asking her the names of the 
medicines written on the containers and when the responses satisfied her, she was offered an 
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opportunity to train as an orderly. Her husband who was then a migrant worker in 




Rebecca Shoko is certainly too old to remember all the details and their chronology with 
precision. Nevertheless, her memories give some hint about the informal recruitment process 
and the practical training involved, including the memorisation of drug names. Another 
apprentice, stayed in the African workers’ quarters with his father who was a general hand at 
the main hospital. When he came of age, Kennedy enlisted him for training as an orderly.
24
 
His training involved instruction and demonstration of all the necessary first aid and nursing 
duties. A kind of ‘postgraduate’ training in midwifery was also offered to the seniors. John 
Iliffe talks about a similar apprenticeship programme in East Africa where most would-be 





That during the first decade of the scheme the local apprenticeship scheme was the mainstay 
of the staffing programme in the Unit can be illustrated by the staff statistics for the 1940s. In 
1941, the entire Unit had a total of twenty-three African orderlies, with twelve of these being 
senior orderlies (or orderlies-in-charge of outstations) and the rest assistant orderlies.
26
 
Among those listed as head orderlies in charge of outstations, six were trained at Ndanga 
hospital, four were immigrants from Nyasaland, two were graduates of Southern Rhodesia’s 
newly-established government training schools in Salisbury and Bulawayo, and two were 
trained at the American Board Mission’s Mount Selinda Hospital located in Melsetter, east of 
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 Most of the assistant orderlies were also local apprentices. In other words, the local 
training scheme was the single largest source of orderlies employed in the Unit. The major 
advantage of such a scheme was that the orderlies so-trained were conversant with local 
culture and were also competent in dealing with the specific diseases affecting that district. 
One of the main disadvantages, as will be elaborated in a later chapter, was that such 
orderlies tended to be subject to the whims of their trainer, the medical officer.  
 
Kennedy’s other innovation was the organisation of in-patient life along family and 
community lines. Ndanga hospital and its satellite clinics did not operate like other 
conventional medical institutions. For nearly two decades of its existence as the Unit’s 
district headquarters the hospital did not have formal beds like other hospitals. Its central 
building, as noted earlier, consisted of a private consultation room, a theatre, an open air 
consultation and dressing shade and a dispensary. Patients were housed in purpose-built 
patients’ villages which were teeming with one-room, pole-and-mud and (later) Kimberley 
brick and grass thatch huts whose number reached hundreds. This patients’ village system 
was replicated in the outstations, which were essentially sub-hospitals because they also 
admitted large numbers of in-patients (see Table 4.1 below). Their main difference from 
Ndanga hospital was that the outstations did not have operating facilities and a resident 
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Grand Totals 5, 787 5, 953 160, 984 
  
Source: NAZ, S1820/9/1 Ndanga Clinic, 1933-1940, Ndanga Unit Returns, Jan. – June, 
1940.   * One patient maintained (admitted) for one day. 
 
 
In these villages, patients were allowed to bring their family helpers who provided around-
the-clock care to their sick relatives. If big enough, each family was given a hut and allowed 
to bring their pots, blankets and other necessary personal effects.
28
 Free food rations 
consisting of mealie-meal, beans, salt, nuts and beef were issued to cater for both the patient 
and family helpers who prepared the food in their own ways and fed the patients. Meat 
rations were run on the hoof and, periodically, beef cattle were slaughtered and rations 
distributed to patients and orderlies alike.
29
 Sometimes buffalo meat hunted by Kennedy was 
used to supplement these rations. A garden and an orchard were planted to provide vegetables 
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and lemon juice for the production of ascorbic acid used in the treatment of scurvy cases. 





In addition to cooking, helpers were also responsible for helping patients with bathing, 
cleaning in-patient huts, as well as the hospital precincts.
31
 During medication times, a 
whistle was blown and family helpers were expected to bring patients to the medication shade 
where treatment was administered.
32
 However, in ‘Jim Kennedy’s kingdom’ these patient 
helpers also became subjects of the determined, frontier doctor’s third innovation: family 
diagnosis. When family members brought their sick relatives, he encouraged all of them to 
submit to medical examination and in the majority of cases they also ended up being patients. 





This system was deprecated by administrative officials from the Public Health Department as 
it tended to significantly increase the number of people who were considered to be suffering 
from minor illnesses that could be dealt with as out-patients cases but who were instead being 
kept in hospital and fed at government expense. In October 1936 W. Proctor, a Public Health 
Department official queried the returns from Bikita clinic, which showed that during each 
month 800-1,000 ‘units’ (in-patients admitted for one day) were entered as ‘helpers’.
34
 While 
Proctor admitted that the practice could not be entirely avoided, he was of the view that if 
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‘figures reach these proportions it is evident that the custom is being abused’.
35
 He exhorted 
Kennedy to ‘endeavour to reduce the number of ‘helpers’ at Bikita and at any other 




However, Kennedy defended the practice, 
A native woman, presenting a gross syphilitic ulcer, arrives with two or three 
children. Of these, one is a most obvious congenital syphilitic child; another, she will 
inform you, had sores at the angles of the mouth or in the groins, etc, while the third 
never had any sores. Of these four, the woman will be entered as syphilitic, and the 
three children as perekedzas or helpers, whereas, actually, three of the four are 
definitely syphilitic and are treated as such.... My difficulty at all my clinics is not that 
I have people with minor (or no) troubles, but it is the endeavour to keep obviously 




As such, he considered these helpers to be a ‘necessary evil... comparable to outpatients, 
whose treatment is merely a waste of time and drugs and dressings in the majority of 
instances, in that it is spasmodic and under no control’.
38
 The system therefore continued as 
long as Kennedy was at Ndanga. Thus, in 1941, another Public Health Department official, 
W. F. Wayne, raised the issue with R. D. Williams, the Unit’s white orderly who performed 
administrative duties: 
It has been noted that in the Ndanga clinics a large number of people are brought in as 
helpers and also that a large number of people are kept in the clinics with minor 
illnesses. I have to advise you that in the interests of economy and efficiency of the 
clinics the number of helpers brought in and fed by the government must be reduced 
to the absolute minimum and patients with minor complaints must attend as out-
patients whenever possible. It is not the policy of the government to feed and maintain 




However, the practice had become entrenched and therefore difficult to terminate. It will be 
recalled from the previous chapter that Kennedy’s relations with Public Health Department 
officials were often unstable. Sometimes his responses to officials’ expenditure-related 
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queries were designed to mock the apparently inconsiderate reasoning of the Public Health 
Department administrators. For instance, at one point he quipped, ‘the number of patients are 
by no means constant and, unlike a leper settlement, I cannot [fore]tell how many there will 
be in any given day’.
40
 The food bill continued to be a source of friction between the Unit and 
the Public Health Department because Kennedy saw it as the surest way of keeping patients 
in hospital while they received treatment. Indeed, his liberal food rations still colour the 
memories of the people of Ndanga.  
 
Moreover, Kennedy tried another innovative way of cultivating rapport between the hospital 
and the surrounding communities. Oral testimonies indicate that every year-end he sponsored 
Christmas parties which were held at the hospital precincts. Grain was distributed to selected 
households which were responsible for brewing indigenous beer for drinking during such 
parties. Beef cattle were also slaughtered for meat rations. Children, especially those who 




Another valorised strategy was to go hunting with local communities, especially the Shangani 
people who inhabited the area surrounding the elaborately built Chidumo clinic. In 
Kennedy’s own words, ‘[I]t became immediately obvious to me that the most satisfactory and 
quickest method of becoming known to – and possibly appreciated by – these people [the 
Shangani] was to hunt with their men folk’.
42
 He further stated that ‘it was the wives and 
children of those with whom I hunted – and to whom I was, in consequence, known – who 
subsequently became my first patients’.
43
 As already noted in the previous chapter, Chidumo 
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clinic was, in Saunders’ terms, Kennedy’s ‘medical safari’. But where did Kennedy get these 
ideas which were critiqued as much as they were welcomed? 
 
On the origins of Kennedy’s ideas 
Kennedy’s method of patient care and management originated from a number of ideas and 
developments. First was the increasing confidence in curative medicine and the associated 
search for the best ways of getting Africans to submit to such biomedical treatment. As one 
medical officer, James Leggate put it,  
[I]n the last resort the ultimate appeal is just to vindicate white medicine and surgery 
by a series of cures so that the preponderance of our successes over native herbalists 





Second, was the conviction that it was almost impossible to treat Africans as out-patients and, 
thus, ways had to be devised of treating them as in-patients as much as possible. This was a 
common belief among colonial medical officials in Southern Rhodesia. For instance, talking 
about how initiating a large-scale medical service for Africans would invariably lead to the 
development of a large hospital service, Fleming said: 
You cannot tell an ignorant native mother whose child is suffering from an acute and 
dangerous disease that she is to give it a dose of the prescribed remedy every hour, for 
she does not know what an hour is, and cannot calculate the dose. I think it may be 
generally accepted that the maladies of indigenous and uneducated natives cannot 





Thirdly, Kennedy’s ideas were also founded on colonial public health’s failure to formulate 
successful preventive measures. The corollary to this was the effort to make hospitals take on 
preventive, promotive and curative functions – all at once. For instance, in 1932, a 
government medical officer for Melsetter District argued that it was difficult to change 
(supposedly risky) African living habits and, therefore, ‘it is not easy to devise any hopeful 
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preventive measures. Increased investigation and treatment [in clinics and hospitals] must 
remain the method of election, now and for some time to come’.
46
 What the medical officer 
in question, and many like him, did not realise though was that their medical training had 
actually handicapped them because of its exclusive focus on curative medicine. To 
compensate for this deficiency, many of them had to use their clinics and hospitals in limited 
ways to perform certain functions related to disease prevention and health promotion. For 
instance, Andrew P. Martin (Medical Director, 1935-1945) wrote that,   
I hope to see these clinics assuming, in addition to their curative function, a broader 
health relationship to the people they serve. I look forward to the day when each clinic 
will be the fountain-head of knowledge of antenatal and child welfare work, 




Kennedy had imbibed these ideas. As he told the Public Health Department in 1936, ‘it was 
felt that treatment of natives as out-patients would, for obvious reasons, be thoroughly 
unsatisfactory in the vast majority of the cases, and would spell disaster’.
48
 For him, 
therefore, the major task was to ‘persuade patients particularly women and children, to come 
for treatment’,
49





Having formed the opinion that Africans had to be treated as in-patients, the next step was to 
find ways of managing in-patient life on a large scale. The idea of patients’ villages met this 
need very well. This system had been practised on a very small scale by his predecessor, Dr. 
Williams, who had also realised that to encourage patients to remain in hospital for as long as 
it was necessary, he had to find a way of accommodating patients and a small number of their 
helpers. As Dr Williams wrote back then in 1913,  
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The native has a great dislike to remaining as in-patients, and treatment as out-patients 
is very unsatisfactory, if for no other reason than that they do not return when pain 
and discomfort are relieved. In order to induce patients to remain in hospital two huts 




However, the consolidation of the system under Kennedy was designed to be a solution to 
another challenge, namely, getting enough nursing orderlies to deal with all the patients 
admitted. Given the fact that each dispensary was run by two orderlies, it was best to use 
patient helpers to perform duties related to patient care, while the former did the actual 
treatment. In that context, food became an important aspect of the management of patient life 
in the patients’ villages. The system of patients’ villages therefore made it possible to 
accommodate several family members as opposed to what was possible in a conventional 
hospital. 
 
The idea of family diagnosis or screening seems to have naturally developed as an off-shoot 
of the patients’ village system. This one can deduce from Kennedy’s words that ‘it was 
perhaps only two or three of a family who actually complained of some illness or other, but it 
did not take long to discover that each of the whole family suffered from more than one 
disease’.
52
 With only Kennedy’s memoirs available on the subject, it can only be speculated 
that the close interactio  that resulted from the system of helpers brought more than one 
family member to the attention of the observant doctor. Since much of the diagnosis during 
that time was based on physical observation of symptoms, it could be argued that such initial 
observations were a first, pragmatic step towards a family screening system.  
 
In adopting all these methods, Kennedy’s aim was to reach out to a large number of potential 
patients by using home life systems. Keen to advance the influence of the biomedical model 
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and civilisation, Kennedy strove to achieve spectacular success as often as possible. As he 
later revealed, it was ‘very necessary to achieve success, if possible spectacular, or of a kind 
which, at least, could be seen’ (emphasis in original).
53
 All this was done with African 
indigenous healers in mind, the aim being to supplant them. As he explained revealingly, 
‘[W]e were up against powerful opposition in the shape of witchcraft and tribal customs of all 
kinds: we were not [initially] popular, nor were hospitals’.
54
 It can therefore be argued that 
much of what Kennedy did was a combination of pragmatic common sense and ethnocentric 
and paternalistic biomedicine.  
 
Without confirming his religious credentials it is hard to compare him with other colonial, 
missionary medical patriarchs such as Albert Cook. However, as the first Southern 
Rhodesian-born doctor, Kennedy seems to have been aware that, although by dint of that he 
was a history-making colonial citizen, he however wanted to chart his own course of history 
through practical means. Moreover, his wife, Ino Kennedy (nee Skinner), was a veteran of the 
two world wars. She was also Southern Rhodesia’s first woman major.
55
 Mrs Kennedy was 
the matron at the old Ndanga Native Hospital from 1926 and Dr Kennedy had met her in 
1928 while he was on locum in Ndanga. Ndanga was therefore an area where these two could 
establish their own ‘independent command’, as Kennedy put it, and distinguish themselves.
56
 
His Southern Rhodesian contemporaries compared him to Albert Schweitzer, an interesting 
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Southern Rhodesia’s own Albert Schweitzer? A Critique 
In an editorial introduction to a joint tribute on the retirement of Dr. Kennedy from Ndanga, 
the editor of the Central African Journal of Medicine (CAJM) spoke glowingly about him, 
claiming among other things that, ‘In his service Jim Kennedy was an Albert Schweitzer. He 
gave gladly. He never sought high office, but preferred the quieter land of his Vakaranga and 
Shangani friends’.
57
 This comparison of Kennedy to Schweitzer was predicated on the then 
glorious image of the much-acclaimed medical missionary who was recognised as an 
embodiment of personal sacrifice. Schweitzer’s abandonment of his European comforts to 
become a ‘jungle doctor’ in colonial Gabon where he founded a hospital and a leprosarium 
was regarded as unparalleled individual commitment to the relief of suffering among African 




However, his celebrated individual commitment, Christianity and humanitarianism zeal for 
the ‘alleviation of suffering and pain’
59
 began to tail off in the early 1960s when Schweitzer 
became ‘fair game for debunkers’.
60
 A June 1963 edition of Time magazine declared: ‘Africa: 
Albert Schweitzer: An Anachronism!’. The Time correspondent, Jon Randall, concluded a 
candid review of Schweitzer with a revealing statement that ‘Schweitzer has made his own 
reality; he lives in the Africa of 1913, hardly knowing or caring that a continent and a century 
have passed him’.
61
 The bitter irony in the CAJM editorial is that, while the intention was to 
put Kennedy in the league of the great in medical and humanitarian service, both men were 
by then anachronisms. Like Schweitzer, Kennedy’s ‘own very special brand of social 
medicine’ later proved to be a static form of ‘benevolent racism’. Ali A. Mazrui has given 
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three types of racism: ‘malignant racism (racial hostility or contempt towards others), benign 
racism (racial ethnocentrism without aggression) and benevolent racism (racial paternalism 
and altruistic ethnocentrism).
62
 Kennedy fits into the last typology. 
 
In the late 1940s and 1950s he still described his patients as ‘wild’ and ‘primitive’, and 
regarded the entire area covered by the Unit as ‘wild and remote country’.
63
 But before going 
further into that, it may be useful to asses the overall impact of his methods, which is a 
difficult thing to do given the vastness of the district he served and the paucity of systematic 
evidence. What is certainly clear though, is that his strategies partly led to a significant 
increase in the popularity of clinics as patient numbers treated in the Unit’s clinics increased 
steadily from the late 1930s (see table 4.2 below).  
 
In other words, people were encouraged to take their illnesses to clinics as health care 
facilities became available on very liberal terms (including free food and treatment). 
Moreover, not to be forgotten was the advent of antibiotics which significantly boosted the 
efficacy of biomedical treatment of infectious diseases from the 1940s, hence raising patient 
confidence. As the same table also shows, parallel to the growth in patient attendances was 
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Table 4.2: Returns for the Ndanga Medical Unit, 1937-1954 














































































































Source: Kennedy, ‘Bygones of a Bundu Bone Thrower: Part III’, p. 322. 
* One patient maintained (admitted) for one day. † Only available for the years indicated.  
 
However, although confidence was certainly growing, death statistics, which increased 
consistently between 1947 and 1954, might suggest that there were still challenges. The 
statistics show that while 1.5 percent of those admitted in 1947 died, the percentage had 
increased to 3 percent in 1954. With no systematic admission and autopsy records, it can only 
be speculated that the system might have been failing to cope with very sick patients who 
came to Unit’s clinics with hopes of recovery. The late 1940s and early 1950s were also 


















 The scramble for a few, contaminated water sources increased enteric 
fevers such as typhoid in places like Gutu.
65
 The peak in admissions during 1951 indicates 
that there was something seriously wrong. 
 
However, the hut system itself did not guarantee aseptic conditions. Whitewash and cow 
dung were commonly used to keep the floors and walls in good repair, methods which might 
have promoted the spread of pathogens. Moreover, since the Unit was run on a shoestring 
budget, it was common to issue patients with used mealie-meal sacks in lieu of blankets 
because of shortages. Hides were also used as doors.
66
 Inevitably, this created a conducive 
environment for vermin of different kinds. In his annual report for 1946, the Gutu Native 
Commissioner reported that the Gutu Dispensary was heavily infested with a type of tick that 
caused relapsing fever. Most patients who were undergoing treatment for other illnesses 
contracted the disease. The Native Commissioner blamed the huts, which had no doors and 
forced patients to improvise with cattle hides as doors. He concluded that ‘altogether the 
position appears to be most unhygienic and urgently in need of improvements’.
67
 Indeed, 
such conditions might have contributed to hospital deaths as many people became crowded in 
patients’ huts that often did not keep up with demand. What could have worsened this was 
the fact that until the 1960s the Unit had functioned with only one matron or fully qualified 
nurse at a time. Although medical assistants found themselves doing much of the delicate 
nursing work, their training did not fully prepare them for that.
68
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The 1945 National Health Services Commission referred to the inferiority of the Ndanga 
medical work which was ‘carried out in rows of dark and smoky huts’, as opposed to that in 
the ‘compact, well-lit, well ventilated huts’.
69
 Although the Commissioners generally tried 
hard to present in good light the ‘sketchy’, ‘rough and ready’ methods used by Kennedy in 
Ndanga, it was clear that they found the conditions to be largely unsatisfactory. In his annual 
report for 1945, A. P. Martin, the Medical Director, also expressed his reservations, noting 
that the Ndanga hut system was ‘not suitable for the nursing of the seriously sick’.
70
 
However, it is surprising why he did not make an effort to improve the system because, in 
contrast, his clinic system that was launched in 1936, was in his own words, ‘an organised 
system based upon the construction of specially designed buildings, in harmony with native 
ideas, but planned on a hygienic basis which allows the use of appropriate modern methods in 




Kennedy’s downfall was his own obsession with his own ‘independent command’. By the 
mid-1950s Kennedy had indeed become an anachronism.
72
 Younger medical administrators 
could not put up with his brand of medicine, let alone his disregard for official procedures. 
Because of his obsession with the physical appearance of hospital precincts, the amount of 
money he once spent on whitewash which he used to paint the huts, became ‘a standing joke 
throughout the [medical] service’.
73
 After the death of his wife in 1947, he also seems to have 
developed depression and gradually became less coherent and more forgetful. Coupled with 
his trademark unorthodox mannerisms, that condition proved to be too risky. Some of his 
referral notes are said to have alarmed other medical officers in the service. For instance, his 
request to ‘please remove this woman from the fibroid’, or ‘this child has 3 legs, which one 
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would like to remove’ and ‘please take the axe-head out of this chap’s brain. It is giving him 
a headache’.
74
 In addition, 
He carried with him at all times a silver-tipped Irish shillelagh, with which he cleared 
a path through crowds of people or livestock, poked dead bodies in cursory 
examination, or demonstrated points he was trying to get across to an audience. After 
use he would hold out the tip of this shillelagh to be cleaned by an attendant who 





When it became very clear to Public Health officials that Kennedy’s eccentric behaviour was 
worsening and negatively affecting the reputation of biomedicine, he was exhorted to retire 
ahead of time.
76
 When he failed to heed that, he was eventually forced to retire and was 
relocated to a farm provided by a companion. While there his condition deteriorated until he 
was referred to a nervous diseases hospital.
77
 He died in 1967. 
 
Fig. 4.5: Undated photo of Dr. Kennedy (with shillelagh under his arm) and African staff at 




(Photo courtesy of the National Archives of Zimbabwe.) 
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His scheme was gradually dismantled during the 1960s. Patient feeding in all outlying clinics 
was phased out during the mid-1960s by Dr McLeod Chitiyo, the Unit’s first black doctor.
78
 
In Ndanga hospital, cooking was centralised and the remaining huts were gradually phased 
out. Fittingly, one of the contributors to Kennedy’s multi-authored obituary revised the 
earlier, glowing comparison to Schweitzer by noting that, ‘Jim may be thought to have been 
an anachronism very much like Schweitzer in the way he thought Africans should be treated. 
His very practical brand of paternalism may be anathema to-day, but it did more to produce a 




However, Kennedy’s very own special brand of social medicine was certainly an 
idiosyncratic one. It did not go much beyond the liberal provision of curative services to 
needy patients in family or community contexts. Although there were indications that he 
could be a good family doctor in a permitting context, his system was not supported by a 
good public health structure. This theme will be fully addressed later in chapter 7. 
 
Conclusion 
‘Now the epoch is ending, as epochs must’, is how one contemporary writer aptly summed up 
Kennedy’s final years i  Ndanga.
80
 As a more of less a pioneer, Kennedy had formulated 
pragmatic methods of practising medicine in a large area, with the main aim being to reach 
out to families and treat their different maladies on very liberal terms. The unfamiliar 
encounters between biomedicine and African communities forced him to consolidate the 
system of patient villages which allowed for medical practice resembling an incipient form of 
community medicine. To his credit, Kennedy demonstrated that he was a pragmatic thinker, 
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although his apparent lack of tact in dealing with medical administrators was a double-edged 
sword. Although he ended up being out of step with historical times, statistics show that 
communities increasingly made use of his district medical service. Although the provision of 
medical services in areas where there is an acute need is an aspect of social medicine, 
Kennedy’s brand of social medicine was no more than curative medicine practiced in a 
community context that he had helped foster for that purpose. 
 
But the story of the Ndanga Unit cannot be solely told from the perspective of Dr. Kennedy 
alone, important as that may be. As this chapter and the previous one have deliberately placed 
much emphasis on him and referred to other key players such as the orderlies and patients 
only passively, the next two chapters will attempt to balance the narrative, and indeed the 
history of the Unit, by focusing on these two key players. They dig deeper into their role to 
uncover what biomedical reform and the development of a district healthcare system meant 
from their perspectives. However, these tw  chapters also provide further commentary on 
Kennedy and colonial medicine in general, especially how its structures were contradictory 


































Thus far, the Ndanga Unit story has been told mostly from the perspective of Dr. Kennedy, 
mainly referring to other key local actors in the passive voice. This and the succeeding 
chapter will shift the focus from Kennedy and illuminate the history of the medical units 
scheme in general and the Ndanga Unit in particular from the perspectives of, firstly medical 
assistants or orderlies and secondly, patients. The present chapter serves as a commentary on 
one of the main elements of Askins’ scheme, that is, the creation of a category of orderlies 
subordinate to white medical officers and nurses. It will be recalled that the medical units 
scheme as proposed by Askins assigned Africans to the lowest category of medical 
auxiliaries in order to reserve the medical turf exclusively for white doctors and nurses. The 
idea of African doctors was jettisoned, while a policy of training African nurses was not even 
mentioned.   
 
The chapter asks whether this subordinate class of African medical staff could be said to have 
profoundly shaped the essence of colonial medicine as much of the recent literature seems to 
suggest. Alternatively, is this group of professionals better viewed as a vital cog in the 
evolution of colonial medicine, being mainly shaped by the distorting colonial public health 
environment in which they operated? To answer these questions, the chapter begins with a 
literature review that assesses some of the main ideas that have emerged thus far on the 
subject of African auxiliaries. It then proceeds to explore the colonial origins of this 
subordinate class of African healthcare staff and reflects on the possibilities and constraints 
















experiences of African medical assistants in Ndanga, paying particular attention to their 
recruitment, roles and their engagement with other district healthcare actors.  
 
In the final analysis, the chapter suggests that, because of the rudimentary and distorting 
nature of medical practice in Ndanga, medical assistants could easily find themselves either 
on the margins or in the middle of the Unit’s structures. In other words, their position could 
be taken as variable or changeable, depending on whether one looks at their position from the 
perspective of the vicissitudes of their colonial employment, intermediary responsibilities or 
the pervasive hierarchies within the medical fraternity. In short, they occupied a very tenuous 
position.   
 
Historiographical debates 
In 1994, when  Megan Vaughan suggested that ‘further work is required on the crucial role of 
African medical personnel, the ways in which they practised and represented biomedicine, 
their interaction with other forms of healing and healers, and the popular perceptions of them 
in African communities’,
1
 there were indeed only a few extant works on this very important 
issue.
2
 Since then, there has been encouraging growth in publications on the subject. Possibly 
captivated by either the current global public health emphasis on the lower cadre of medical 
personnel and the imperative of searching for antecedents in the historical record, or the 
seminal intersections between the social and cultural histories of colonial medicine, or the 
surging post-colonial interest in the subaltern voices, historians have, since the turn of the 
century, certainly begun to pay increasing attention to African medical personnel (including 
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doctors) of the colonial period.
3
 It could as well be that, as Gerald C. Mazarire says, 
historians are beginning to extend the earlier, popular histories of epidemics to include the 
social histories of the institutions set up to control those diseases,
4
 in the running of which 
African medical personnel loomed large. 
 
With methodological approaches encompassing a fusion between group biography and social 
history
5
 and cultural history,
6
 innovative perspectives have been canvassed, broadening and 
deepening our knowledge about the subject. For some scholars, African medical personnel 
demonstrated their utility as culture brokers who mediated the transfer and translation of 
ideas, concepts and therapies between the Western and African models of healthcare.
7
 In this 
role, not only were they able to help colonial medical officials establish and adapt the 
relevant aspects of their therapies and techniques, but they also inscribed Africans’ own 
concepts on the practice of biomedicine through, inter alia,  linguistic translation and local 
negotiations over acceptable nosology and therapy,
8
 while also contributing to the emergence 
of medical pluralism.
9
 Moreover, they facilitated conversations between the two medical 
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This new historiography which elevates African agency in ways not initially envisaged offers 
both subtle and overt challenge to an older school of thought represented by scholars such as 
Megan Vaughan and Maryinez Lyons who, in their own studies, had found that the working 
of colonial medical hegemony was at its strongest in the training and management of African 
health personnel.
11
 As Vaughan put it, ‘If one can locate any hegemonic function for colonial 
medicine... it is... in the education of medical assistants, midwives and nurses undertaken for 
the most part by the missions in the practice of mission medicine, and in the welfarist and 
educational activities of the Jeanes School’.
12
 While Lyons averred that African medical 
personnel ‘largely accepted the values attached by colonizers to their medical intervention 




This line of thinking has been most overtly contested by Walima T. Kalusa who feels that it 
tends to undermine the power and agency of the African medical assistants, which power was 
particularly derived from their linguistic and cultural advantages over their European medical 
overseers. According to Kalusa, African medical auxiliaries profoundly reformulated the 
essence of colonial medicine using terms anchored in their own indigenous ‘grammar, 
vocabulary, and ritual discourse’, and ‘invariably filtered colonial/missionary medicine 
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through existing medical culture, logic and meaning’.
14
 For Kalusa and others, therefore, 
African medical auxiliaries distinguished themselves not primarily as conduits for western 
medical precepts, but as champions of the adaptation and reinterpretation of these precepts in 
Africans’ own lexicon.  
 
Perhaps working within a social constructionist framework, Vaughan and Lyons may have 
overlooked certain factors by insinuating that African medical assistants were not much more 
than active agents of (biomedical) imperialism. However, the essence of their argument, that 
is, the influential role played by colonial ideology in medical training and care, is certainly 
enduring and can be used alongside the newer socio-cultural historiography without 
contradiction. In fact, Vaughan’s view was an extension of the central argument elaborated 
earlier in her Curing their Ills that, ‘in British colonial Africa, medicine and its associated 
disciplines played an important part in constructing “the African” as an object of knowledge, 
and elaborated classification systems and practices which have to be seen as intrinsic to the 
operation of colonial power’.
15
 Except noting that such construction was always contested, 
the central essence of this argument has not been successfully challenged, except if one is 
prepared to view colonialism in parenthetical terms as a non-event.  
 
Partly in an attempt to bridge this apparent fissure in historiography, but also to present new 
perspectives on the subject, this chapter uses the case of  the Ndanga Medical Unit’s African 
medical staff to illustrate that, with all its prospects, uncertainties and pitfalls, the world 
inhabited by African medical personnel was a complex and ambiguous one. The chapter 
suggests that, perhaps rather than seeing African medical personnel as belonging only to the 
margins of colonial medicine as ‘auxiliaries’ or ‘subordinates’ or, as the latest language 
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suggests, only at the centre as powerful ‘medical middles’ or ‘intermediaries’, it may be 
useful to imagine them traversing both worlds, depending on the historical circumstances as 
well as their relationship with other key players in the colonial health sector. They were as 
much cultural brokers as they were marginalised, fledgling professionals. They indeed 
brokered mutually beneficial communication between colonial doctors and African 
communities. But they also endured the professional disadvantages of being the lowest cadre 
of medical staff in colonial conditions.  
 
This alternative, more complex picture only emerges when one innovatively pulls together 
the medical, cultural, economic and professional aspects of the work of African medical 
assistants under a single analytical framework. For instance, in Ndanga, some nursing 
orderlies were locally recruited and trained by the senior district medical staff before being 
deployed to run a network of outlying dispensaries under the distant supervision of the 
medical officer (based at the main district hospital) and/or the local Native Commissioner. 
Local training certainly helped them to be apprentices of local, practical socio-medical 
pedagogy. Post-apprenticeship, relatively independent work in outlying dispensaries also 
allowed them a degree of latitude to be decision-makers within the broader biomedical 
framework and, in the process, mediating between two therapeutic and cultural worlds and 
relatively modifying the culture of biomedicine.  
 
However, this also had its fair share of disadvantages. Local recruitment and training bred a 
system of localised paternalism whereby medical assistants served at the whim of the local 
government medical officer or the Native Commissioner, who had the responsibility of an 
oversight role over clinics in his district. As shown in the previous two chapters, with the 
presiding medical officer, Dr Kennedy, famously acting as his own headquarters, for most 
















isolation also prevented useful group interaction. Colonial control mechanisms, although 
subject to subversion, made independent practice outside the colonial medical service 
extremely difficult. Upward mobility and the acceptance of Africans as doctors was unduly 
delayed, a development which limited the application of African medical talent to the lower 
rungs of the medical fraternity. With this in mind, it will be difficult to dismiss Vaughan’s 
succinct observation that, although the discourse of colonial medicine was ‘fragmented and 
contested’, at the same time it ‘constituted a powerful influence on the creation of the 




Furthermore, taking a cue from Markku Hokkanen, this chapter argues that it may also be 
useful to think about the ambivalent position of medical assistants vis-a-vis patients and 
therapy managers.
17
 The concept of therapy managers, that is, those core relatives close to the 
patient who decided on behalf of, or in consultation with the patient, the best therapeutic 
choices, was first popularised by anthropologist John M. Janzen.
18
 Hokkanen has argued that 
in the case of Nyasaland, although medical assistants were better placed than their European 
supervisors to occupy central roles in therapy negotiation as they were more easily 





Moreover, viewed sociologically as a group of emerging subordinate professionals who, as 
Iliffe and Lyons have showed, joined the service because of the ‘promise of power and 
profit’, the prestige wrought by medical technologies, ‘the promise of altruism and 
trustworthy care’ based on their genuine belief in the benefits that could accrue to African 
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 and perhaps even Christian conviction, it may be wise not to draw 
conclusions on the basis of only one aspect of their complex history. To all intents and 
purposes, they were part of the newly emerging African middle class brought into existence 
by colonial medical policy.  
 
Overview: the colonial origins of African medical work force 
Although colonial public health departments could have managed to serve the interests of the 
white settler enclaves with little help from African medical personnel, the extension of 
colonial medical facilities to incorporate the largely underserved rural communities, which 
took a definite shape in the interwar period, entailed the recruitment and training of 
multitudes of Africans in medical care. The medical, cultural and economic advantages of 
inaugurating an African medical service became so self-evident that the major disagreements 
during that time revolved around the nature of such a service rather than its necessity.
21
 
Should Africans be trained as doctors or medical assistants? If they were trained as doctors, 
what would be the impact on the exclusively white medical turf? If they were trained as 
assistants, what should such training involve? What would they be allowed to do? What 
would be their position in the medical hierarchy? What would be the colonial advantages of 
such a category over doctors? These are some of the questions that occupied the minds of 
colonial medical officials as they sought to create an African medical service.  
 
The idea of training African medical doctors, as is now well known, was strongly opposed in 
most colonies, while those who were lucky to qualify often found it extremely hard to 
practice their trade. Only in some regions did the idea of training Africans as medical aids or 
medical assistants, a category which was just below doctors and was equivalent to the Indian 
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Sub-Assistant Surgeons, gain much early support.
22
 In French West Africa, where the idea 
gained much popularity, a few outstanding candidates were allowed private practice,
23
 
although in most cases these medical assistants worked in state medical services under the 
supervision of white medical officers. In places like South Africa, the many practical 
difficulties – some historically peculiar to that country – hobbled the policy of training 
medical aids in the 1930s.
24
 In many colonies, therefore, Africans were mainly formally 
trained or apprenticed as orderlies, dispensers, hospital attendants or hygiene demonstrators – 
depending on the priorities and nomenclature chosen by each colonial power. These occupied 
the lowest category in the colonial medical hierarchy. However, without understating the 
power and agency of these men and women as key players in the evolution of colonial 
healthcare, whether medical assistants or orderlies, the fact is ‘Within colonial society... they 





In Southern Rhodesia, when the reform-minded Medical Director, Dr Askins, made a definite 
proposal in 1930 to embark on a process of setting up district health care facilities covering 
the entire colony, his main concern was to be cautious so as not to rehearse the quintessential 
South African debate which pitted the liberal officials who were pro-training of black doctors 
against the conservative and powerful elements within the white medical establishment 
favouring a lower cadre of trained African medical aids.
26
 Askins warned against the 
importation of the recommendations of South Africa’s Loram Commission which had argued 
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in favour of the training of black doctors; instead, in anticipation of acrimonious opposition 
from the colony’s entrenched white doctors, he decided that the acceptable approach would 
be to train subordinate African orderlies who would then work under the supervision of white 
doctors.
27
 This approach was also supported by the influential pan-African Health Conference 
convened under the auspices of the League of Nations Health Organisation in 1932 and 
1935.
28




Needless to say, the scheme pandered to the popular racial ideologies of the day. To 
rationalise the approach, medical authorities argued that Africans’ standard of education had 
not sufficiently developed to meet the requirements for full medical training yet. The 
minimum educational standard for training as an orderly (as they were to be known) was 
therefore set at Standard V. Although the key figures of the liberal Moffat government 
approved the scheme immediately, without any reservations, it was not until 1935 that the full 
training of Africans as nursing orderlies took a definite shape.
30
 Initial challenges 
encountered ranged from the financial to the logistical. When the scheme eventually 
commenced, it progressed slowly, picking up momentum only in the late 1940s with a 
notable increase in the number of orderlies trained per year.  
 
While in the early 1940s the colony was still training about 8-10 orderlies per year,
31
 in 1947 
a total of 49 candidates sat for the final examination.
32
 As both entrance requirements and the 
curriculum were upgraded, the nomenclature was also remodelled to ‘medical assistants’. 
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Some candidates took additional courses in midwifery and qualified as maternity assistants. 
Others were selected from among the qualified assistants and trained in basic microscopy. 
The idea of training Africans for a better rank of medical aids was skirted. In1941, the Acting 
Medical Director had indicated that, 
No very serious discussion has so far taken place on the policy of creating a “sub-
assistant surgeon” type in the colony but it seems to have been tacitly agreed that 
when the New Salisbury Native Hospital is completed that it will include a training 
school for native males who will be nearer inn status to medical practitioners than the 
present class of native nursing orderlies, of whom we train some 8-10 a year, and 
place in native clinics under the periodic supervision of Government Medical 
Officers. I have always envisaged the possibility of giving the more promising of 




However, in reality nothing of that sort happened. The training of full doctors was also 
actively discouraged by the Medical Director, A. P. Martin, who argued that ‘the medical 
services of this colony have not yet been sufficiently organised to warrant encouragement 
being given to natives to qualify as doctors and then to practice in Southern Rhodesia’.
34
 
Because this issue had come as a result of an African who had requested state assistance to 
study medicine in South Africa, the Minister of Native Affairs was worried that if Africans 
were continuously denied such opportunities, ‘this government would lay itself open to a 
charge of insincerity with regard to its policy of parallel development if it refused to give 
encouragement to natives who sought to advance to the utmost limit available in any 
particular direction’.
35
 However, the idea had no support among medical officials who argued 
that the colony had no training facilities and sending such candidates to South Africa would 
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render them useless as they will learn the bad habits of the Union ‘native’ and lose the virtues 




Due to lack of consensus, the issue was postponed. L. J. J. Orpen, a trusted South African 
medical expert who had worked in Southern Rhodesia up to the early 1930s before moving to 
join the medical aids training programme of the South African Native College in Fort Hare, 
also advised against the idea. He noted that in South Africa there was a feeling that such 
candidates were highly trained and might be a threat to white doctors. Instead, he advised that 
‘it would be better if they were trained more as propagandists on lines completely divorced 
from those of the ordinary medical course’.
37
 Indeed, as if to belatedly respond to this 
recommendation, in 1946 the category of public health assistants (also called ‘hygiene 
demonstrators’) who mainly worked outdoors among communities, doing propaganda public 
health work, was introduced. This innovation was the brain child of Dr. Dyson Blair, 




The advanced nursing and medical training of Africans only started taking shape in the early 
1950s when the state started sending a few African females with scholarships to study as state 
registered nurses (SRNs) at McCord Zulu Hospital in South Africa.
39
 SRN training took long 
to set up in Southern Rhodesia itself, becoming a reality only in 1958 with the 
commencement of a training scheme at the newly constructed urban African hospitals, 
namely Harari (in Salisbury) and Mpilo (in Bulawayo). It was then that the McCord 
arrangement was terminated, together with the training of the lowly medical assistants in 
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Southern Rhodesia itself. It was also in 1950 that, after warming to the idea of having black 
doctors, the first two black medical students, T. S. Parirenyatwa and E. J. Pswarayi, were sent 
on scholarships to the Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg, to study towards medical 
degrees.
40
 These were followed by a few others such as McLeod Chitiyo, Oliver Munyaradzi, 
Simon Mazorodze, Sidwell Musengezi and Emilio Mazhindu, who qualified as doctors in the 
early 1960s in Natal. A national training scheme for doctors was only commenced in the 
early 1960s, following the opening of the Godfrey Huggins Medical School in Salisbury.  
 
The late commencement and slow development of training schemes for qualified African 
medical personnel meant that Southern Rhodesian hospitals and clinics, especially the 
isolated rural ones, had to work out alternative means of meeting their urgent needs for 
personnel. For a long time the colony’s medical institutions depended on immigrants such as 
the nursing orderlies from Nyasaland where there were early training schemes in Blantyre 
and Livingstonia Mission. Also, the state medical service depended on local mission 
establishments to supply it with some of its certified nursing orderlies. In Ndanga, the 
situation compelled Kennedy to formulate an in-service training scheme or apprenticeships 
whereby suitably-qualified Africans were invited to join the Unit and trained locally but not 
certified. Such individuals, who made up a significant proportion of the Ndanga Unit’s corps 
of medical assistants, generally became known, rather incorrectly, as ‘untrained’ or 
‘unqualified’ orderlies.  In actual fact, they were trained but uncertified.  
 
The making of African healthcare staff in Ndanga  
For the greater part of the period under study, that is, 1930 to the early 1960s, the Ndanga 
Medical Unit was serviced by a mixed cohort of trained and the so-called untrained, local and 
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foreign orderlies, and it is with this mixed group that the chapter is mostly concerned. The 
Unit only managed to recruit its first state-registered African nurse and doctor as late as 1964 
when Dr. Chitoyo and his wife (both trained in Natal) were posted to Ndanga following a 
stint in Port Harold, Nyasaland, during the Federal period. African nurses and doctors 
therefore came at the tail end of the period covered in this chapter, hence the main focus on 
orderlies or medical assistants, as they were later known.    
 
Fig. 5.1: The First Cohort of Black State Registered Nurses, mid-1960s 
(Matron with a green belt) 
 
 
Photo Courtesy of Dr M. Chitiyo. 
 
On the eve of the launch of the Unit, the old Ndanga hospital had only two orderlies, 
Wazanda (senior orderly) and Diran (junior orderly).
41
 Bikita clinic also had two orderlies 
around the same period.
42
 As already noted in Chapter 4, by 1941, about ten years after the 
launch of the Unit, Ndanga hospital and its outlying clinics had a total of 23 nursing orderlies, 
with twelve of these being senior orderlies (or orderlies-in-charge of those in clinics) and the 
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 Their places of training were discussed in the same chapter. As the 
headquarters of the scheme, Ndanga hospital had the lion’s share of the orderlies, while the 
nine clinics had two each, a head orderly and an assistant.  
 
Although the list is not specific on gender, from the common names listed, it appears that 
most of them were males. In outlining his medical units scheme, Askins had proposed ‘the 
training of male African orderlies and possibly female nurses’.
44
 However, although women 
were also required in the service, there were gendered difficulties associated with their 
education during these early years.
45
 To illustrate the need for women orderlies, during 
recruitment the Unit’s medical officer did specify a preference for orderlies with wives who 
would perform certain duties as required of them by the matron. In 1934, Kennedy put up an 
advertisement inviting applications by a married male candidate. The orderly’s wife would be 
required to carry out certain duties among children and women as assigned by the matron.
46
 
Indeed, in 1945, the main hospital had eight orderlies with wives.
47
 Although with time 
women began coming through the public training scheme, it is very likely that the women 
who began to appear in Ndanga came from the ranks of these wives.  
 
As for the Nyasaland expatriates, it is very possible that these were part of a wave of migrant 
labourers from Britain’s central African colony, which later became part of the Federation of 
the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Southern Rhodesia was both destination and conduit for 
waves of migrants from Nyasaland – a colony that distinguished itself as an unceasing 
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fountain of labour for its richer southern African neighbours.
48
 As the terminus of some 
missionary establishments linked to popular figures such as the influential missionary-
explorer David Livingstone, Nyasaland had an early edge in the training of Africans for 
hospital work, and Markku Hokkanen’s work on the medical work of the Livingstonia 
Mission provides recent perspectives on the subject.
49
 The expansion of the clinic system in 
Southern Rhodesia from the 1930s gave most of the Nyasaland orderlies opportunities 
unrivalled in their own home territory. So dependable were these expatriates that half of those 





For example, orderly Morton Kaunda who trained at Livingstonia Mission was head orderly 
of Bikita clinic, having joined in 1931, just before the inclusion of the clinic into the new 
Unit. Another Nyasaland orderly, Elliot, who joined the Unit in mid-1933 and was, in 1941, 
the head orderly at Siawareba (Siawareva) clinic, trained at the Universities Mission in 
Central Africa, Zomba, in Nyasaland.
51
 Did the local people accept them? Michael Gelfand 
suggests that for some time there was a belief among the Shona people of Southern Rhodesia 
that orderly work was for the people from Nyasaland as they ‘possessed charms that 
prevented them from contracting serious diseases when nursing the sick’.
52
 Moreover, there 
was also a sense in which the healing beliefs of the local Shona people and Nyasalanders 
were gradually finding some common ground. In the early 1930s, mchapi (or mchape) herbal 
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and charm healers from Nyasaland traversed most parts of the eastern and south-eastern parts 




If anything, this illustrated the general acceptance of varapi (as healthcare providers are 
known in local Karanga dialect) from distant territories. That said, doubt must be cast on 
Gelfand’s view that the early dominance of expatriate orderlies owed much to Southern 
Rhodesian Africans’ own prejudices against nursing work. Instead, it may be useful to view 
the expatriate orderlies as part of a general wave of indigenous biomedical therapy providers 
who were seeking for better prospects in the Southern Rhodesian market. Although the early 
start of orderly training schemes by Southern Rhodesian mission establishments compensated 
for the colony’s late commencement of a public scheme, local missionaries were generally 
poorly endowed with funds and their training schemes were therefore very small.  
 
Thus, as result of the severely limited training opportunities in Southern Rhodesia during the 
1930s and indeed the early 1940s, expatriates and local apprentices dominated the Ndanga 
Unit. In the early 1940s, the local apprentices headed four of the Unit’s clinics.  . The local 
training of orderlies by Kennedy and his white staff commenced soon after the launch of the 
Unit in 1932.
54
 Although there is a dearth of sources covering the essential details of the 
training scheme, it is evident that suitable candidates who could read and write were recruited 
and trained ‘on eminently practical lines’, as Kennedy put it.
55
 While it was customary for 
prospective trainees like Rebecca Shoko, whose story was told in the previous chapter 4, to 
be specifically invited by hospital officials, it was also common for prospective apprentices to 
                                                 
53
 NAZ, S1563/2, Native Commissioners’ Annual Reports, Annual Report of the Native Commissioner, 
Ndanga, for the Year Ended 31 Dec. 1934, p. 15. 
54
 NAZ, S2101/1/3, Bikita Native Clinic, 1928-1936, Native Commissioner, Bikita, to Superintendent of 
Natives, Fort Victoria, 3 Jan. 1933. 
55
 James Kennedy, ‘Bygones of a Bundu Bone Thrower’, Central African Journal of Medicine, vol. 3, no. 6 
















come forward on their own, seeking opportunities to be trained as orderlies, as it was 
regarded as a prestigious occupation.  
 
In June 1931, for instance, the Native Commissioner for Ndanga reported having been 
approached by an African from his district who was a former teacher at Morgenster Mission 
near Fort Victoria. The unnamed African asked the Native Commissioner whether there were 
any tuition opportunities in hospital work, as he was willing to work as an orderly at an 
African clinic.
56
 There were other reports of similar enquiries from other districts: for 
instance, Sikwiliti of Matobo district, who possessed a Standard 4 qualification, also 
approached the Native Commissioner, Fort Usher, to enquire about opportunities for training 
in medical work.
57
 This happened before Southern Rhodesia had its own national training 
scheme, and such candidates ended up being trained locally in hospitals such as Ndanga. 
 
According to Kennedy’s account, the training at Ndanga involved the observation and 
diagnosis of the common diseases, the techniques (subcutaneous, intramuscular and 
intravenous) and dosages of various injections, and the required lengths of the different 
treatment courses.
58
 Apprentices were also taught how to apply different types of dressings, 
how to perform minor operations, and a range of basic obstetrical skills. Dr Kennedy 
commended many of the Unit’s senior for being ‘expert[s] at such complications as breech 
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With a view to their being competent later to take charge of a distant outlying clinic, 
they had also to be taught dispensing, and had to be able to make up the common 




Together with that, the apprentices were also equipped with other essential aspects of hospital 
work, namely record-keeping and admission and discharge procedures.   
 
As the Ndanga Unit’s outlying clinics operated in a peculiar way as mini-hospitals, that is, 
admitting as many inpatients as the ambulatory patients they dealt with, orderlies were also 
trained in keeping records of food supplies for inpatients received from the Unit’s main 
hospital. It is not clear how long the training took to complete before an apprentice was 
deployed to run an outlying clinic, but everything seems to have revolved around the 
satisfaction of the medical officer and his white staff. Some of those who, in 1941, were 
listed as head orderlies in clinics had signed up for work in different years: Mutambo, who 
was head of Chidumo clinic, joined the Unit in 1934; Murombo of Bikita clinic started in 
1937; Wilson Dondowedzai, the head of Gutu clinic, also first signed up for work in 
September 1937.
61
 Dondowedzai and Murombo’s cases show that they had been with the 
Unit for barely four years, but were already entrusted with running clinics. It should be added 
that another important test that Africans had to pass was that of gaining the total trust of the 
officials. Kennedy emphasized that ‘honesty, resourcefulness, and ability to act reasonably in 




For formally-trained and locally-apprenticed orderlies, both local and foreign, joining the 
Unit represented a multi-sided process of shaping and being shaped by the forces of colonial 
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healthcare history. Their ambivalent position oscillated between being medical cultural 
brokers and decision-makers on one hand, and professionally insecure subordinates of a 
racialised medical system on the other.  
  
Intermediaries, screening agents, marginal interlocutors 
The role of African medical assistants as cultural brokers has been well covered by other 
scholars,
63
 and Ndanga does not offer any radically new or unexplored perspectives in that 
regard. Rather than re-treading what appears to be a well-trodden path, therefore, it may be 
useful to comment only on a few aspects. It will be recalled that the Ndanga Unit operated as 
a group of networked medical institutions, with the main hospital dealing with complicated 
cases from the outlying clinics in addition to offering treatment to its own surrounding 
communities. Before channelling cases to the secondary hospital, the clinics were required to 
deal with most common illnesses by providing what could be considered frontline care. This 
function of clinics as screening centres endowed orderlies with considerable decision-making 
power as they played a central role in determining secondary hospital cases and separating 
them from those that could be dealt with at primary level. That mediatory role required not 
only cultural understanding of a patient’s backgrounds but also good clinical judgement.  
 
Interestingly, from the late 1940s when public health assistants were deployed into 
communities, screening sometimes actually started in homes. The role of public health 
assistants, as the last chapter of the thesis will show, was to visit homes to teach hygiene and 
sanitation, carry out vaccinations and encourage the sick to visit the nearest clinics for 
treatment.
64
 The intermediary role of African auxiliaries therefore extended from 
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communities to clinics, making them at once advocates of modern therapy-seeking and 
conduits for funnelling patients through the two main levels or tiers of the district healthcare 
system. In a way the system anticipated what would later be known as primary health care, 
and was part and parcel of the widening practices of social medicine witnessed in places like 
Pholela (South Africa), China and Yugoslavia.
65
 Many of the common illnesses such as 
malaria, venereal diseases and colds (among others), could be dealt with by orderlies at the 
local level, while cases such as those requiring surgical and X-ray procedures, for instance, 




The mediatory role played by orderlies as screening agents was, however, only part of a 
larger story. As the reality was that the Unit’s outlying clinics were mini-hospitals in their 
own right, orderlies found themselves having to deal with sizeable numbers of in-patients 
who stayed with their relatives in the patient villages, as was the case at Ndanga hospital. 
Diagnosis, dispensing of medicines and the distribution of food and beef rations slaughtered 
locally, gave the presiding orderlies great leverage over issues of patient welfare without 
daily supervision by the district medical officer. The medical officer was scheduled to visit 
each clinic at least once every ten to fourteen days at most.
67
 However, with ten medical 
stations covering a very wide area to run, in practice some clinics were visited only once per 
month. Even before there were many clinics, the road network was poor and some rivers 
were impassable during summer months.
68
 This meant that much of the day-to-day influence 
and decision-making remained virtually in the hands of the head orderlies. Close supervision 
by some unenthusiastic Native Commissioners was sometimes weak, causing the medical 
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 The decisions relating to patient admissions, treatment management, 
referral and discharge were thus mainly theirs to make. 
 
Moreover, there were times when orderlies were virtually on their own for months on end. 
For instance, during World War II a number of clinics went for long periods without the 
doctor visiting because Kennedy was called up for service with the Rhodesian African Rifles 
in October 1940.
70
 His locum, Dr. Minto Strover, who was based in Fort Victoria itself, had a 
large area to cover which included his own medical district and Kennedy’s own vast 
‘kingdom’. Strover found it difficult to visit all the far-flung clinics unless his services were 
‘urgently required on the spot’.
71
 It was thus reported in early 1941, that the doctor had last 




Admittedly, R. D. Williams, the white steward orderly who had been appointed in 1938, 
visited the clinics that Strover could not reach and removed to Ndanga hospital those cases 
requiring a doctor’s attention. However, for much of this wartime period the orderlies were 
practically the sole medical overseers of sizeable communities comprising patients and their 
relatives. For instance, in 1940 Bikita clinic recorded a total of 29,608 ‘units’ or each patient 
treated per day.
73
 On its part, Chikwanda clinic in Gutu recorded 31,028 units.
74
 In 1944 
alone, as noted in chapter 4, the whole Ndanga Unit recorded a total in-patient total of 
451,377 ‘units’.
75
 These statics illustrate the number of cases that came under the direct 
influence of orderlies, not only as screening agents but also as semi-independent managers of 
outlying stations, which kept many in-patients of their own. 
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However, although orderlies indisputably played a crucial intermediary role, if not semi-
independent role, the degree of their influence over patient life and therapy management was 
far from being absolute. This was the case because, unlike modern hospitals where patients 
could be isolated in wards with family members only being allowed brief visits, in the 
Ndanga Unit’s clinics – and indeed at Ndanga hospital itself – family members continued to 
hold a great deal of power over patients and therapy management as they stayed with their 
sick relatives in the patient villages. While S. K. Sayenda says that in the modern, colonial 
hospitals in Nyasaland medical assistants became the patients’ ‘semi-relatives’
76
 because of 
the removal of patients’ actual relatives, at the Ndanga Unit the existence of patient villages 
where patients lived with their family helpers also meant that much of the closer care of 
patients remained the responsibility of their relatives. They cooked and fed patients in their 
own ways. Orderlies found their roles being confined to the general inspection of patients’ 
huts and the actual administration of treatment during medication times. In essence, patient 
care and therapy management were joint activities shared by orderlies and patient helpers for 
the greater part of the period under review.  
 
Moreover, as patients became acquainted with the functioning of the system, they began to 
differentiate between doctors and orderlies. This differentiation between the doctor and 
orderly can be observed in a practice that tended to embarrass many orderlies: on the days 
when the doctor was known to be visiting a local clinic, patients came in their big numbers. 
During such days, the screening of patients was a difficult exercise for orderlies, as 
everybody wanted to be seen by the doctor and preferred to be given even pain killers by the 
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doctor rather than by an orderly.
77
 Although some orderlies were initially viewed as doctors 
some patients, with time, that illusion could not be sustained. Moreover, because of their 
training or apprenticeships in biomedicine, they were also mainly viewed as part and parcel 
of the new socio-medical order.  However, their greatest challenge came from their superiors, 
the medical and district officials. This point is elucidated in the following section. 
 
Officials’ attitudes towards orderlies 
Although their positioning in isolated clinics afforded orderlies relative independence, that 
arrangement had its own risks for them because colonial officials were always wary of letting 
Africans wield untrammelled medical power, especially in isolated places where there was no 
immediate white official oversight. In the absence of the medical officer, the district Native 
Commissioner was required to exercise oversight over clinics in his district. As most Native 
Commissioners were sticklers for ‘native’ order and fond of exercising paternalistic authority 
over Africans,
78
 orderlies usually found their conduct, morality and characters constantly 
under the spotlight. What was even more damaging was that a genuine mistake or an act of 
dishonesty by one individual was taken as being representative of the entire racial group’s 
mentality. Native Commissioners often expressed their misgivings in very candid terms. In 
1941, the Gutu District Native Commissioner said, ‘I suppose I am not as enthusiastic as I 
could be over a system that leaves most of the activity in the hands of the Native Orderly, no 
matter how competent he may be’.
79
 Perhaps the comment was made with an incident that 
had happened the previous year in mind. In 1940, an orderly from the district had been 
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brought to court, prosecuted and fined after considerable stores of medicines were found at 
his home.
80
 He was however, allowed to continue with his duties. 
 
African orderlies were often suspected of being thieves, as illustrated by the Bikita District 
Native Commissioner’s remark, that ‘it is surprising how quickly the wrong orderly can 
empty a clinic’.
81
 As indicated in chapter 3, clinics were strategically sited near any 
settlement where there were white people so as to allow for regular supervision because, as 
medical officials said, without that ‘these institutions would readily lose in efficiency and 
indeed might easily become the centres of undesirable practices’.
82
 Several assistants at 
Ndanga suffered summary dismissals or spot fines by Kennedy and other doctors who came 
to Ndanga as his locums. Quizzed by authorities for imposing such a fine on an African 
medical assistant for what appeared to be ‘small misdemeanour’,
83
 Kennedy revealed that he 
had found the unidentified man ‘hopelessly drunk on two occasions’.
84
 In further defence of 
this decision, he reminded his superiors that he operated in an isolated place where he had to 
try by all means to ‘preserve order and discipline’ without spending time and mileage 




Dr. Strover, who covered for Kennedy during World War II, dismissed another orderly, 
Makaya, for ‘some mischief’.
86
 Makaya had trained at Mt. Selinda, in neighbouring Melsetter 
District, and worked at the Unit’s Matsai and Chitando clinics. Those orderlies who worked 
alone in outlying clinics were, ironically, the most vulnerable because the discovery of any 
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mishap raised suspicions of endemic incompetence or ‘mischief’, which invariably often led 
to dismissals or transfers in the case of the fortunate ones. 
 
However, officials’ concern with African orderlies’ characters was not a peculiarly 
Rhodesian phenomenon. Even among the most liberal of colonial institutions – missions – 
there was obsession with close control and the inculcation of Christian values among African 
assistants as a way of civilising or transforming them. Prominent missionary-doctor, the 
Nyasaland-based Rev. Robert Laws, had argued for strict supervision of African orderlies 
because ‘the temptations to go astray would be far greater for a native medical than a native 
pastor’.
87
 As Lyons has argued in the case of Uganda and the Belgian Congo, the fixation 
with control and strict supervision of African medical assistants was born of the colonial view 
that access to medical knowledge and techniques equalled access to power. In Lyons’ words, 
‘a medical system can be a potent means of controlling the total person, mind and body; 
consequently access to medical systems is often jealously guarded’
88
 (emphasis in original). 
This was, of course, the key motivation behind the delayed training of Africans as fully-
licensed doctors in most colonies, including Southern Rhodesia. 
 
In Ndanga, orderlies were always plagued with insecurity of tenure because of the 
atmosphere of official mistrust and a system of localised paternalism. Most of them entered 
employment under informal, local contracts that could be easily terminated by Dr Kennedy. 
For instance, an investigation carried out in early 1941 by authorities from Salisbury 
discovered that the Unit had on the ground more orderlies than were indicated on the official 
government pay sheet records and that there were other orderlies who were drawing 
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government salaries under the names of those who had long left the Unit.
89
 Although, to his 
credit, Kennedy made local funding arrangements to remunerate some of the additional 
orderlies in line with general levels (or even better in some cases), his explanation of how he 
ended up employing orderlies but not registering them formally with the Public Health 
Department, or having some of them drawing salaries against the names of those who had left 
the Unit, is revealing. Kennedy explained, 
That came about this way. First of all I hadn’t sufficient staff and it was difficult to 
get any more. Secondly they were always changing, and I had to let one go sometimes 
or push him out because he had done various things he should not do and I had to get 
him replaced. I was having constant changes, and instead of notifying Head Office of 
every change and then waiting for authority to come out I carried on on my own 
because it seemed to me the only way to keep you going, and I not only paid out what 




In an earlier memorandum he had revealed that ‘it was felt that unnecessary labour would be 
involved at my end and the Head Office if every change of herd boy, grass cutter, or junior 
untrained orderly had to be reported by name’.
91
 Thus, without authority and approval from 
the department’s head office, Kennedy dismissed orderlies and hired others at his discretion. 
In the eyes of many orderlies he was, therefore, medical officer, supervisor and employer, 
which could have complicated interaction. Those who operated in outlying clinics were 
particularly the targets, making their isolation not so splendid after all. 
 
The paternalism of the doctor over orderlies was further enhanced by the fact that the former 
often fought on behalf of the latter in cases of government affront and neglect of their rights. 
In 1934, Kennedy petitioned authorities for funds to build new quarters for his orderlies as 
one of them lived among patients, a second in one of the hospital buildings, and the third at 
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 Over the years, he had to work hard to reduce the gap between the trained 
and the so-called untrained orderlies. According to government schedule issued in 1941, the 
former’s starting salary was £2 per month, rising to a ceiling of £5 after many years of 
service, while the latter’s starting salary was a paltry 30/- per month, rising to a ceiling of 
60/- per month after many years of service.
93
 Kennedy considered this ‘manifestly unfair’.
94
 
By force of circumstances, however, he did not endeavour to reduce the gap between and 




It would be a grave mistake, however, to think that in all this African medical assistants were 
passive players. An incident that transpired in 1941 is a good illustration of the struggles of 
the orderlies to make their voices heard, and proof that they could indeed stand up for their 
rights when opportunity presented itself. About three months after the departure of Kennedy 
to the war front, the Unit’s orderlies apparently convened and wrote an explosive letter to the 
colony’s Medical Director.
96
 In their opening line the orderlies said, ‘We most respectfully 
beg to apply for another boss in charge of the Ndanga Native Hospital and the clinics 
surrounding it, instead of Mr. Richard Donald Williams’. Further developing their 
justification for the replacement of Williams, the white orderly who had joined Ndanga in 
1938, the orderlies noted that, while Dr. Kennedy was in charge of the Unit, ‘there was great 
quiet’, but since he left ‘there are so many disturbances in the clinics’. They then proceeded 
to list what they called ‘Mr Williams’ cunning plans’: 
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1. They charged that he ‘disturbs the orderlies in order to find faulty (sic) with them and 
discharges (sic) them’. If the dismissed orderly was an assistant who earned £2, Williams 
would proceed to employ a new person and starts him with 10/- ‘yet on the pay sheets there is 
written £2 for the assist. (sic)’. The new orderly would spend the whole year earning 10/-. 
2. If the dismissed orderly was a senior earning £2.15 per month, Williams would put ‘a raw 
man as the orderly and starts him with £1’. The orderlies wondered if ‘this money [the 
difference] returns to Salisbury’.  
3. ‘Apart from that’, they further noted, ‘there is a system of killing cattle for inpatients and 
the skins from beasts are sold and he is getting a considerable amount of money because each 
skin is bought for 5/-’. The irate orderlies charged that Williams ‘c llects all [the money] for 
his own use’. They found this to be irregular because, while Kennedy was around, he would 
allow orderlies to use the money to buy requirements for patients such as milk ‘for bad cases 
and little coffee as stimulants etc’. They acknowledged that they knew that ‘the time is very 
bad’ because of the war, but they demanded to know whether ‘this money helps in the war 
fund’. 
 
In concluding their letter, they said there were many complaints among orderlies relating to 
matters of leave, among others. Wittily, they brought the attention of the Medical Director to 
an African proverb that says ‘a baby who doesn’t cry when not at ease dies on the mother’s 
back’. ‘Being so black skinned’, they further argued ‘or although we are natives we have 
feelings as other human beings’. In their opinion, ‘since we are ruled by Justice we cannot let 

















Clearly, this hard-hitting letter was not about Williams alone. Indeed, in oral interviews 
Williams features prominently as a harsh and unkind white man.
97
 That Mhiripiri, a Karanga 
language term for chillies or pepper, was his nickname says it all. Available documents are 
silent about his end, but there is consensus in oral sources that he committed suicide in one of 
the Unit’s clinics, apparently because he had ‘eaten people’s money’, as the local informants 
put it.
98
 It is, however, unlikely that what is contained in the letter could be a record of 
developments that took place barely three months after Kennedy’s departure in October 1940. 
Williams may have started his apparently imprudent dealings from the time of his arrival in 
1938, and may have done some of the things without Kennedy’s knowledge. Williams was 
employed as a steward orderly to deal with the administrative issues. It seems that in 
executing his duties, he sometimes did so in very unkind and inconsiderate ways. Kennedy’s 
departure was therefore taken as a good opportunity to lift the lid. 
 
In response to the stinging letter, the Public Health Department dispatched W. F. Wayne, a 
high-profile administrator in the Department, to investigate the accusations.  Wayne 
uncovered serious administrative irregularities within the Unit. Some of the defects have 
already been referred to earlier in the present chapter as well as in chapter 3. These included 
the employment of orderlies irregularly, the signing of pay sheet certificates which were not 
in accordance with facts, failure to remit to Treasury funds accrued from the sale of 
‘government property’ (hides and sacks), use of government money for personal purposes by 
the medical officer, spending of government money without going to tender, and only 
intermittent visits to outlying clinics.
99
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After compiling his report, Wayne forwarded it to the Auditor-General who ruled that the 
irregularities constituted gross negligence by a public official, and recommended that action 
be taken against Kennedy in the form of an official reprimand and the postponement of his 
impending pay rise by a whole year.
100
 The Acting Medical Director took up the matter, a 
charge sheet was sent to Kennedy, and he was called back from his regiment for a Public 
Services Board inquiry, on 22 September 1941. The Board found him guilty, but after taking 
into consideration some of his achievements, he was only reprimanded and told to organise 
his affairs when he returned to Ndanga after the war.
101
   
 
Unfortunately, the Board Inquiry focussed mainly on the grievances of the state and less on 
the grievances of the orderlies. Asked about the letter right at the end of the session, Kennedy 
dismissed it thus:  
Actually that letter was written by the wife of a native whom I happen to know. It was 
not written by the orderlies. The others whom I have had for years are all rather down 
on this fellow for having written it. The complaint was that this man was using 
patients for bringing up his own wood and water to his hut and was making them do 
bits of work in his garden, all of which was stopped by Williams. I had warned him 





Although the couple were not named, indications are that it could have been Mr and Mrs 
Makaya. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Makaya was dismissed by Kennedy’s locum, 
Strover, for ‘some mischief’. It is inconceivable that such a striking incident could have 
passed without casualties on the part of the orderlies themselves. The only silver lining was 
that, as part of the process of putting back the Ndanga system on a regular administrative 
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footing, the Public Health Department recognised all the ‘unofficial’ orderlies and issued a 
directive for the effecting of wage increments to all those due for such pay rises.
103
 That 
notwithstanding, orderlies remained a vulnerable group, not least because they were 
considered to be useful on the one hand, and problematic on another.  
 
Moreover, there was little support outside the state medical service as private practice was a 
preserve of the better trained white medical staff. Some orderlies or medical assistants tried to 
establish private clinics or first aid stations. In the 1960s there were several reports of these 
attempts, including a private clinic in Gutu and a first aid station in Bikita.
104
 However, there 
were many challenges as the state was not supportive of such initiatives; in fact, it proscribed 
them. In April 1964, one Ruvengano, a qualified medical orderly who was married to a 
qualified nurse, was told by medical officials that he could not practice medicine for profit 
unless he was a medical doctor, and also that the government would not offer him any 




Another applicant was given an ambiguous answer that he could open a private clinic, but 
will not be allowed to give injections or to admit patients.
106
 As a result, some African 
orderlies resorted to illegal medical practice. For instance, Mr and Mrs Makaya, who were 
dismissed by Dr Strover in the 1940s, were in 1961denied state assistance to operate a first 
aid station at their store even though they had the support of Dr A. Parker, Kennedy’s 
successor. In 1966, they raised anxiety among officials as they were reported to be 
conducting ‘unsupervised private medical practice’ in Murwira Township, in Bikita.
107
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Although such actions illustrated African frustration with the system and their own efforts to 
subvert it, lack of such support and even the proscription of such initiatives meant that their 
comprehensive growth would never be achieved. Medical assistants were therefore 
marginalised both in government service and in the private sector. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the importance of thinking about the positioning of colonial 
orderlies in interconnected ways. It has illustrated that it is useful to think about them as 
intermediaries or screening agents at the centre of the evolution of a colonial healthcare 
system. At the same time, when one looks at their professional situation it will be discovered 
that they were also vulnerable. A holistic depiction that ascribes to them relative power rather 
than absolute power allows us to see them as dynamic historical actors who were both shaped 
by their circumstances as much as they tried to shaped them. Such an approach leaves us with 
room to manoeuvre in assessing their conduct, that is, we are able to sympathise with them 
where appropriate and to be critical where need be. Instead of seeing them as fixed in the 
middle or on the margins, this chapter has depicted them as actors who moved between both 
poles. A similar approach could be applied in the case of patients who are the subject of the 
next chapter. More importantly, it should be reiterated that they were actors in a field that was 






















 Chapter 6 
 
‘It takes two to make a medical encounter’: The patient perspective in the history of the 
Ndanga Unit  
 
Introduction 
Owing to the belated realisation by historians that the sum total of any healthcare system does 
not only consist of doctors (and nurses), their scientific discoveries, actions and views alone, 
but ‘a historically formed network comprising all concerned’,
1
 it is now axiomatic that 
comprehensive histories of healthcare systems should seek to account for ‘all actors, 
structures and forms of knowledge’ that contribute in equal measure to the functioning of any 
system.
2
 One integral, and by far the largest, group of actors in any healthcare system are the 
patients whose representation in the burgeoning historiography of medicine is still considered 
to be unsatisfactory.
3
 Perhaps because of medical history’s initial interest in medical 
advances and great doctors, and the widely known methodological difficulties of writing 
patient histories, until recently, mainstream histories of healthcare systems have mainly been 
told from the perspective of providers. Yet, as Roy Porter memorably remarked in his 
influential 1985 article on the challenges and prospects of writing patient histories, ‘it takes 




Working from this Porterian view, this chapter puts together fragments of evidence and 
explores the Ndanga Unit story from the perspective of patients. Its main objective is to use 
the patient voice to explore the potential strengths and fundamental weaknesses of the 
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emerging rural healthcare system in Ndanga. Closely examining first the patients’ views, 
attitudes, conditions of life and behaviour, and then exploring the ways and extent to which 
their ideas and interests were taken into consideration by the healthcare staff leadership, will 
be the main approach of the chapter. What meanings did the medical staff ascribe to lay 
nosologies, prognosis and therapy-seeking behaviour? How did such perceptions change over 
time, if they did?  Can we say that the Ndanga Unit developed a patient-centred ethos based 
on a careful consideration and accommodation of patients’ views and interests? The objective 
is therefore to go beyond the mere recovery of the patient voice by examining the 
responsiveness of the system to their perspectives, taking into consideration the contemporary 
historical context. Indeed, the success of any medical system should partly be assessed 
through a closer look at how patients’ ideas and actions were perceived, received and acted 
upon. 
 
Although like other histories from below this chapter reveals the patient footprint in the 
changing history of the Ndanga system, the aim is not to shape the chapter solely from the 
narrow perspective of power relations. Because the history of patient experiences during the 
colonial period can seldom be detached from the larger question of colonial power relations – 
a subject which, in postcolonial studies, has witnessed a great deal of both measured and 
doctrinaire revisionism – it is very easy to fall into the now discredited imposition-and-
resistance trap.
5
 Although illuminating if properly used, in the case of patient histories such a 
framework may mask the patients’ own uncompelled choices to use biomedical services by 
unduly concentrating on the impositions of officials, which were most pronounced during 
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epidemic emergencies. Although important, patient-centred histories should not be confined 
to that level alone.  
 
Moreover, although it has been qualified, albeit cautiously, that colonial officials failed to 
fully impose their will on African societies, the question that is yet to be asked is how far the 
Africans, who had their own set of expectations of their rulers, managed to impose their will 
on the latter. For instance, did patients manage to influence decision-making by doctors and 
nurses often or did they only manage to sometimes thwart the latter’s nefarious or even un-
understood designs during some clinical encounters?   
 
Much of the recent literature has begun to revise the earlier historiographical and sociological 
approaches developed in the 1970s and 1980s, which emphasised colonial hybridity and 
synthesis as the main outcomes of colonial power relations and negotiations.
6
 For instance, 
although admitting that there was always communication across the two systems, Julie 
Livingston has argued in the case of colonial Botswana that medical relations were imbued 
with ‘productive misunderstandings [which] served to reinforce the boundaries’ between 
indigenous and biomedical systems, ‘even as they facilitated patient movement between 
systems’.
7
 In other words, the two medical systems continued to function parallel to each 
other, although each borrowed aspects from the other. In such a scenario, hybridity might be 
a problematic concept to use. 
 
The main argument of this chapter is therefore that, although oftentimes the medical staff 
were forced to act in ways that were preferred by patients, they often perceived this as an 
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inferior type of medical practice. They mainly regarded it as a necessary strategy for 
achieving the civilising agenda rather than a rational adaptation of clinical practice flowing 
from the deliberate creation of a patient-centred biomedical system. Although patients 
gradually espoused medical pluralism and replaced some of their own ineffective indigenous 
healing methods with new biomedical ideas, in the main, medical officials saw the alteration 
of their own practices to accommodate patients as inferior medical practice. However, their 
views of patients were also suffused with contradictions: at one turn, patients were perceived 
as primitive and unchanging, at another, as enthusiastic and transforming. The many genuine 
efforts notwithstanding, the discourse of colonial healthcare thus remained largely self-
serving and continuously condescending to patients’ ideas. 
 
To both exemplify and elaborate on these issues, the chapter begins with a brief reflection on 
the methodological issues pertaining to the history of patients and an outline of the relevant 
approach that delimits the themes chosen for consideration in the chapter. It then proceeds to 
give an overview of the patients’ changing conditions of health, as well as their evolving 
ideas about health and disease. This might serve to illuminate what underpinned their 
dynamic and fraught engagement with biomedicine, as exemplified by their resistance, 
ambivalence, pluralism and selective embrace of its precepts. This is followed by a detailed 
examination of selected cases that illustrate the complex relations between patients and the 
district medical staff, paying attention to patients’ actions and the medical staff’s 
interpretations and responses to such actions. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the 
meaning and implications of these developments.  
 
Can the patient speak? 
One of the acknowledged difficulties in the writing of comprehensive histories of healthcare 
















presenting it in meaningful ways. ‘Can the clinical subject speak?’, asked the historically-
minded psychologist, Sally Swartz.
8
 Underlying this question is a theoretical and 
methodological exploration of alternative ways of recovering the patient voice given the 
skewed nature of the medical archive. Historians often find themselves at the mercy of the 
archives that are dominated by the voices of, primarily, medical doctors and, to a certain 
extent, other allied healthcare professionals and general administrators. The overwhelming 
dominance of medical encounters by what has come to be known as the ‘clinical gaze’,
9
 has 
largely contributed to the muting and marginalisation of the patient voice in historiography, 
in profound ways. 
 
As Swartz has aptly put it, the voices of patients are often lost in the ‘louder resonances of 
theories and trainings’ of clinicians.
10
 Commenting specifically on clinical records, Swartz 
says that they ‘serve as a memory for the clinician, and as a regulatory device within and 
between institutions. They place the clinical subject forever under construction for various 
purposes, none of which allow her to speak for herself’.
11
 This difficulty is even more 
pronounced in former colonies where the voices of medical professionals held sway in 
addition to their belonging to the dominant group of colonial rulers. The colonial sick were 
not just patients, but ‘sick Africans’,
12
 suggesting that they were perceived differently from 
sick Europeans. The experience of disease was expressed in ethnocentric terms.    
 
These difficulties notwithstanding, historians have not been content to let the patients remain 
obscure in medical historiography. After all, as Howard Phillips and Kirsten Thomson have 
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made it clear, patients form the largest part of the medical and public health enterprise.
13
 This 
therefore means that they should not form the smallest part of medical historiography, as is 
currently the case. Gleaning subaltern patient voices from the dominant sources, as well as 
doing oral histories – or being ‘a patient listener’
14
 – where possible, have thus become the 
main methodological strategies used to recover the important histories of patients. Although 
criticised for being limited by the range of issues ‘determined in advance’ by the dominant 
archive,
15
 reading the dominant sources ‘against the grain’ has been found to be possible 
nonetheless. ‘Suitably interrogated’, argues Porter, ‘what doctors recorded can often be 
decoded to reveal what the sufferers dreaded or demanded’.
16
 Through such efforts, patients 




As this chapter focuses on a rural, colonial case where patients seldom, if ever, personally 
recorded their own experiences of sickness and hospital and clinic care, using these 
explorative methods arguably useful in uncovering traces of patient agency in the evolution 
of the Ndanga system. The aim of the chapter is therefore to try to build a narrative that maps 
the patient footprint, however small, in the history of the Ndanga Unit. It considers a range of 
possible traces of the patient perspective, and builds on the understanding that the history of 
patients can encapsulate a range of key issues such as their ‘condition, perceptions, attitudes, 
behaviour, expectations, experiences and relationships’.
18
 To unpack these issues, Porter’s 
comprehensive, four-part patient history schema has been used. In the model, Porter suggests 
that a patient-centred historical approach should ideally begin by an appraisal of the ‘terra 
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firma of the material conditions of communities in times past’.
19
 This ideally includes 
ploughing through the vital statistics that can give us insights about the nature of the 
populations we are dealing with, from ‘cradle to grave’.
20
 However, a caveat should be issued 
here, that in the case under review, the statistics are far from being comprehensive, and some 
colonial officials were the first to admit that.  
 
The second part, Porter says, should focus on the patient’s cosmology, that is, ‘their belief 
systems, images and symbols’.
21
 This should incorporate what patients thought about issues 
of life, death, the body and the various stages of life. The third aspect should encompass what 
can be classified as ‘lay nosologies’, that is, how people viewed, experienced, explained and 
categorised different types of illnesses they encountered. This helps to illuminate how they 
comprehended issues surrounding ‘cause, type, prognosis, and remedy’.
22
 Lastly, Porter 
suggests that we should explore the laws and cultural traditions that governed therapeutic 
choice.
23
 In other words, when, how and where did the sick seek succour? In pluralistic 
medical situations, this entails looking at how patients sought treatment from health 
practitioners representing different healing systems.  
 
Eberhard Wolff, whose four-part model mirrors Porter’s framework except for one addition, 
further developed and landed credibility to the schema. Wolf’s schema calls attention too to 
patients’ circumstances, relationships, behaviour and ideas.
24
 While Porter seems to have 
thought that patients’ beliefs about issues of bodily processes, life, and death could be 
separated from their ideas about nosology, Wolf combined these and added another 
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perspective that is absent from Porter’s model, viz. patient relationships among themselves 
and with family and community members.  Nevertheless, the line-up of questions that Wolf 
says should lie at the heart of any effort to probe patient histories essentially mirror the issues 
marked out by Porter earlier: 
How did people behave with regard to what in their time was understood as the 
health, sickness, or healing, either of themselves or of those close to them? How did 
they perceive these phenomena? What were their attitudes to the various healers? 
What were their notions of sickness and health? How did they evaluate diagnostic, 
therapeutic, or preventive offers from others, and how did they use them?   
 
Using the Porter-Wolff schema as a general guide, the following section discusses a range of 
issues that serve as a background to the Ndanga patients’ worldview. However, rather than 
discussing these issues in separate sections strictly following the Porter-Wolff model, the 
chapter builds these strands into one section that traces the changing conditions of health and 
the shifting attitudes to health, disease and healing. This is necessary to capture in one 
examination the multiple dynamics of patienthood.  
 
Changing attitudes to health, disease and medicine 
The African peoples’ experiences as patients, including the ways in which they responded to 
episodes of sickness, were underpinned by their changing health status, coupled with their 
transforming attitudes to disease and healing. Although African society was never static, the 
advent of colonial rule profoundly transformed rural communities’ conditions of health as 
well as their ideas about therapy. A number of scholars have underscored the importance of 
the early colonial period as a turning point in the epidemiological histories of most African 
regions.
25
 In Southern Rhodesia, the advent of colonial rule was accompanied by the outbreak 
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of a devastating rinderpest epizootic which coincided with drought and swarms of locusts that 
destroyed crops. Africans interpreted these disasters as a consequence of white colonial rule, 




Although the epizootic affected humans mainly indirectly, by causing them to lose many of 
their cattle, it was the first dramatic indication of a rapidly changing disease environment.
27
 
Following colonisation, locales such as Ndanga began to experience a high prevalence of 
infectious diseases, mainly triggered by colonial population movements. Many of the 
diseases that afflicted the Ndanga area during the 1930s onwards were discussed in Chapter 
3. However, what should be restated here is that the increasing prevalence of some of them 
was an early twentieth century phenomenon associated with the colonial presence. For 
instance, at the turn of the century, Ndanga district officials reported being informed by 
Africans that there was a new wave of syphilis that had been brought from Kimberely and 
Johannesburg by Africans from the district who had gone there in search of work. The areas 




Obviously some of the cases may have been yaws which to look at was indistinguishable 
from syphilis. Nevertheless, some officials were struck by the increasingly common 
occurrence of sexually transmitted diseases in the rural districts of Fort Victoria, of which 
Ndanga was one. In 1911, the Native Commissioner for Makoni District remarked that 
‘syphilis was unknown when I first came into the country. The first cases which came to my 
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knowledge as taking place among natives, occurred in Victoria District and are traceable to 
Europeans.’
29
 Fort Victoria was exposed because of its geographical proximity to South 
Africa where most labour migrants went to seek employment.  
 
Domestic mines also became important sources of syphilis and other sexually transmitted 
diseases like gonorrhoea and non-STIs such as silicosis. Following the rinderpest disaster, 
Gutu witnessed a ‘surge of labour migration to the mines at Gwelo and Selukwe’.
30
 By the 
end of the second decade of colonial rule, parts of Ndanga district had become notorious for 
illicit labour recruiters or so-called ‘black birders’.
31
 From very early in the colonial period, 
Ndanga, Bikita and Gutu had all been re-organised into labour reserves and therefore 
recipients of industrial diseases rejects since colonial employers returned most sick labourers 
to their homes with little medical treatment. This was done to save costs. Already by 1911, 
the Bikita monthly district reports were recording returnees from domestic mines who came 
back to the district on health grounds.
32
 With poor healthcare facilities in the mines, these 
returnees were conduits responsible for the conveyance of a great deal of sickness which 
gradually changed the health conditions of their communities.  
 
Besides syphilis, other complications which came from industrial areas and caused havoc in 
what later became the Ndanga Unit as the century progressed included tuberculosis and 
silicosis  By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century silicosis was already a huge 
concern in the colony, leading to the promulgation of the 1913 Southern Rhodesia Miners’ 
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 In the monthly records covering the period from around 1911 to the 
1920s, chest complaints which were occasionally identified as either silicosis or consumption 
(or pulmonary tuberculosis), accounted for the largest number of deaths of tax payers in 
Ndanga and Bikita districts.
34





Many other diseases can be cited to illustrate the fact that the African people’s health status 
was rapidly changing during the first three decades of the twentieth century, in consonance 
with the growth of the colonial economy and society. Changes among African communities 
that were induced by colonial incursion triggered many flare-ups of diseases that were 
previously kept at bay through, for instance, careful settlement patterns. Malaria is one such 
example. Although colonial officials described the lowveld, which included Ndanga and its 
neighbouring districts, as a land of ‘languor, malaria and heat’, they proceeded to create 
reserves to which Africans were confined after their healthier lands had been alienated to 
white settlers.
36
 The Southern Rhodesian malaria story has been told expertly by JoAnn 
McGregor and Terence Ranger elsewhere.
37
 But how did the African patients and their 
communities respond to these changes? 
 
Africans’ responses to these changing disease conditions were premised on three 
considerations: their evolving understanding of the origins and course of different diseases; 
the nature and efficacy of the available therapeutic options; and their interpretations of the 
attitude and aims of the colonial state and its agents. With regard to all three factors, it is not 
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the aim of this chapter to be exhaustive; neither is there space for a wide-ranging discussion. 
Instead, sufficient explanation of each is offered in preparation for more focused examination 
of selected cases in the next section of the chapter.  
 
With regard to the first consideration, Sandra Greene observed in her illuminating study of 
the comparative case of colonial encounters in Ghana, that the Anlo understood the human 
body to be ‘a material entity that could experience pain and sickness, health and death from 
natural causes. But it too was intimately associated with separate spiritual forces that had the 
power to induce both sickness and health, life and death in the physical itself and in others’.
38
 
This observation has relevant application to Ndanga and other African communities, and 
belies colonial thinking that African notions of illness were bound up only in the spiritual 
realm.  
 
In the 1970s, Herbert Aschwanden, a Swiss medical doctor carried out medical-
anthropological research in association with African nurses working for a mission hospital 
near Zaka, Ndanga district’s administrative centre. The aim of the research, which was 
published in three companion volumes, was to determine the Karanga people’s notions of 
sickness, health and death and the symbols they used to express these.
39
 The Karanga were 
the bulk of the local population. The major finding was that the Karanga people conceived of 
disease and illness as closely linked to beliefs in ancestral spirits, God, their relationship with 
nature, place and culture.
40
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It showed that the Karanga did not blindly ascribe all manner of illness at all its stages to 
ancestral spirits, as was often believed by colonial officials. For instance, epilepsy – which 
was called buka (animal related) or tsvio because of the resemblance of the sudden seizures to 
the movements of a certain animal – was mostly ascribed to spirits at the latter stage of its 
course, when all remedies had failed.
41
 But epilepsy in children could also be blamed on the 
mother’s culinary behaviour during pregnancy; thus, to avoid epilepsy, mothers were 
forbidden to eat eggs from the gestation period onwards. The thinking behind this was that 
eggs were fragile and thus could be an underlying cause of epileptic seizures.
42
 Those trained 
in science were quick to dismiss this as superstition, but at the bottom of this belief was 
heredity as cause, which carries striking parallels with biomedical explanations of epilepsy.  
 
Although witchcraft was normally blamed for many illnesses among people, this does not 
seem to have meant that it was viewed as a spiritual source of disease beyond the realm of the 
material. Witchcraft was viewed as a malevolent practice that was responsible for the 
conveyance of diseases, perhaps just like vectors do in scientific medicine, in the material 
realm. Likewise, remedies for diseases caused by witches could also be material in form, and 
they could include biomedical therapy.
43
 The materiality of disease was also illustrated in the 
Karanga people’s conception of the origins of some of the venereal diseases. For instance, 
they observed moral prohibitions against adultery as that had the risk of bringing sickness to 
the family.
44
 Indeed, the erosion of most of these prohibitions fuelled the rapid spread of 
venereal diseases. Moreover, the Karanga were generally wary of cavalier exchange of bodily 
fluids such as blood, which made them suspicious of blood transfusion in hospitals. In their 
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However, the picture was complicated by the advent of western scientific and Christian 
conceptions of sickness. As Julie Livingston has observed in the similar case of colonial 
Botswana, the growth of biomedical services ‘was a central factor in changing patient 
experiences and understandings of health and the human body’.
46
 Biomedicine was a major 
change agent in the area of remedy, which brings us to the second point on African patients’ 
conceptions of therapy. As the twentieth century progressed, patients gradually incorporated 
selected precepts of biomedicine into their healing cosmologies. The process was uneven as 
some procedures became popular while others were received with caution, if not outright 
suspicion. By the 1930s, the Ndanga communities had been gradually exposed to a variety of 
biomedical therapies, although the ongoing provision of these was still very limited. In 
addition to the fact that, by the 1930s the district already had a few medical centres, as 
indicated in Chapter 3, the many people who went to mines and towns obviously brought 
back information about biomedical cures and rehabilitation techniques.  
 
As an illustration, in 1932, Chipengo, a mineworker from Bikita had his leg amputated 
following an accident at the Globe and Phoenix plant, one of Southern Rhodesia’s biggest 
mines in Que Que (Kwekwe). Through the Native Commissioner (NC) of that district, 
Chipengo wrote a letter to the Chief Native Commissioner (CNC) saying, ‘I wish to go back 
to my kraal [home] but I can do nothing with only one leg’.
47
 Chipengo demanded an 
artificial limb as he had seen a certain white man with one. Citing prohibitive costs, mining 
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officials forced Chipengo to accept a wooden peg. It is not far-fetched to suggest that such 
procedures filtered back to the communities where labourers like Chipengo came from and 
contributed in the transformation of people’s ideas about rehabilitation 
 
Mission stations, the Native Commissioners’ administrative centres and entourages, farms 
and trading stores were the other conduits that facilitated the propagation of biomedical ideas. 
For instance, by 1911 the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) was in charge of two main 
missions at Pamushana (Bikita) and Jichidza (Ndanga), as well as fourteen ‘kraal’ schools.
48
 
In Gutu, the DRC had two main missions at Gutu and Alheit, which were opened in 1907 and 
1909 respectively. In addition, about eleven ‘out schools’ were opened in 1915. Ten years 
later, the number had increased to 46.
49
 Health and hygiene were part of the school 
curriculum.
50
 In addition, by 1920 Ndanga had seventeen trading stores, while the Native 
Commissioner’s administrative entourage boasted a total of 25 Africa ‘messengers’ who 
often performed medical duties as they were required to escort sick patients to clinics, to act 





Obviously, the process of the propagation and assimilation of new biomedical ideas was 
contested and uneven. However, by the 1930s, there was a discernible therapeutic pluralism 
among Africans as the uptake of biomedicine gradually taking root and African chiefs were 
calling for the construction of clinics in their communities.
52
 Yet, these new biomedical ideas 
were grafted upon existing indigenous knowledge and they competed for attention with it. 
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For instance, in 1934, officials in Gutu were alarmed by the fact that a team of mchapi anti-
witchcraft medicine peddlers from Nyasaland had traversed the region selling their 
medication. Because colonial officials were against such practices, the mchapi healers were 
tracked down and they were found in possession of ‘no less than £174’, which they had 




Thus, African patient communities’ approach to biomedical care was ambivalent; their aim 
was not to totally abandon African forms of healing, but to supplement. In addition, patients 
analysed and selectively embraced medical and surgical procedures. Often, they tried out 
several therapies during the course of one illness.
54
 Indeed, as Steven Feierman and John 
Janzen have observed elsewhere, during one course of sickness, an African patient could 
consult a coterie of healers, including medical doctors, religious healers, spirit possession 
healers, and herbalists, among others.
55
 Feierman and Janzen’s observation that ‘what 
patients see in Africa as in many other parts of the world, is a diverse, heterogeneous set of 
options for treatment – options that vary from place to place’,
56





However, other biomedical procedures were rejected outright. This was normally the case 
when colonial officials and practitioners forced people to submit to biomedical cure, which 
takes us to the third and last premise that defined how sick Africans reacted to their changing 
health conditions. The attitudes and actions of colonial medical officials constituted an 
important variable in patient behaviour. From the time when Southern Rhodesia depended on 
the Cape medical codes and a battery of its own compulsory ordinances, to the period after 
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1925 when the colony enacted its own sweeping Public Health Act, infected Africans were 
usually compelled to submit to involuntary medical examination and vaccination. Their 
personal effects could be destroyed, their movements restricted and their villages 
quarantined.
58
 A number of Africans thus viewed some biomedical approaches and 
procedures with suspicion for a long time.  
 
By the time of the launch of the Ndanga Unit in the 1930s therefore, the African communities 
from which patients were drawn, exhibited ‘a much more varied, perhaps chaotic, picture of 
therapeutic ideas and practices’, to borrow from Feierman and Janzen’s articulate assessment 
of African communities in general. Luise White’s concept of ‘active ambivalence’ best 
describes their approach, as ‘procedures were as feared as they were welcomed’.
59
 This 
‘chaotic’ picture confounded officials and practitioners alike. The next section of the chapter 
takes a closer look at how this turned out in practice. 
 
The patients’ ‘active ambivalence’ 
African patients’ engagement with the emerging biomedical system in Ndanga was dynamic. 
It ran the gamut from enthusiastic embrace through ambivalence to total rejection. 
Hospital/clinic attendance statistics, officials’ reports and oral testimonies show an eclectic 
range of actions by patients. Starting with the affirmative, attendance records show that 
people presented themselves in increasing numbers at clinics for biomedical treatment, as 
was also indicated in Chapter 4. The number of patients attending the Unit’s medical centres 
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grew significantly between 1937 and 1954: from 7,134 inpatients and 11,173 outpatients in 




Although this may be taken to be a misleading comparison, given the fact that in 1937 the 
Unit had fewer clinics than was the case in 1954, the statistics for 1954 were significantly up 
on even those for 1947, by when all the clinics had been built. In 1947, 25,428 in-patient 
admissions were recorded, while 35,272 were seen as outpatients, just half the number of 
those treated in 1954.
61
 Statistics for individual clinics also indicate some notable increases in 
patient attendance. For instance, in 1931 Bikita clinic, which was in its fourth year of 
existence, treated 728 patients, with 352 of these being inpatients and the rest outpatients.
62
 In 
1934 the total annual figure had increased to 3,094,
63
 a sharp increase in the uptake of 
biomedical services within a short space of time.  
 
Subsumed under these statistics were generations of families who received treatment and 
bore children at Ndanga hospital that, among many, became source of succour and 
employment and even a home. One informant, Mrs JZ, who was born to a general worker at 
Ndanga hospital in the early 1940s, told the story of her father who was an orphan and was 
admitted for a wound o  his leg by Kennedy in the 1930s and remained there until he was 
cured. He stayed on there as a general hand, married, and had children, including Mrs JZ, 
who grew up in the hospital village. In the late 1950s, Dr Kennedy recommended Mrs JZ for 
nursing training at Morgenster, near Fort Victoria urban, before she even turned eighteen 
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years old. She became a nurse at Ndanga in the early 1960s.
64
 This beneficiary of Kennedy’s 
indigent policy is, not surprisingly, still grateful: ‘Dr Kennedy was a person who cared for 
black people. During those days, it was tough to the extent that if he was not a caring person, 
even my father would not have survived. Even us we would not been here today. So he was 




After successful treatment, such individuals like Mrs JZ’s father became key agents in the 
recruitment of other patients among their families and friends. One good example is Mr PB 
who narrated the story of his first admission at Ndanga, in 1935, with a swollen leg and fever. 
Mr PB fell sick while working at a farm and his employer took him to Ndanga hospital. After 
two months’ stay at the hospital, he was successfully cured. In 1953, he was back at Ndanga 
with his thirteen-year old son who was suffering from tonsillitis. Soon thereafter, Mr PB was 





To others, Ndanga hospital and some of its clinics became attractive as sources of food. Both 
written and oral sources corroborate each other in indicating that some people feigned 
sickness in order to access hospital food. One informant, Mr CK of Bikita, related an 
astonishing story of his brother who would sit in the sun for a long time so that his 
temperature would rise above normal.
67
 This, he said, would allow him to get hospital food, 
as he would go to hospital under the pretext of sickness. Another interviewee recalls that 
there were people who were known to be regular visitors to hospitals not because of bona fide 
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sickness but because of the need for food. Such people would spend some nights away from 




These stories sound almost incredible, but they are corroborated by written documents. 
During times of famine, officials complained of being swamped by patients. In his report for 
1950, the Medical Director said that Kennedy had noted to him that, ‘in times of food 
shortage, his institutions become more than overcrowded with a flood of patients seeking 
treatment for ailments, which every African can deal with at home…. The real reason’, he 
observed, ‘being the desire to feed themselves at the clinics with food provided to patients 
free of charge by Government’.
69
 Speaking in specific reference to indigents, Kennedy noted 
that, 
Such cases are not infrequent, but it is hardly the function of native hospitals and 
clinics to treat or care for such cases indefinitely. As an instance, cripples, usually the 
result of repeated burns sustained during epileptic fits, are not an uncommon sight, 
while individuals who have for one reason or another no means of subsistence are, I 





Indeed, the early 1950s were record years in terms of patient admissions at the Ndanga Unit’s 
clinics. In 1949, the number of patients admitted was 27,282. This number increased to 
38,039 in 1950, and then spiked to 43,251 in 1951 before dropping to 39,635 in 1952. The 
year 1951 was known to be a starvation year and the number of ‘units’, that is, one patient in 
hospital for one day, reached a record 1,107,831.
71
 Certainly, times of food shortage are also 
almost invariably epidemic times, which serve to explain the spike in patient numbers during 
such times. Although these numbers overwhelmed Kennedy, he had himself to blame as he 
had created a situation whereby food was at the centre of the Unit’s medical approach. 
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Indeed, tales of Dr Kennedy’s generous food rations, his organisation of hospital space on 
communal lines and the successful cures he achieved, colour the memories of his former 
patients and community members. Although with the benefit of hindsight some enlightened 
witnesses have come to realise that the liberal offer of food by Kennedy was a strategy used 
by a pioneer to attract patients,
72
 others remember those times with nostalgia. The 82-year old 
Mr MH, a former patient of Kennedy’s, spoke expertly from first-hand experience about 
colonial medical staff at Ndanga hospital and whites in general, differentiating their 
economic oppression from their medical compassion. ‘Those people had compassion for 
people, even though oppression was there.... In the area of [medical] treatment, in caring for 
you so that they could then exploit you, they were experts’, he said. ‘Here in hospital’, he 
continued, ‘they would care for you and treat you until you got well’.
73
 These positive 
sentiments were generally shared by Mr PB and his son whose story was cited a little earlier 
in the chapter.  
 
Some of those former patients with good memories remember pain relief and successful cures 
with medicines such as penicillin and aspirin.
74
 However, others remember being given only 
very bitter medication. For instance, one former patient in Bikita recalled that he fell ill 
because of stomach pains and, 
So I went to hospital and, ah, I was given very bitter medicine, it was not nice. The 
tablets during those days were not like the ones we have now. Most of the tablets 
were very bitter as if they originated from our indigenous Karanga medicines, because 




For such patients, the similarities in the bitterness of indigenous therapeutics and 
biomedicines might have facilitated seamless transition. Others remember the relative 
strength of hospital surgery over indigenous treatment systems because of the successful 
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 Few former patients remember what it was like in the wards, perhaps 
because formal wards were a late development and their memory was overshadowed by the 
popular patients’ villages. A few exceptions are those who remember the red floors and the 
physical cleanliness of the wards as opposed to the patient huts, or the figure of Kennedy 





The baira, as the open air dressing and medication shade was known, is also popularly 
remembered as the main arena for clinical encounters.
78
 The name baira is a derivative of the 
Karanga term baya, which means ‘prickle’ or ‘pierce’. Therefore this shade might have been 
called baira because that is where injections were administered. ‘Patients would come to the 
shade to receive their injections. Sometimes they would be treated in their huts’, recalled Mr 
PB whose first encounter with the hospital was during the mid-1930s. For his sore leg Mr PB 
remembers receiving an injection and some ointment.
79
 His son who suffered from tonsillitis 
added that, ‘I used the medicines here. We were not allowed to take them home because they 
thought people would not be able to use the medication properly on their own’.
80
 Although 
these two now understand that such procedures were undertaken because biomedicine was as 
yet unfamiliar, it is not clear how they felt back then. However, according to Ivy Shoshore, a 
former nurse aid, with time most people preferred to be inpatients as they knew that they 




Punctuating the generally positive memories of Kennedy are comparisons with his three 
successors A. Parker, R. W. Doy and M. Chitiyo, who presided over the gradual phasing out 
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of rations in all clinics except the Ndanga Hospital.
82
 Also starkly contrasted with Kennedy is 
R. D. Williams, the infamous white orderly discussed in the previous, chapter 5. Mr Mhiripiri 
(‘Mr Chillies’) as he was nicknamed is remembered as being very unkind to patients. As Mrs 
CK put it, ‘He did not have deep love for patients. Sometimes when a patient was failing to 
eat, he would say to the orderly “no, no, no, feed him, give him the food”.
83
 However, 
Kennedy did also have his blind spots. Some eyewitnesses remember him forcing people to 
drink castor oil or an aloe solution as punishment for coming late to the baira after the 
blowing of the whistle to alert patients that it was time for medication.
84
 Mr and Mrs KS also 
recall that ‘Kennedy was very strict about cases of domestic violence and child negligence. 
For instance, in cases of a husband beating his wife or a burnt child, he would demand to 




Among other things, these ‘insider’ memories tell us that the people of Ndanga and 
surrounding districts patronised the Ndanga Unit and closely observed it as it emerged and 
developed. It shows that people were increasingly embracing biomedical institutions. 
Officials took this as an indication of the fact that Africans were abandoning their own 
therapeutic traditions and that biomedicine was gaining popular appeal among patients. In a 
discussion of the Ndanga and Mtoko Medical Units in the 1934 annual public health report, 
the Medical Director noted that, 
The idea that the native is unwilling to accept European medicine can be discarded. 
Experience in the two native medical units shows that he is quite willing to undergo 
both medical and operative treatment, and further, is willing to entrust the treatment 
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Also, obviously speaking the mind of the medical officer who drafted the district’s medical 
reports, the Native Commissioner, Ndanga, noted in 1942 that, ‘From remarks by natives it is 
evident that modern surgery and obstetrics appeals to them and the X-raying of every patient, 
no matter what the ailment, would probably embarrass the Medical Department with 
applications for treatment’.
87
 Always yearning for approval, colonial and health officials took 
these developments as a sign of growing confidence and goodwill by the normally sceptical 
Africans. Some of them gloated, seeing this as an inevitable triumph of scientific medicine 




However, this apparent enthusiasm for biomedical institutions and procedures tells only part 
of a rather complicated story. Patients showed themselves to be highly selective and 
unpredictable in their resort to these institutions. Initially many of them shunned 
hospitalisation. Others were not inclined to be left in the care of strangers in hospital, 
preferring to be looked after by their close relatives, while some mothers refused to leave 
their children in hospital for treatment. Mass or total commitment to biomedical institutions 
was always elusive. In addition, patients considered a range of other options before, during 
and after seeking biomedical care.  
   
Oral sources reveal, for instance, that while pregnant women did not generally heed 
exhortations to attend antenatal clinics, at the last minute they came to the hospital to deliver 
their babies.
89
 McLeod Chitiyo, the first black doctor to be appointed at Ndanga in 1964 
remembers that he had to deal with many cases with a ruptured uterus as women in advanced 
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labour were brought to hospital from very far.
90
 Available statistics show that in 1954 a paltry 
384 babies were delivered in the Unit.
91
 The number had never been higher. This shows that 
many people still considered home birth to be a desirable option, even though this was very 
much maligned by colonial medical officials who often sought to use mother and child health 
care as a way of reaching out to African communities. 
 
Dr Kennedy often issued pleas exhorting patients to seek ‘early treatment rather than wait 
until the disease or complaint was so bad that it took a long time to effect [a] cure’.
92
 In the 
clearest indication that patients held on to some of their own hallowed therapeutic practices, 
some officials expressed concern that,  
European medicine is certainly handicapped by family spirits and witchcraft because 
in the majority of cases the sick do not reach the hospital or clinics until the diviner 
has had his say and by that time it is not a matter of the hospital rendering medical aid 




Viewed from a biomedical point of view, this behaviour by patients was fatal; but viewed 
from a pluralistic point of view, it was reasonable. Another apparently fatalistic practice by 
patients was absconding from treatment prematurely. In some cases, patients presented 
themselves in good time, but absconded when hospital medicine either took long to induce 
cure while a patient’s condition deteriorated or when particular medicines caused grave 
discomfort. Syphilitics, tuberculosis sufferers, bilharzia patients and mothers with babies 
suffering from fontanelle-related disorders were particularly prone to abscond from hospital. 
The first three did so because the treatment regimen tended to be long and painful, while the 
last group (mothers) absconded because they had different explanations for fontanelle-related 
sickness.   
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During the pre-penicillin era, syphilis patients were notorious for absconding as the drugs 
used then were such that sufferers had to endure a long and painful course of treatment. As 
Shane Doyle has noted in a comparative case study of Uganda for instance, because of 
‘unpleasant side-effects... few patients ever completed their courses’.
94
 This challenge 
confronted Southern Rhodesia too. Although Ndanga officials appreciated that ‘... there can 
be no doubt that the Native is beginning to realise the necessity for and the benefits received 
from the treatment of this scourge [syphilis] and the position undoubtedly continues to 





Elsewhere in colonial Africa, syphilitic patients were so observant that they preferred 
arsenical (salvarsan or 606) drugs to mercury. Colonial governments, including the Southern 
Rhodesia one, were not inclined to use costly anti-syphilis drugs on Africans.
96
 In Nyasaland, 
officials often had to battle patient selectivity after the latter discovered that there was a two-
tier treatment scheme and that they were on the second tier. According to Megan Vaughan, 
‘when arsenical treatments became available in hospitals but not in rural dispensaries, 
attendance at the latter fell off’. Patients refused treatment with mercury as soon as they 
discovered that arsenical drugs were in stock.
97
 In Southern Rhodesia, patients preferred the 
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Syphilis was certainly not the only disease with an unpleasant therapeutic regimen. Other 
prevalent diseases such as bilharzia also had notably controversial treatment regimens. For a 
long time, physicians in colonial Africa, as was the case elsewhere, utilised antimony 
compounds such as tartar emetic (potassium tartrate) and stibophen (Fuadin) as a cure for 
bilharzia. Discovered by John Brian Christopherson in 1918,
99
 the tartar emetic cure for 
bilharzia was the most widely used in Southern Rhodesia. Its anti-bilharzia pharmacological 
properties notwithstanding, antimony tartar emetic was notorious for its toxicity and the 
relatively long, repetitive intravenous treatment regimen which was distasteful to patients. 
Thus, there was a sense of hope in 1945 when a Southern Rhodesian physician, W. M. Alves, 
pioneered intensive treatment which entailed the increase of antimony dosages to try and 
reduce the treatment course.
100
  Alves’ new treatment schedule, which was locally known as 
the ‘blitz method’, was premised on a compressed ‘two-day course of 6-8 injections of 




The unveiling of the ‘blitz’ method was welcomed by officials of the Ndanga Unit. Writing in 
his annual report for 1945, the Native Commissioner for Bikita expressed confidence that, 
‘The new ‘Blitz’ treatment for bilharzias will have far reaching effects. Natives get tired of 
long courses necessitating numerous injections, and I feel certain that when the new method 
is in general use, many more Africans will avail themselves of it’.
102
 Officials were clearly 
anxious for effective treatment of this common ailment. The situation was compounded by 
the fact that there were several diseases with lengthy treatment schemes. Tuberculosis 
patients were, for instance, also notorious for deserting as their treatment with isoniazid and 
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streptomycin, at least from the 1940s, was much longer than what syphilitic and bilharzia 
patients had to endure.  
 
On their part, lactating mothers had different interpretations of fontanelle-related sickness 
from the views espoused by biomedical practitioners. Those mothers who discovered, when 
already in hospital, that their children were suffering from what was locally known as nhova, 
that is, a sunken fontanelle, usually requested to be discharged or to be allowed to go and 
consult indigenous experts.
103
 There was serious divergence of opinion between biomedical 
specialists and indigenous tradition around this issue. The latter believed that, soon after 
birth, infants had to have their fontanelle medicinally-cum-spiritually fortified using 
indigenous therapeutic paraphernalia as a preventive measure against danger.
104
 When this 
was not done and the child developed fontanelle-related complications, a finger was used to 
tenderly push up the sunken fontanelle. Remedies were then applied to keep it there.  
 
However, doctors such as Kennedy abhorred the practices and chided African mothers for 
exposing their children to death through them.
105
 Biomedical theories normally blame 
dehydration or some other anatomical disturbance for any illness related to the fontanelle. 
Thus, comprehensive patient care was emphasised. However, this did not stop many mothers 
stealthily taking their babies from the hospital to consult traditional healers and then bringing 
them back if necessary.
106
 This was made possible by the fact that for the greater part of the 
period covered here patients stayed in huts. In all these processes of therapy selection, 
African patients and their helpers, unlike the officials who were schooled in biomedical 
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theories, did not see any contradictions in using these ostensibly different healing systems 
concurrently as it fitted well into their hierarchy of resort.  
 
Patient’s preference of productive co-existence between biomedicine and indigenous 
therapies is borne out in their memories of Dr Simon Mazorodze, the second black doctor to 
practice in Ndanga from 1967. Dr Mazorodze is popularly remembered for recognising that 
there were illnesses that could not be treated in hospital and for recommending that such 
patients be taken to indigenous healers.
107
 In that context, biomedicine was perceived as a 
specific intervention, dealing with only a circumscribed portion of an otherwise teleological 
sickness, that is, a sickness with a broader-than- physical meaning.
108
 To borrow Luise 





In addition, patients wanted to use biomedical services on their own terms. A good example 
is the ambulance service. In the 1950s, there was public official outcry that patients abused 
the ambulance service by lodging calls for minor illnesses. Although, as eyewitness 
remembers, hospital authorities emphasised that for an ambulance to be called, the patient 
had to be very sick and unable to walk,
110
 the apparent abuse drove Kennedy to despairingly 
tell the Medical Director that, ‘compared with reasonable and legitimate use [of native 
ambulances], the number of instances of abuse make one wish, quite frankly, that such a 
service had never been instituted’.
111
 Because of the widespread perception of abuse of this 
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service, national medical officials were thus anxious to abdicate the service to another 
authority such as Native Councils.
112
 What seems to have been at stake here were the 
different notions of what constituted serious sickness. Colonial officials always had this 
notion that Africans could walk long distances in search for therapy, without any problem. 
Therefore, their concerns about the abuse of ambulance services should be understood against 
this context.  
 
Furthermore, as clinicians endeavoured to ‘expand their effectiveness, their clientele, and 
their social influence’;
113
 patients also demanded certain patterns of behaviour and attitudes, 
especially from nurses. One retired nurse has memories of the difficulties of having to deal 
with, especially, tuberculosis patients who were very selective in their eating habits and very 
particular about the attitude of the nurses. Ninety-one years old Rebecca Shoko who worked 
as an orderly in the Unit remembers that, 
TB patients were very difficult to deal with. They were very selective in their food 
habits, they would throw away food in your presence, whether meat, milk or 
anything.... They were also particular with your attitude as a nurse; they did not want 
you to appear as if you were shunning them. If a TB patient coughed while you were 
at their bedside they did not want you to shun that.
114
   
 
It is possible that many other patients with different conditions were particular about the way 
they were handled by nurses. Kennedy is said to have been equally particular about the way 
patients were treated by nurses,
115
 which could have put many of them in a quandary in cases 
such as the one narrated by Shoko. Among other things, this showed that the world of the 
patients was a very complex one.  
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The question that the last part of this chapter therefore seeks to address relates to how 
officials handled such a complicated situation. How far were patient ideas, fears, interests and 
behaviour factored in the workaday running of the Unit? In short, to what extent did the Unit 
develop a patient-centred approach? 
 
Officials’ attitudes and actions 
Recognising that there was a great deal of scepticism, especially during the early days, 
district health officials adopted different strategies aimed at inducing patients to present 
themselves for treatment at the earliest stage of illness, as well as to gain their continuous 
confidence because treatment regimen tended to be long. Treatment was offered on very 
liberal terms, but patients’ pluralistic behaviour was not welcomed, cultivated, or at least 
thoroughly explored for deeper understanding. The next few paragraphs will expand on and 
explain these key points.   
 
To overcome patients’ initial fear of the care by strangers, medical officials used subtle 
persuasion and inducements. The creation of patient villages, discussed at length in Chapter 
4, was done on the principle of subtle inducement. In his first report as Medical Officer of 
Ndanga district, the pioneer of Ndanga Native Hospital, Dr Williams, wrote that,  
The native has a great dislike to remaining as in-patients, and treatment as outpatients 
is very unsatisfactory, if for no other reason than that they do not return when pain 
and discomfort are relieved. In order to induce patients to remain in hospital two huts 
have been built so that friends may stay with them for a time.
116
   
 
Kennedy further developed this system when he took over from Williams in the early 1930s. 
In his memoirs, Kennedy confessed that, ‘One had to persuade patients, particularly women 
and children, to come for treatment – by some means or other’.
117
 From the onset, ‘it was 
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obvious that liberal and varied food was half the battle’.
118
 Indeed, it was Dr Kennedy’s 
practice to keep patient cases, even those considered by national public health officials to be 
minor cases, in hospital until they were cured. During the pre-penicillin days, syphilis cases 
were usually kept in hospital for the duration of the treatment, as they were prone to abscond 
from the course. It was usual for hospital officials to ask these convalescents to perform tasks 
such as grass cutting and the cleaning of hospital precincts. As elaborated in Chapter 4, the 
keeping in hospital of such patients was the source of constant friction between Kennedy and 
his Public Health Department superiors. 
 
Another inducement, that was hailed by interviews such as Mr MH was the offer of free 
treatment to all patients. Although contemporary Zimbabwean patients’ nostalgia about the 
good old days of free medical treatment should be understood against the background of the 
current decline in health services and the unaffordable hospital fees underpinned by economic 
collapse, it goes without saying that, even during the colonial period, free treatment was a 
boon for many families who were saddled with numerous tax commitments. Colonial district 
officials also understood this, and they thus fought hard to dissuade national authorities from 
introducing hospital fees, as they sought to do so from time to time. In 1938, the Native 
Commissioner for Bikita warned that,  
It is greatly to be hoped that no charge will be made and I am quite convinced that the 
introduction of, even a small fee, at these clinics would do immense harm and years 
of effort expended in encouraging the Native to make use of European drugs and 




The Native Commissioner repeated this plea in 1942 when he remarked that ‘there is little 
doubt that this [practice of free treatment and food rations] contributes considerably to the 
popularity of the clinic’.
120
 It was only in the 1970s that patients in hospitals such as Ndanga 
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started paying fees, the details of which decision are outside the scope of this thesis. In 
addition to offering treatment on liberal terms, the district’s officials also strove to care and 
successfully cure patients as a way of competing successfully with indigenous healers and 
gaining the confidence of many patients. It was hoped that notable success in clinical 
treatment would change African patients’ attitudes to non-biomedical forms of healing. The 
Chief Native Commissioner was expressing this view when he confidently stated that, 
There can be no doubt that there is no surer means of breaking down prejudice and of 
overcoming superstitious beliefs than that offered by medical service. The value of 
medicine and surgery cannot be overestimated, not only as a means of alleviating 
human suffering, but also as an educational agency, by which we gain confidence and 




On his part, Kennedy confessed in his memoirs that he perceived himself as being in 
competition with ‘witchcraft and tribal customs of all kinds’. As he reminisced, ‘It was 
evident that we had to make these people feel “at home” and treat them under conditions they 
understood. It was also very necessary to achieve successes, if possible spectacular, or of a 
kind which at least, could be seen’ (emphasis in original).
122
 According to Kennedy, where 
treatment was not known, ‘we would forecast for them, with some degree of accuracy, the 
course of illnesses.
123
 This strategy of outdoing or outperforming indigenous healers 
possessed a long colonial history and had been tried in other contexts before but never really 




This begs the question of whether, in using these strategies, district medical officials were 
concerned about developing patient-centred approaches or only vindicating biomedical 
culture or both. Did Ndanga develop a patient-centred approach? A plausible answer is that it 
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did so only partly and to a limited extent. Both Kennedy and the Native Commissioners 
fought to keep liberal offers of treatment in place, not only because food is an important 
aspect of medical treatment and recuperation. Kennedy’s endeavouring to achieve spectacular 
success did indeed bring benefits to patients and their families as illustrated by the 
testimonies quoted earlier. Also noble was the aim of making patients feel ‘at home’.  
 
However, the discourse surrounding these strategies was self-serving, while the practice was 
perceived as inferior medicine. The paramount aim of the officials was to vindicate 
biomedicine and thereby spread ‘civilization’. Although that was also done as a way of 
attracting more patients, it ended up being pursued doggedly. As the next chapter will 
elaborate, the focus on achieving spectacular cures led to the neglect of other necessary 
public health strategies. More importantly, however, the patients’ pluralistic outlook was 
dismissed as smacking of primitivism because they continued to hold on to their indigenous 
treatments. In his memoirs published in the late 1950s, Kennedy condescendingly said that, 
‘Even as recently as 25 years ago our particular clients were a wild and primitive tribe’.
125
 
These particular memoirs were heavily infused with caricature as the title, ‘bygones of a 
bundu bone thrower’ illustrates. The ‘bundu’ is untamed bush and the implication is that he 
was a bush doctor. Although he might have been looking for humorous alliteration, his 
description of himself as a ‘bone thrower’ and not a ‘doctor’ also indicates that he perceived 
himself as somehow having been indigenised by practising among people who often resorted 
to indigenous bone throwers for diagnosis. What he did was therefore an ‘inferior’ type of 
medicine, whose major aim the civilising of the ‘primitive’ races.  
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Earlier, writing a report as a Rhodes scholarship alumna, he said that ‘Most of my time is 
spent in the... wilderness doing largely native work’.
126
 During the following year, he 
reiterated that he was still ‘consolidating and expanding this Unit of Native Hospitals and 
clinics in Southern Rhodesia on a very large area. A good deal of this work is in wild and 
remote country’.
127
 Given that he was writing this in a context in which other Rhodes 
scholars would be reporting their great achievements in different endeavours, he seems to 
have wanted to spell out his own achievements in spreading biomedicine and civilisation in a 
backward part of the British Empire. His intolerance of alternative, indigenous views is also 
borne out in the interviews.
128
 Although ‘resistance to innovation and rejection of new 
technologies are common in all societies’,
129
 among the patients at Ndanga this was taken as 
an act of primitivism and not rational mental thinking.  
 
However, as the perceptive doctor, Herbert Aschwanden, noted in his research cited earlier in 
the chapter, in pursuit of their own ways of doing things, most practitioners forgot that before 
the advent of biomedicine Africans lived on the basis on their own knowledge. Writing 
specifically about indigenous maternity procedures, Aschwanden correctly noted that, 
‘African women gave birth successfully long before the white man introduced sterility 
founded on science and, with the bacteria, also banished from the maternity-ward the human 
aspects of the act of childbirth’.
130
 Although African childbirth could be improved, most 
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This chapter has attempted to sketch the ways in which African patients unofficially 
participated, through their own forms of agency, in the process of the transformation of rural 
healthcare delivery. Although reluctant to use this narrative to make a grand statement about 
the now fashionable anti-hegemonic discourse, the chapter nonetheless argues that patients 
were not just passive participants in a process that was clearly dominated by the interests of 
providers of care and healing. The reason why a crude counter-hegemonic narrative is 
eschewed, even when there are illustrative examples of patient power and agency, is that, 
because of colonial conditions, biomedicine tended to be an inherently distorting 
phenomenon in which patients participated to benefit from its beneficial knowledge and 
skills, but not to change it or alter its broader features per se.  
 
The patient perspective forms only part of the story of biomedical transformation – and that 
story has a larger plot. Running the gamut between scepticism of and confidence in 
biomedicine, patients left a footprint in Ndanga. They, to a certain extent, contributed in the 
fashioning of its culture and ethos through the bargaining power they held as a result of 
medical pluralism and their conditions of illness. Alas, their perspectives were only partly 
taken into consideration; even then, this was done as an expedient to push other agendas. 
Thus, as the next chapter on public health will also show, the Unit’s officials failed to 
overcome their own prejudices. They had a low regard for what they considered to be ‘native’ 


























Colonial ethnocentrism and public health: Assessing disease prevention and health 





Thus far, this thesis has illustrated the potential strengths and fundamental weaknesses of the 
Ndanga Medical Unit by looking at the nature of the policy that brought it into being, the 
character and efforts of the pioneering medical officer, the role of African society and the 
administrative and local politics surrounding the Unit’s emergence and development. This 
last chapter closes the thesis by focusing on some important, but often very difficult to 
accomplish aspects of public health: disease prevention and health promotion. The aim of the 
chapter is to assess the nature and effectiveness of the public health discourses, structures and 
contents upon which the Ndanga Unit was established. It proceeds from the premise that for 
the Ndanga Unit to eventually make a discernible impact on district health, it required a 
strong public health support structure and contents. Two companion questions are posed. 
First, what were the main components of the Unit’s public health structure and contents? 
Second, what were the strengths and weaknesses of these?  
 
Available evidence indicates that public health ideas and initiatives were not totally absent 
during the period under review. However, these initiatives were seriously defective because 
they tended to be framed in prejudicial, ethnocentric terms and triggered conflict between 
state agents and the communities, especially when it came to immunisations. Some of the 
initiatives were also severely underdeveloped. Some of these deficiencies were noted by 
contemporary observers within white settler society, but little was done to improve the 
situation. The main problem therefore seems to be that the public health service was framed 
















was that, internationally at this time, the public health discourse was narrowing its focus 
because of the influence of bacteriology, and in the process it neglected issues to do with 
inequality which was at the heart of much ill-health in the colonial world. 
 
The chapter has three main sections and a conclusion. It begins by contextualising the 
Ndanga Unit within the broader colonial and international public health discourses in order to 
show, as part of the background, the frame of mind that was at work in the formulation of the 
initiatives dealt with in the chapter. In the second section the chapter proceeds to outline and 
explore the various defects within the Unit’s public health system. The third section 
illustrates the tensions generated in the processes of implementing some of the initiatives 
such as public immunisation. The concluding section ties up the chapter by reflecting on the 
key problems posed by the Unit’s public health system. 
 
Contextualising Ndanga: Disease, colonial public health and history 
Colonial disease outbreaks were complex phenomena which provoked ambiguous reactions 
from the dominant groups. In their delineation of the bifurcated character of the public 
healthcare approach in South Africa, Shula Marks and Neil Andersson noted that African 
epidemics provoked ‘drastic interventions in the case of diseases which it was feared “would 
know no colour bar” and the turning of a blind eye on those diseases confined to blacks in 
rural areas’.
1
 Also to receive attention were those diseases in African areas which posed a 
threat to labour supply. This is not to say that the many debilitating and endemic diseases that 
occurred among the rural Africans were totally ignored.  
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On the contrary, the general conditions of sickness among African communities often 
provided opportunities for the propagation and institutionalisation of biomedical 
enlightenment and Christianity among the colonised peoples.
2
 Also, as Michael Worboys has 
pointed out, colonial medicine was not totally insulated against a notable measure of 
welfarist, paternalist humanitarianism upon which some of the public health initiatives were 
premised.
3
 Other scholars such as Douglas M. Haynes, Roy MacLeod and Milton Lewis have 
also noted that colonial disease control initiatives actually contributed to boosting the power 
and authority of Western medicine and the perceived moral superiority of Western 
institutions and ideas.
4
 Disease prevalence, therefore, provided opportunities that were 
exploited for various purposes serving the agendas of colonial rule. 
 
However, in addition to being subject to uneven development, these virtually discretionary 
healthcare impulses served the interests of their originators and, only tangentially, did they 
partly address the needs of the sick Africans per se. The social and geographical inequalities 
in health and healthcare in colonial Africa that a growing number of scholars have 
examined,
5
 attest to the validity of this observation. Despite the often grand rhetoric, many of 
the programmes pursued by public health departments, as Miriam S. Chaiken has correctly 
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observed, were never adequate to fix basic healthcare defects in the colonies.
6
 Only a few 




The other major problem with colonial public health discourses around which policies were 
formulated was that much of the ill-health was considered to be inherently African, and 
biological and cultural theories were framed to advance such perceptions. Sandra M. 
Tomkins notes, for instance, that the persistence in the colonial world of diseases such 
cholera and smallpox following their eradication in the temperate world, was perceived as 
‘evidence of indigenous inadequacy and backwardness’.
8
 As Randall Packard has also noted, 
the scandalous deaths of Central African labour migrants in South African mines in the early 
twentieth century was, for instance, explained through a ‘typologising’ medical discourse 
which presented their mortality as resulting from the ‘cultural and ultimately biological 





As such, instead of substantially reforming social conditions in the mines and the surrounding 
compounds, officials sponsored research into drug development – that is, curative rather than 
preventive medicine – a much cheaper option than social reform. The net effect of this 
stereotypical approach was that the important subject of African healthcare was not 
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approached objectively and holistically, but rather piecemeal and with prejudicial 
inclinations.  
 
While African healthcare suffered in general because of the predominantly self-serving 
theories and perceptions of colonial officials, the prevention of disease and improvement of 
health among rural communities through, among other things, community development, 
environmental health, and other non-biomedical measures, also failed to blossom because of 
the general decline in influence in public health of the environmental impulse. According to 
Virginia Berridge, during the twentieth century the ‘ideology’ and ‘aims’ of public health 
‘narrowed’ as a result of the growing influence of bacteriology.
10
 Personal prevention and 
personal services took the place of environmental health. ‘Ignorance’ gained prominence as 
an explanatory category as ill-health came to be increasingly viewed as an ‘avoidable flaw’,
11
 
and health education promoted as the main preventive tool. Although poverty and inequality 
(the social determinants of ill health) loomed large as factors in poor health status, officials 
responded by deploying ‘health visitors, personal services and health education’.
12
 There was 
obsession with what was known as higienismo in the Latin American world. Under 
higienismo, the focus was on infection control, narrow notions of nutrition and other 
population health initiatives and hygienic interventions mainly linked to labour productivity, 
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As public health became strongly influenced by bacteriology, treatment increasingly became 
a dominant element of disease prevention. For instance, while still a Medical Officer in 
Bristol, Askins (who later became a key public health figure in Southern Rhodesia) stated 
that ‘The extension of clinic treatment must be regarded as a notable advance in preventive 
medicine’.
14
 In the same curative vein, he later opined that the implementation of the British 





The general view that disease control through investigation and treatment was to be the 
cornerstone of modern healthcare found much fertile ground in colonial contexts where the 
organisation of bona fide preventive services, especially in rural areas, was considered to be a 
logistically difficult and futile exercise. ‘[H]aving regard for the kraal conditions under which 
the native lives, and the difficulty of changing his traditional habits – it is not easy to devise 
any hopeful preventive measures’, argued one Southern Rhodesian medical officer in 1932.
16
 
In this medical officer’s view, ‘increased investigation and treatment must remain the method 
of election, now and for sometime to come’. In addition, medical officials were to prioritise 




In this warped thought, this medical officer was not alone. Making his own intervention on 
this subject more than ten years later, Godfrey Huggins, the colony’s Prime Minister who was 
a surgeon by training, admitted that, ideally, the government was supposed to focus on 
providing food, shelter, safe water, efficient sanitation and the elimination of scourges such 
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as malaria and bilharzia, in order to reduce hospitalisation and the expensive resort to 
doctors.
18
 Alas, Huggins dithered, opining that this constituted a long-range vision that would 
take a long time before turning into reality. He thus suggested that, ‘meanwhile our curative 
services must be greatly increased’.
19
 Earlier, the Chief Native Commissioner, C. L. Carbutt, 
had also thrown his weight behind curative care by stating that: ‘[I]n the last resort the 
ultimate appeal is just to vindicate white medicine and surgery by a series of cures so that the 
preponderance of our successes over native herbalists speaks sufficiently loudly to convince 
even the most superstitious and the most timid’.
20
   
 
This consensus between medical officers, politicians and bureaucrats was obviously driven 
by the growing influence of curative medicine which dominated medical training and was 
itself increasingly confident that it could overcome disease thanks to therapeutic innovations 
like salvarsan (1920s) and antibiotics (1940s). Curative institutions were also thought to be 
affording colonial officials the visibility they desperately desired among African communities 
in order to justify colonisation, something which was not possible with purely preventive 
services.  Thus, some historians have found the hospital to be the most potent catalyst for the 




Indeed, hospital care continued to dominate the healthcare discourse in Southern Rhodesia. 
The 1959 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Health and Medical Services of the 
Federation (of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland), claimed that the hospital was a foremost active 
agent of health education for rural communities, through services such as maternal and child 
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care, child guidance and physiotherapy, among many other services.
22
 Pushing further the 
idea that hospitals and clinics ‘are proving as agents for such aspects of both curative and 
preventive’ services, the authors of the report averred that the flow of ‘primitive’ patients 
through clean wards had instructive qualities as they would be influenced to adopt habits of 




Only in the 1960s and 1970s did the chickens begin to come home to roost in Southern 
Rhodesia and in many parts of the world. Officials began to accept that the colony had been 
building a very unsustainable healthcare system. The Secretary for Health, Charles Webster, 
lamented the fact that ‘at least 90 percent of the cost of the medical services is related to the 
cost of running hospitals and clinics very largely for the treatment of preventable diseases’.
24
 
Gloomily, Webster warned: [We] are standing today at cross-roads – one way leads to 
disaster, the other is fraught with many difficulties....’
25
 That the colony had developed to that 
poor state of public health is rather surprising given the fact that during the late 1930s, the 
Public Health Department was signalling a shift of focus to disease prevention. The Medical 
Director, A. P. Martin, admitted in 1937, that, 
On the preventive side... progress has not been so steady and satisfactory. Prevention 
is neither exciting nor spectacular, and the assets of prevention are largely invisible; 
there are no fine hospitals, marvellous operating theatres or awesome X-ray plants to 
catch the eye, nor is there the dramatic thrill of snatching an individual life right from 
the jaws of death, to excite imagination.
26
     
 
However, as Martin further argued, the ‘concentration on the curative side of medicine to the 
exclusion of the preventive side is not only bad medicine but unsound finance’.
27
 Martin 
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realised that sound public health knowledge and measures were required among ‘all classes 
and races in the Colony’, but especially among mothers and children and the African 
communities producing labour.
28
 He noted some of the public health challenges that had been 
brought to his attention by government medical officers. These included poor housing 
conditions and lack of sanitary facilities, which were responsible for intestinal diseases. He 
also noted nutrition-related troubles. Although taking the responsibility for inordinate focus 
on curative care, Martin also chided both races for ignoring the very basic laws of disease 
prevention and health promotion, including hygiene, sanitation, prophylactic measures, 
nourishment and housing. In his opinion, ‘at least two-fifths of the ills that beset them arise 





Broadly speaking, Martin’s understanding of public health was progressive for his time. 
Martin was of the view that, 
Medical knowledge must be linked with the life of the people and this can only be 
achieved when public health ceases to be regarded as an isolated science concerned 
only with drains and sewage disposal and dependent solely upon its supervision of 
hospital and medical services for its contact with the people. Public health is national 
health, the science of the prevention of disease, and to achieve its purpose public 
health must be linked up with every form of national activity... only by concerted 
planning – planning which invites and secures the willing co-operation of the 
agricultural industry, the mining industry, commerce and trade, the townsman and the 
rural dweller, the European and the native – can the national health be built up and the 





Coordinated planning and the wider conception of health to include economic activity, are 
some of the hallmarks of preventive public health. To begin to shift the focus towards 
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preventive health, in 1938 a Field Officer responsible for surveys had been appointed.
31
 
Martin also proposed the division of the colony into six ‘public health districts’ operated by 
medical officers trained in public health administration. These officers would be responsible 
for conducting surveys among African communities in respect of housing, nutrition and 




These progressive ideas by Martin fit into the positive review of colonial healthcare by Helen 
Tilley. Tilley has correctly argued that colonial healthcare officials were not oblivious of 
public health challenges and ideas, as many scholars have argued. Instead, they engaged in 
auto-criticism and challenged the status quo as it related to curative care.
33
 However, Tilley 
failed to separate rhetoric from action. The undeniably progressive ideas were not matched 
with equally progressive action. In fact, some of Martin’s ideas were contradictory and 
condescending of African life. He condemned Africans as people of ‘unhygienic habits’ and 
their indigenous housing as ‘breeding-ground of many forms of sickness and death’.
34
 
Moreover, he continued to see African health through the eyes of European healthcare. 
Martin was worried that African communities continued to throw up epidemics that 
threatened Europeans. The major effect of this was that the focus tended to be propaganda 
about hygiene, the rapid re-orientation of people’s ideas about healthcare-related issues and 
the enforced suppression of epidemics. As the next two section will show, there was little 
development and improvement if life conditions. This too was recognised but little was done, 
perhaps because the Africans were disenfranchised subjects.  
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The Unit’s public health profile 
As a first step towards the appraisal of the Ndanga Unit’s public health system, it may be 
useful to recall what some contemporary witnesses observed and said about it. The first 
known contemporary critique of the Ndanga Unit system was offered by Dr. Dyson Milroy 
Blair
35
 who, in 1938, made history by becoming the colony’s first Field Officer and, in 1948, 
the inaugural Director of Preventive Services. On a few occasions Blair acted as a locum for 
Dr Kennedy. As already pointed out, writing in a personal statement drafted in April 1945, 
Blair noted critically that,  
 
Even now the only work of real lasting value to the African population is being 
carried out by one medical officer [Dr. Kennedy] who works whole-time with African 
patients. However, even in this well-managed scheme so far little attempt has been 
made to prevent disease. The Ndanga system in conjunction with a public health 
survey to include vital statistics and practical control in all aspects of health would 





While welcoming the increase in the number of rural clinics between 1935 and 1945, Blair 
lamented that these clinics were largely biased towards curative functions and little was done 
in pursuing ‘the cause’ of ‘the effect’.
37
 Blair’s critical sentiments were echoed in 1945 by the 
Southern Rhodesian National Health Services Inquiry Commission (or Saint Commission).
38
  
The Saint Commission Report refrained from condemning the Ndanga scheme outright, even 
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though admitting that its overall strategy exhibited serious inadequacies.
39
 Restrained by the 
acknowledgement that the scheme was until then the only example of organised rural medical 
care in the colony, developed ‘when there was little else... to bring some form of health 
service to all those [Africans] who needed it’, the Saint Commission opted for 
circumspection. Nevertheless, the Commissioners’ main concern with the Ndanga system 
was that, in addition to being makeshift, it was also wittingly or unwittingly promoting 
increased hospitalisation, downplaying the ‘paramount importance of preventive work’.
40
 The 
Saint Commission called for significant improvements in general African health conditions 
within the Unit’s catchment area so that services ‘of a higher standard than Ndanga has been 




The Saint Commission adopted Blair’s suggestion of an expanded Foreami-like scheme and 
suggested that it be pioneered in Ndanga. Calling it ‘[H]ealth and [S]ocial [D]evelopment’, 
the Commission recommended that the ruling colonial government of Huggins should make a 
‘concerted effort to improve, not only the health, but also the well-being of the inhabitants’. 
Such an effort should, of necessity, give attention to: health measures, both preventive and 
curative; agricultural development (conservation, irrigation, afforestation); animal husbandry; 
nutrition; housing; sanitation; water supplies; vital statistics; education (practical and 
theoretical); development of communications; transport facilities; development of townships 
(marketing, health and educational centres); and establishment of inland fisheries.
42
 The 
Commission’s suggestion that Ndanga be the pioneer station was premised on the fact that Dr 
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Kennedy had already started ‘tackling the health of the family’ and that the ‘potentialities for 




However, this elaborate programme seems to have been doomed by Huggins’ 1944 pre-
emptive strike cited earlier in the chapter. Although he acknowledged that these were noble 
ideas, in terms of implementation they had to be postponed. Nevertheless, the Saint 
Commission’s approach struck at the heart of what was missing in the Ndanga Unit. Instead 
of improving conditions of living through development, officials sought to change people’s 
living habits through what appeared to be ethnocentric ideas or higienismo. 
 
To further understand this concept of higienismo which was briefly explained earlier in the 
chapter, it may be helpful to refer to a similar concept of ‘surveillance medicine’ which 
emerged out of the growing influence of bacteriology in the twentieth century.
44
 According to 
Virginia Berridge, in surveillance medicine ‘the individual patient became the locus of 
infection’, while ‘education and personal hygiene’ became the golden remedies.
45
 This 
impulse gained currency in political circles in many parts of the world because it was 
amenable to ‘a circumscribed notion of appropriate intervention’.
46
 In colonial Africa, such 
notions and approaches tended to be ethno-specific. Megan Vaughan has demonstrated in her 
work that the construction of the ‘African’ and ‘African sickness’ was a central element of 
colonial medical discourse.
47
 In such cases officials were pre-occupied with tracing the sick, 
especially those with infectious and loathsome diseases, and forcing them to submit to 
treatment.  
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Within the colonial African version of higienismo, many of the preventable diseases were 
blamed on African mentality and living habits. A mind frame of difference and cultural 
superiority guided the views of the colonial officials. Rural diseases were framed as 
inherently African, hence  labels such as ‘kaffir itch’, ‘kaffir sores’, ‘kaffir ulcer’, for 
instance. These supposedly ethno-specific diseases were blamed on ‘kraal’ (as African 
homesteads were then known) conditions and the unchanging traditional habits of the 
Africans.
48
 In line with this thinking, the Ndanga Unit’s Native Commissioners who occupied 
an important position within the three districts’ public health structures blamed the 
continuous prevalence of preventable diseases in their districts on what they perceived to be 
Africans’ slow acceptance of sanitary and hygienic ideas.
49
 Indeed, in 1936, one of the main 
areas of concern flagged by the Native Commissioner, Ndanga, was that ‘no progress in 




Helminthic diseases such as bilharzia (or schistosomiasis) were blamed on African bathing 
habits. In 1945, reporting on this very prevalent disease, the Native Commissioner, Bikita, 
said, ‘on arrival at this station, one is struck by the vast number of people seen bathing in 
streams. Unfortunately, this very pleasant habit is the cause of many people being infected 
with bilharzias’.
51
 Writing on malaria, the same Native Commissioner drew a link between 
African living habits and the prevalence of this disease by opining that ‘it is only by teaching 
natives to improve their methods of living that this disease [malaria] will be stamped out’.
52
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Perceived African prejudice and superstitious beliefs were also sharply criticised.
53
 Weighing 
in, Huggins stated publicly that, as far as health was concerned, ‘the native is his own worst 




Framing disease as inherently African prefigured the specific responses that were perceived 
to be suited to deliver the basic health needs to the African communities, as determined by 
colonial officials. One of the ways in which colonial officials sought to deal with rural health 
problems was to embark on spreading ‘civilising’ propaganda – a very ambiguous process 
which fronted a corps of moderately educated Africans as the propaganda staff. In 1929, 
Harold Jowitt, a reform-minded education expert, had introduced the Jeanes Teacher scheme, 
which was a community education scheme formulated on the example of the American 
South’s community teaching scheme.
55
 Organised and funded by the state and implemented 
through the managerial agency of missionaries, the Jeanes Teacher Programme’s aim was to 
equip moderately educated and mainly Christianised Africans with ‘basic skills of 
community development, including hygiene, school improvement, industrial skills, medical 
aid and domesticity’.
56
 These Jeanes teachers were trained as demonstrators at Domboshawa, 
near Salisbury and Hope Fountain, near Bulawayo. In addition to the supervision of rural 
schools, these community modernisers, were required to supervise community clean-ups and 




An outcome of the early colonial period’s linkage between African education and health, this 
programme was used by officials as part of the healthcare propaganda, focusing on basic 
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forms of rural sanitation and hygiene among other things. In the Ndanga Unit area, the Jeanes 
Teacher scheme ran into serious problems because of petty jealousies among different 
departments. The Native Affairs Department officials, who generally regarded themselves as 
the ‘guardians of the natives’, were particularly unhappy that the programme was not under 
their direct control. E. G. Howman, the Fort Victoria-based Superintendent of Natives, 
warned that, 
I do not want the Jeanes Teacher [Lysias Mukahleyi] to do anything for me as long as 
he remains outside my control. I do not know what community work means exactly 
but if it consists of pestering the village dwellers to adopt European methods of 




 This did not mean that Howman was in principle opposed to the idea of spreading 
knowledge of hygiene and sanitation. Instead, he was opposed to the idea of such work being 
done by an African outside his administrative control. When the Jeanes Teacher Programme 
collapsed, the state introduced another special scheme of to train health assistants (initially 
called hygiene demonstrators). The scheme was inaugurated with the aim of promoting 
preventive community healthcare work, including hygiene and sanitation, disease 
surveillance, vaccination, and environmental health.
59
 The health assistants’ scheme reached 
its apogee in the 1960s, with the Ndanga Unit having a team of ten members. They inspected 
schools, housing, and water supply, rubbish disposal, business premises, investigated 
sickness in homes and outbreaks of epidemics, and also helped people initiate community 
development projects such as the securing of water points.  
 
For instance, in December 1950, A. B. Mashingaidze, a health assistant responsible for 
covering parts of Gutu, broke news of an outbreak of smallpox in the Chitsa area in northern 
Gutu. In a handwritten note to the Government Health Inspector for Fort Victoria province, 
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Mashingaidze noted that, since 25 December 1950, the disease had killed four children of the 
same family, one child from a different family, while four other members were ‘badly 
attacked which will result in death.... As they carry these children the disease is spreading 
because most of these people were not treated due to the fact that medicines got finished ....’
60
 
Mashingaidze was concerned that if urgent action was not taken, ‘these four will die again 




Ostensibly to expand the work of health assistants, in 1966 the Fort Victoria provincial 
medical directorate introduced a community nursing scheme under the auspices of the 
Rhodesia Freedom from Hunger Campaign, a local programme of a United Nations initiative, 
started in 1960. The inauguration in Ndanga of a community nursing scheme also chimed in 
with the general shift towards community development by the Rhodesian state.
62
 For its part, 
the Rhodesian state was also aligning itself with international developmental trends which 
were increasingly foregrounding community development initiatives.   
 
The community-nursing scheme was first introduced in Ndanga, with two partly trained 
community nurses appointed to specialise in home-based maternal and child welfare.
63
 As 
their focus was child nutrition and health, this inevitably entailed dealing with the entire 
home environment, including housing, location of kraals, home gardens, rubbish disposal, 
and food provision. Community nurses particularly targeted homes with newly-born infants, 
and gave lectures and demonstrations on baby feeding, child illness and welfare, food values 
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and cooking, causes of malnutrition and the use of supplementary foods such as powdered 
milk.
64
 Those who were found sick were encouraged to visit the nearest clinic. 
 
The main differences between health assistants and community nurses was that the former 
had a larger remit as their work included the inspection of prospective and existing business 
premises to determine any public health concerns and to inform the authorities accordingly. 
They worked from the Native Commissioner’s compound, but reported to the Government 
Health Inspector. Community nurses focused more on mother-and-child welfare. Their work 
thus involved tracking those homes with expecting mothers and those with recently-born 
babies, conducting child care demonstrations and lecturing on other necessary child care 
issues. In such homes they also spoke about hygiene and sanitation. Community nurses 
mostly worked from local hospitals or clinics, and their arrival coincided with the emergence 
of well-baby clinics. 
 
All these initiatives were good and relevant. However, the focus tended to be on surveillance 
while community development was neglected. As a result, they had limited impact. The noble 
suggestions of the Saint Commission were ignored. A telling example that can be explored 
here is the issue of water development in Gutu. With erratic rainfall and a soil type that is 
‘predominantly coarse-grained sandy loams...with low organic and mineral nutrients...poor 
water retention capacity and friable characteristics that make them susceptible to soil 
erosion’,
65
 Gutu was a likely environment for enteric fevers and gastroenteritis. Available 
sources covering the period under review are replete with reports drawing attention to 
typhoid cases.  
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In 1937, Native Commissioner for Gutu reported that, during hot weather and prior to the 
beginning of the rains, stomach and bowel problems were very prevalent due to the problem 
of water supply.
66
 In 1938, the Native Commissioner again drew attention to the inadequate 
water supply, which precipitated an epidemic of stomach problems and dysentery.
67
 In 1946, 
Mutema School was hit by an epidemic that was only diagnosed as typhoid after 37 serious 
cases had been removed to Ndanga where an examination was done.
68
 Typhoid continued to 
be a menace in Gutu throughout the 1950s, and its widespread existence is confirmed by both 
written documents and oral sources. A key informant revealed that the current tuberculosis 
isolation ward at Gutu Mission Hospital used to be an isolation ward for typhoid cases.
69
 
Although the state continued to blame African communities, it was the state which failed to 
provide safe water sources.  
 
Indeed, the state was guilty of many other omissions. While officials often condemned 
Africans for being filthy, the state also failed dismally to keep its institutions in good 
condition. In 1945, following his sharp criticism of African living habits, the Native 
Commissioner for Bikita had to admit that ‘[I]t is useless, however, preaching to the people 
on improving their conditions when messengers and Government employees are housed in 
dilapidated pole and dagga huts’.
70
 Sending out a similar message, in the late 1950s the two 
health assistants at Ndanga Hospital were reported to be without proper accommodation.
71
 
Moreover, the community nursing programme collapsed within two years of its operation 
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because of funding problems. Over the two years of its operation, the officials had managed 
to recruit and train only three community nurses in total.  
 
In addition to poor housing for state employees, patient housing in the Ndanga Unit was 
always appalling. In Chapter 3, the challenges encountered by Kennedy when he tried to 
improve patient accommodation were discussed at length, which precludes any further 
discussion here. Suffice it to say that during the mid-1940s, Gutu clinic was rocked by patient 
desertions because of the serious infestation of patient housing with ticks that caused 
relapsing fever.
72
 In both Ndanga hospital and Gutu clinic, patient huts had no doors and so 
patients hung cattle hides and sacks over the openings to secure themselves from the 
elements.  
 
In addition to these infrastructural failures, the state and its district representatives also failed 
to collate vital statistics. Anecdotal evidence, patchy statistics and ‘sensationalist’
73
 
generalisations often took the place of accurately collected statistics. With no thorough 
census of Africans undertaken until 1962, assessing the prevalence of disease and the impact 
of medical interventions were bound to remain poor attempts. Up to 1962, the total 
population of Africans was computed through the inadequate method of extrapolation, in 
terms of which the total African population was estimated to be three and a half times the 
number of taxable males. Only taxpayers were enumerated and tracked. Only a few officials 
deplored the exercise openly. Making specific reference to mortality statistics, for instance, 
the Native Commissioner for Gutu, lamented in 1938 that ‘it would appear that apart from tax 
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purposes the present system of native death registration is valueless and should, for the wider 




In similar vein, Garfield Todd, the missionary-turned-politician who later became a Prime 
Minister, complained bitterly in the Legislative Assembly about this slovenly attitude towards 
African statistics. In 1946, in a contribution to the debate on the National Health Service 
Commission Report, Todd taunted the responsible officials, especially the Medical Director, 
Martin, for his inclination towards ‘general statements’ when it came to African healthcare 
issues.
75
 Todd demanded accurate African statistics, as was the case for Europeans.  
 
In addition to patchy vital statistics, surveys were few and were done by the already over-
worked district medical officer. Some of the notable surveys included the 1932 medical 
survey conducted in Gutu to determine the prevalence of leprosy, the 1944 deficiency survey 
in north of Ndanga Reserve to determine cases of beriberi and scurvy and the 1945 deficiency 
survey in Ndanga East Reserve which led to the establishment of Sangwe clinic.
76
 Although 
these surveys did produce some localised results, the overall strategy remained questionable 
because of lack of a comprehensive approach. The surveys led only to curative biomedical 
interventions. Although the development of medical services where there is a need is an 
important aspect of social medicine, the main problem is that such services were bound to 
perform badly in a context where conditions of life were poor. Even the ‘civilising’ gospel 
would not stick in such contexts. The next section will examine how Africans responded to 
some of these initiatives.  
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Several scholars have shown that the colonial project of fostering healthy societies mainly 
through the rulers’ own actions ‘could be challenged, ignored or accepted in part’.
77
 George 
O. Ndege has used the idea of conflict, compromise and accommodation, to illuminate this 
development.
78
 The various public health messages and ideas about sanitation, hygiene and 
nutrition, were domesticated in different ways by different African communities. Social 
status, attitudes and levels of education determined the extent to which community members 
imbibed the new health culture. The gradual adoption of cultures of using cesspits and pit-
latrines, of pasteurising milk and boiling water, of washing with hygienic ‘vanities’ like soap, 
and of entering hospitals and clinics bear testimony to the fact that elements in communities 
took the messages of the healthcare proselytisers seriously. Indeed, some Jeanes Teachers 





In general, though, as the development of healthcare overlapped with other contentious 
colonial social processes and trespassed upon certain indigenous practices, people seem to 
have sampled and adopted mainly those ideas which improved their well-being while not 
clashing with their other hallowed interests. It was not uncommon to hear officials reporting 
that ‘efforts... to teach Africans sanitation and hygiene as preventive measures, achieved 
negligible and discouraging results’.
80
 In 1935, Wilson Mtetwa, the Jeanes Teacher covering 
the Ndanga district, reported having encountered opposition in his community health work. 
The opposition encountered by Mtetwa centred on the placement of cattle enclosures (kraals) 
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which health workers advised should be located far from homes. Although the Africans were 
informed that having kraals nearer to their homesteads brought bovine dirt and flies, they 
were loath to position these kraals far from their huts because of fear of carnivorous animals. 
They argued that it was only by proximity to their domestic animals that they could protect 
them.
81
 Indeed, the 1960s reports of the community nurses in Ndanga made recurrent 




However, it was the public health system’s most stringently enforced interventions such as 
compulsory vaccination, which were met with overt resistance. Documents are replete with 
religious-based forms of resistance, which added to the non-religious forms of resistance. As 
one of the foremost rural epicentres of independent African churches, it is not surprising that 
southeast Fort Victoria was a theatre of religious-based anti-biomedical resistance. 
Independent churches such as Samuel Mutendi’s Zion Christian Church (ZCC) and David 
Masuka’s Zion Apostolic Church emerged in the sub-region in the 1920s,
83
 and popularised 
the alternative discourse of faith healing, which had wide appeal among growing numbers of 
converts who became sceptical of biomedicine. In fact, as M. L. Daneel argues, the 
popularity of these churches owed much to their faith-healing activities: the headquarters of 
the ZCC in Bikita Reserve gained fame as a hospitara (hospital), and more than 200 huts 
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By the 1940s the Zionist churches had spread to Ndanga and Gutu and other districts around 
Fort Victoria. This was a source of concern for officials who initially tried, but failed, to 
proscribe the movement. In 1942, Ndanga’s Native Commissioner noted two challenges that 
faced European medicine: ‘magic’ which contributed in keeping patients at home until 
disease had developed to critical levels, and the followers of the Zionist movement who did 
not believe in biomedicine.
85
 The Native Commissioner, Bikita, expressed a similar concern. 
While noting that free treatment and free rations had contributed considerably to the 
popularity of clinics in his district, he was concerned that ‘the spread of the Zionist cult has... 





During outbreaks of virulent epidemics such as smallpox, officials used threats of prosecution 
to force people to present themselves for vaccination. Reporting on a vaccination campaign in 
Bikita in 1951, the Government Health Inspector noted how ‘attendance at the first lot of 
gatherings was not what it could have been but increased as the news about the prosecutions 
spread’. Forty-eight people were prosecuted for non-attendance and fined between £3 and £5 
each.
87
 Most dissidents came from among the ranks of the Zionist churches. In a 
memorandum to the Provincial Health Inspector, the Secretary of Geo H. Nolan, a mining 
company in Bikita, expressed fear that, during scheduled vaccinations, ‘we may have 
difficulty with certain religious groups on the mine’.
88
 In 1959, in a memorandum to the Fort 
Victoria Provincial Magistrate, the Provincial Medical Officer of Health noted an outbreak of 
smallpox in Bikita Reserve in a locality where most people ‘belong to some faith healing 
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sect, the members of which normally refuse to be vaccinated’. The Magistrate was exhorted 




A similar compulsory vaccination order (CVO) was requested in respect of Gutu following 
an outbreak of smallpox in the north-eastern parts of the district early in 1959. Justifying the 
call for the CVO, the Provincial Government Health Inspector noted that the outbreak took 
place in an area ‘where the majority of inhabitants are faith-healers and for that reason it will 
be essential to have a Compulsory Vaccination Order ... in order to suppress the outbreak’.
90
 
The local magistrate obliged (See a copy of a CVO in Appendix 1). Chief Munyikwa, in 
whose area the outbreak took place, was prosecuted for failing to report the outbreak of the 
outbreak as required by Section 36 of the Public Health Act.
91
 Chiefs were required by law to 
report disease outbreaks under the system of infectious diseases notification. Some chiefs 
obliged, but others did not cooperate. 
 
Likewise, the threat of prosecution did not force ardent Zionist adherents to willingly submit 
to medical officials in times of epidemic outbreaks. Indeed, in 1962, Dzosayi, an ordained 
preacher of the Zion Apostolic Church under Rev. J. D. Masuka, refused to be vaccinated 
during a smallpox vaccination campaign in Bikita. Dzosayi had been found in a church 
service by vaccination teams.
92
 Following this incident of defiance, the overseer of the 
congregation, the Rev. Masuka, was summoned to Fort Victoria to face the jury.
93
 
Unfortunately, there is no reference to the case and its outcome in the available documents. 
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However, the general practice was to impose fines and, in case of religious figures, threats of 
withdrawal of preaching licences were also issued. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the different disease prevention and health promotion strategies that 
were preferred by colonial officials, and explored their weaknesses. It has made it apparent 
that it may be wrong to suggest that public health was virtually non-existent by tracing its 
patchy record and ethnocentric formulation. Indeed, a discernible pattern can be delineated: 
in the 1930s, colonial health officials were still trying to find a foothold for rural public 
health. Thus, rural health promotion and disease prevention, such as they were, tended to fall 
within the amorphous ambit of Jeanes Teacher programme. he 1940s witnessed a shift 
towards the agency of health assistants, which was a more focused cohort of health 
propagandists. From the early 1960s, the concept of community nursing began to appear in 
rural healthcare.  
 
However, under the thin veneer of these changes was a constant thread which played a 
decisive role in determining the direction and quality of public health, and that is, the 
distorting perception that rural sickness was inherently African and therefore there a notion 
that the strategies deployed by the state were either sufficient or undermined by Africans 
themselves. And yet, as this chapter has attempted to show, the state’s methods were 
problematic in their own right, and the conceptualisation of the problem was severely 
defective. The paucity of methods used to survey health conditions and collect vital statistics 
meant that knowledge about the prevalence of disease among the rural Africans remained 
haphazard, subjective and tentative. Moreover, differences in perception about the meaning 
of wellbeing, as shown by clashes between public health officials and Zionists, also 

















The main conclusion of this chapter is that the Ndanga Unit was badly served by the existing 
conception and structure of public health. Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Unit’s medical 
institutions were battling many preventable diseases. Amoebic dysentery, gastro-enteritis, 
various forms of malnutrition-relation diseases such as kwashiorkor and hookworm, among 
others, were some of the major health conditions the Unit was battling with.
94
 Only belatedly, 
under the UN’s Freedom from Hunger Campaign, did the colonial state begin distributing 
seedlings, fertilisers and other ready-made supplements to try and bring down such cases 
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One of the apt reviews of the limitations of colonial biomedicine is that it helped to reproduce 
the ‘very conditions of underdevelopment’ that were the cause of so much ill-health that it set 
out to deal with in the first place.
1
 The story of Ndanga, which has been told from various 
angles in this thesis, seems to fit this candid appraisal. This was one of the greatest ironies of 
colonial healthcare. A recap of some of the major points raised in the thesis might help to re-
establish this point. As the thesis showed in chapter 2, the Ndanga Unit was an offshoot of Dr 
Askins’ medical units scheme which was developed in 1930 to reform the colony’s defective 
healthcare system. In formulating his ideas, Askins was inspired by newly emerging ideas of 
organising health services. The main elements of the scheme were framed from a 
combination of ideas drawn from both the metropole and the colonial world.   
 
However, in what appeared to be a reformative scheme were also sowed the seeds of a 
reactionary, typically colonial programme. What was colonial about Askins’ medical units 
scheme? Firstly, his ideas were premised on the problematic models of imperial scientific 
thought and the emergent germ theory of disease which gave colonial officials the pretext to 
eradicate or, at the very least, to assimilate non-Western therapeutic cultures and practices.
2
 
This thinking was behind Askins’ denigration of indigenous medical practices, including 
midwifery. Secondly, his ideas on the composition and pecking order of the district 
healthcare team enhanced white privilege and undermined African professional advancement. 
Although the many African orderlies who were employed by the Ndanga Unit became vital 
culture and biomedical brokers, as this thesis showed particularly in chapter 5, their 
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professional position was tenuous. They were perceived as Africans first, and then healthcare 
workers, second.  
 
The implementation of the medical units scheme in Fort Victoria by Dr Kennedy further 
illustrated that colonial medicine was a double-edged sword. Although in pioneering the 
Ndanga Unit Dr Kennedy had his own personal vision, he was nonetheless informed by 
Askins’ mandate and the broader developments in biomedical culture and science. To his 
credit, he endeavoured to practice curative medicine in family and community contexts. As 
illustrated in chapter 3 and chapter 4, in addition to making singular efforts to boost the 
popularity of the Ndanga Unit’s institutions – which, as shown by the increasing patient 
numbers, paid dividends – Dr Kennedy also acted as an advocate for the disenfranchised 
communities when the state’s commitment showed signs of faltering. To a larger extent, the 
Ndanga Unit survived because of his commitment to Askins’ vision.  
 
However, colonial medical practice was always a complex mix of contradictory motives and 
strategies as the doctor was both a professional and a coloniser, as Fanon aptly observed.
3
 
Working among exoticised African communities, colonial doctors tended to dabble in 
amateur ethnography and the civilising agenda, often perceiving themselves as bearers of 
light in a dark world. Colonial and cultural encounters cast medicine in an evangelical and 
civilising role.
4
 Indeed, Kennedy saw himself as being engaged in a civilising mission. His 
sarcastic self-presentation in his memoirs as a ‘bundu bone thrower’ tells us all about his 
motivations. His practice was premised on the paternalistic and evolutionist tendencies of 
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biomedical civilisation. At the tail end of his career he was trapped in an outdated medical 
practice and presided over a sprawling medical slum. 
 
But as one of the foremost critics of colonialism and colonial medicine, Fanon, also admitted, 
biomedicine is not inherently bad as it essentially concerns itself with man’s health and relief 
of pain.
5
 Yet, it was the innovative edge of biomedicine and its ability to structure society in 
new ways which unfortunately helped to drive colonial medical ethnocentrism. Many of the 
therapeutic and preventive victories achieved by biomedicine were undermined by the 
retrogressive ethnocentric attitudes and the arrogance of colonial public health officials and 
practitioners. Public health reforms that threatened the racial order of colonial society and 
white privilege were given scant attention; while other potentially useful policies were 
pursued piecemeal through racially informed biomedical policies, discourses and practices, as 
shown in chapter 7. Under Kennedy’s watch, therefore, the Ndanga Unit did not do much 
beyond the provision of medical services to rural communities on very liberal terms. But this 
problem was not solely a personal one. Rather, it was a systemic issue. 
 
With these considerations in mind, the main conclusion of this thesis is that, seen through the 
perspective of the Ndanga Unit, colonial biomedicine seems to have had a double, if not 
multiple, identity. It was a dynamic tension between innovative and retrogressive impulses. 
Although due care has to be taken not to retrospectively rationalise and sanitise what might 
look farsighted to us today,
6
 allowing the vocabulary of an innovative biomedicine to partly 
inform our analysis is important in that it helps us to separate contemporary approaches from 
inherent racism. Also, it is useful to appreciate the historical dynamism of biomedicine as an 
                                                 
5
 Fanon, A Dying Colonialism, p. 121. 
6
 Miriam S. Chaiken, ‘Primary Health Care Initiatives in Colonial Kenya’, World Development, vol. 26, no. 9 
















autonomous body of knowledge.
7
 The partial autonomy of biomedicine can help us to 
understand the schisms between Dr Kennedy and officials from the Public Health 
Department, addressed mainly in chapter 3 and 4.  
 
In this thesis, the complex, multiple identity of colonial biomedicine was pinned down not 
only through a close interrogation of the motives and strategies of the public health officials 
and medical practitioners alone, but also more importantly by taking a cue from the actions of 
the African communities and patients. Africans critiqued, partially rejected and partially 
embraced biomedicine – all at once. Chapter 6 on patient experiences caps this important 
observation that essentially runs through all the sections of this thesis. Therefore, a caveat has 
to be issued here that a total rejection or total embrace of the Ndanga Unit as a model of 
colonial healthcare negates the actions of the people who were served by it. This is one of the 
major methodological innovations of this thesis.  
 
It may be useful to also close by reiterating an important point discussed in the introduction, 
which point reinforces what has been said above, that in reality colonial healthcare was a 
tension between broader colonial ambitions and the routine interests of the different 
stakeholders involved in the delivery and consumption of healthcare services. The Ndanga 
Unit emerged as a model scheme but ended up as what others called a medical slum because 
the broader imperatives of colonialism in healthcare interacted with, and were both enhanced 
and challenged by quotidian individual interests, community views and governmental 
procedures. 
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 In other words, although as part of the broader ‘native question’ and the colonial 
developmental agenda the rural healthcare question seemed imperative, progress on the 
ground depended on availability of funds, the enthusiasm of those responsible for the 
implementation of policy and the cooperation of local communities. While the state was on 
the offensive targeting Africans for urgent healthcare provision as the latter were considered 
to be a public health nuisance, as illustrated in chapter 3, many of the facilities ended up 
being constructed by the pluralistic-minded Africans themselves as they required such 
services in their communities.  
 
Clearly, the intentions of the state were ambiguous and capabilities limited, although the 
rhetoric suggested otherwise. In evaluating colonial healthcare initiatives, a sharp eye must be 
kept on these ambiguities. As Chaiken has noted, ‘while many colonial medical officers 
expressed sincere dedication to improving the welfare of the African masses, colonial 
policies sought to eradicate “backwardness” and to “elevate” the African masses, making 
such approaches as improving the sanitation and public education an appealing blend of 
preventive medicine and paternalistic haughtiness’.
8
 Fresh histories of colonial medicine 
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Pl1!3LIC HEALTH Aar (CHru-"""'TER 14!J) of' 
SOVI'fBRN RHODESIA . 
Compulsory Vaccination :("or smallpox 
Gutu Native District . 
Y/HEREAS t here is an occurr'ence of' SJ-!..AL:LR:)X in the Gutu Native 
Reserve , Victoria District : 
IN m.Y capacity as l ocal authority for t h e rural a reas of' the 
Victoria Magisterial District and in terms of' section 76 (b ) of' 
the Public Heal. th Act (Chapter 1 ~JJ) of' Southern Rhroesia . as amen:led 
and adapted. I hereby require all. persons within the area dof'inecl in. 
the Sched.ul.e to atterrl at centres accordi ng 1..0 inst :rt.1ctions issued by 
the Director of" Medical Services f'or Southern Rhodesia of' the Federal 
Ministry of' Health and to undergo inspection, v accination or re-
vaccination as circumstances requi~re . 
Dat ed at FORT VICTOPJA this 2 nd day of' Y!..ARCli: , 1 959 , 
SCP".i:DULE • 
















Appendix 2: A Collection of Photographs 
 
 
2(a): Medical Directors: Andrew P. Martin (Askins’ successor), Andrew M. Fleming 
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